diff --git a/convert-anystyle-data/anystyle-to-simple-json.ipynb b/convert-anystyle-data/anystyle-to-simple-json.ipynb
index a5ebe56d7208272c8af216d3fe6c9425619d1fba..753b916f3f9f36051cfbcf6d85d941ee641f7936 100644
--- a/convert-anystyle-data/anystyle-to-simple-json.ipynb
+++ b/convert-anystyle-data/anystyle-to-simple-json.ipynb
@@ -9,8 +9,8 @@
{
"metadata": {
"ExecuteTime": {
- "end_time": "2024-07-12T15:57:59.317356Z",
- "start_time": "2024-07-12T15:57:59.198914Z"
+ "end_time": "2024-07-15T09:25:32.594541Z",
+ "start_time": "2024-07-15T09:25:32.464600Z"
}
},
"cell_type": "code",
@@ -18,7 +18,6 @@
"import xml.etree.ElementTree as ET\n",
"import json\n",
"import regex as re\n",
- "import string\n",
"import glob\n",
"import os\n",
"\n",
@@ -26,17 +25,28 @@
" tree = ET.parse(input_xml_path)\n",
" root = tree.getroot()\n",
"\n",
- " with open(output_jsonl_path, 'w', encoding='utf-8') as f:\n",
+ " with (open(output_jsonl_path, 'w', encoding='utf-8') as f):\n",
" for sequence in root.findall('sequence'):\n",
" output = []\n",
" for element in sequence:\n",
" for tag in tags:\n",
+ " fn = None\n",
" if type(tag) is tuple:\n",
" tag, fn = tag\n",
" if element.tag == tag:\n",
" value = fn(element.text) if callable(fn) else element.text\n",
- " if len(output) == 0 or tag in output[-1]:\n",
- " output.append({}) \n",
+ " is_new_ref = (len(output) == 0 # if no refs yet\n",
+ " or tag == \"citation-number\" \n",
+ " or tag in output[-1] # or tag already exists\n",
+ " or (tag in [\"author\", \"editor\", \"authority\", \"legal-ref\"] and 'date' in output[-1])) # or a creator field follows a date field \n",
+ " if is_new_ref:\n",
+ " output.append({})\n",
+ " # add citation number from previous citation \n",
+ " if len(output) > 1 and 'citation-number' in tags and tag != \"citation-number\" and 'citation-number' in output[-2]:\n",
+ " output[-1]['citation-number'] = output[-2]['citation-number']\n",
+ " # merge tags\n",
+ " if tag == \"authority\":\n",
+ " tag = \"author\" \n",
" output[-1][tag] = value\n",
" if len(output) > 0:\n",
" instance = {\n",
@@ -46,19 +56,20 @@
" f.write(json.dumps(instance) + '\\n')\n",
"\n",
"def remove_punctuation(text):\n",
- " punctuation = set(string.punctuation)\n",
" start, end = 0, len(text)\n",
- " while start < len(text) and text[start] in punctuation:\n",
+ " while start < len(text) and re.match(\"\\p{P}\", text[start]) and text[start] not in \")]\":\n",
" start += 1\n",
- " while end > start and text[end - 1] in punctuation:\n",
+ " while end > start and re.match(\"\\p{P}\", text[end - 1]) and text[end - 1] not in \")]\":\n",
" end -= 1\n",
" return text[start:end].strip()\n",
"\n",
"def clean_editor(text):\n",
- " return remove_punctuation(re.sub(r'hrsg\\. v\\.|hg\\. v|hrsg|ed\\.|eds\\.|in:', '', text, flags=re.IGNORECASE))\n",
+ " text = re.sub(r'în:? ?', '', text.strip(), flags=re.IGNORECASE)\n",
+ " text = re.sub(r'hrsg\\. v\\.|hg\\. v|hrsg|ed\\.|eds\\.', '', text, flags=re.IGNORECASE)\n",
+ " return remove_punctuation(text)\n",
"\n",
"def clean_container(text):\n",
- " return remove_punctuation(re.sub(r'in:|aus:|from:', '', text, flags=re.IGNORECASE))\n",
+ " return remove_punctuation(re.sub(r'^(in|aus|from)(:| )', '', text.strip(), flags=re.IGNORECASE))\n",
" \n",
"def extract_year(text): \n",
" m = re.search( r'[12][0-9]{3}', text)\n",
@@ -66,21 +77,36 @@
"\n",
"for input_file in glob.glob('in/*.xml'):\n",
" base_name = os.path.basename(input_file)\n",
- " output_file = f'out/{os.path.splitext(base_name)[0]}-simple.jsonl'\n",
+ " output_file = f'out/{os.path.splitext(base_name)[0]}.jsonl'\n",
+ " print(f'Processing {input_file}')\n",
" xml_to_jsonl(input_file, output_file, [\n",
+ " 'citation-number',\n",
" (\"author\", remove_punctuation),\n",
" (\"editor\", clean_editor),\n",
" (\"authority\", remove_punctuation),\n",
" (\"title\", remove_punctuation),\n",
+ " (\"legal-ref\", remove_punctuation),\n",
" (\"container-title\", clean_container),\n",
" (\"journal\", clean_container),\n",
- " (\"date\", extract_year)\n",
+ " (\"date\", extract_year),\n",
+ " (\"backref\", remove_punctuation)\n",
" ])\n",
"\n"
],
"id": "f101a4e2408d6313",
- "outputs": [],
- "execution_count": 30
+ "outputs": [
+ {
+ "name": "stdout",
+ "output_type": "stream",
+ "text": [
+ "Processing in\\10.1111_1467-6478.00057.xml\n",
+ "Processing in\\10.1111_1467-6478.00080.xml\n",
+ "Processing in\\10.1515_zfrs-1980-0103.xml\n",
+ "Processing in\\10.1515_zfrs-1980-0104.xml\n"
+ ]
+ }
+ ],
+ "execution_count": 53
},
{
"metadata": {},
diff --git a/convert-anystyle-data/in/10.1111_1467-6478.00057.ttx b/convert-anystyle-data/in/10.1111_1467-6478.00057.ttx
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..801b4f56b3f3913509428864a4ce7099e61d3e0a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/convert-anystyle-data/in/10.1111_1467-6478.00057.ttx
@@ -0,0 +1,887 @@
+meta | JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIETY
+ | VOLUME 24, NUMBER 4, DECEMBER 1997
+ | ISSN: 0263–323X, pp. 486–503
+blank |
+ |
+ |
+title | The Judicial Gendering of Citizenship: A Look at Property
+ | Interests During Marriage
+blank |
+ |
+author | MARGARET THORNTON*
+blank |
+ |
+text | INTRODUCTION: ACTIVE AND PASSIVE CITIZENS
+blank |
+text | Within the international community, the meaning of citizenship is
+ | determined by difference. It is only through the notion of non-citizenship,
+ | or ‘other’, that ‘the citizen’ acquires meaning. In this way, ‘we’ are
+ | distinguished from ‘them’. The legal meaning is assumed to be of most
+ | significance at the borders, that is, at the points of entry into and exit from
+ | the state – where passports and visas are the relevant signifiers of status.
+ | Within national communities, the concept of citizenship is invoked to draw
+ | a mantle of sameness over those deemed to be members of the community.
+ | Liberal theory expects the particularities of difference that characterize the
+ | self to be sloughed off. In one sense, there is a positive communal dimension
+ | associated with the suppression of the self and the erasure of particularity,
+ | but this carapace of universalism also serves a convenient purpose within
+ | liberalism because it denies difference. However, as Anne Phillips points out,
+ | citizenship is fundamentally a political category that cannot address the
+ | inequalities of the social and economic spheres.1 Corporeal differences,
+ | including sex, colour, sexual orientation, disability, and age are unseeable
+ | within the universal public realm with which citizenship theory is concerned.
+ | Status differences, such as marriage and parenthood, which disproportionately
+ | affect women, are even more elusive. Despite the declining social significance
+ | of marriage, the observation of Teresa Brennan and Carole Pateman two
+ | decades ago that ‘[w]omen, more specifically married women, constitute a
+ | permanent embarrassment and problem for liberal political theory’2 is still
+ | relevant, as I propose to demonstrate.
+ | In Anglophone societies, it is tacitly assumed that the benchmark citizen
+ | is a white, Anglo-Celtic, heterosexual, able-bodied, middle-class man, for it
+blank |
+affiliation | * School of Law and Legal Studies, La Trobe University, Melbourne, Vic.3083, Australia
+blank |
+acknowledge | Paper presented at Citizenship, Accountability and Law Conference, China University of
+ | Political Science and Law, Beijing, December 1996. I would like to express my thanks to Paula
+ | Baron for reading the manuscript and making helpful comments.
+blank |
+meta | 486
+blank |
+meta | © Blackwell Publishers Ltd 1997, 108 Cowley Road, Oxford OX4 1JF, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA
+text | is he who has historically dominated political life. Traditionally, only he had
+ | the right to vote and to represent others.3 When the issue of women is raised,
+ | particularly if Aboriginal, lesbian, disabled or working class, the notion of
+ | citizenship is immediately challenged; there is a dissonance between ‘woman’
+ | and ‘citizen’ that disturbs the would-be universal.4 As the benchmark citizen
+ | has constructed normativity in his own image, he has been able to claim a
+ | monopoly over rationality, objectivity, and non-partisanship: characteristics
+ | deemed appropriate for the management of property, and for decision
+ | making in the public sphere. To enhance the norm, the ‘other’ is associated
+ | with the antithesis of these positive characteristics. Women, regardless of
+ | their personal attributes, have been constructed as non-rational, emotional
+ | and partial: characteristics which are inappropriate for the management of
+ | property, and corrosive of the claimed universality of citizenship.5
+ | To illuminate the gendered distinction between the benchmark citizen and
+ | the ‘other’ which has been camouflaged by the cloak of universalism, I turn
+ | to the philosopher, Immanuel Kant, who drew a distinction between active
+ | and passive citizenship.6 He assigned to the active category all propertied
+ | men of independent means. To the passive category, he assigned all women
+ | and any men who depended on others for their support. Because their
+ | dependency denied them legal personality, Kant described women and
+ | dependent men as ‘mere subsidiaries of the commonwealth’. While there is
+ | a class distinction fracturing the category ‘men’ so that some are assigned
+ | to the active side and others to the passive, Kant assigned all women to the
+ | passive side, regardless of class. This active/passive binarism has contributed
+ | to a discourse of gendered specificity within citizenship, underpinned by the
+ | fact that men’s active citizenship has been contingent on women’s
+ | subordination.7 Historically, the status of men as heads of households enabled
+ | them to engage in public affairs because their wives engaged in the necessary
+ | roles of production and reproduction. Thus, Fraser and Gordon suggest
+ | that coverture (whereby a woman lost her legal personality on marriage at
+ | common law) should be understood as ‘a modern phenomenon that helped
+ | constitute civil citizenship’.8
+ | With the disintegration of feudalism, marriage alone ‘retained some of
+ | the peculiar attributes of feudal bondage’.9 Marriage vitiated all civil rights
+ | for women, including the denial of legal personality.10 The control exercised
+ | by the husband over the body of his wife was designed to ensure sexual
+ | fidelity and the legitimacy of children. The control, therefore, was linked
+ | with the patrilineal transmission of property, which constituted the backbone
+ | of civil society. Vogel points out that all the prominent thinkers of classical
+ | liberalism connect the preservation of civil society with the harmonious
+ | transmission of property along family lineages.11 An understanding of the
+ | crucial social role of marriage, therefore, goes some way towards explaining
+ | why modernization of the status of marriage has been retarded and why
+ | civil citizenship for women, particularly married women, continues to be
+ | problematic.
+blank |
+meta | 487
+blank |
+meta | © Blackwell Publishers Ltd 1997
+text | Although the boundary between the benchmark, or active, citizen and the
+ | ‘other’, or passive citizen, is not rigid, the very process of resisting the
+ | binarism may paradoxically reify both normativity and otherness, as noted
+ | in the Foucauldian analysis of Frigga Haug:
+ | All objects and human beings exist within relations of power; even those who resist, who
+ | set their faces against what appear to be the norm (homosexuals, to take one example),
+ | participate in the production of the norm in the very act of opposing it, by allowing the
+ | norm to be articulated against its abnormal opposite.12
+blank |
+text | There is, therefore, an inevitable downside associated with the interrogation
+ | of conventional gendered binarisms because it risks reproducing active
+ | images of masculinity and passive images of femininity. Like Bottomley, I
+ | reject a simplistic structural argument that ‘power relations are simply about
+ | men holding power to the detriment of women’.13 Nevertheless, we are all
+ | inescapably caught by the viscous strands of power: ‘human subjects are so
+ | deeply penetrated and constituted by powerful social institutions that there
+ | is no “subject†outside power to resist it’.14 Regardless of this insight, liberal
+ | legalism operates as though blanched of power, and agents of legality –
+ | judges, lawyers, and academics – present themselves as neutral conduits of
+ | legal authority. I propose to show how the judiciary uses its power to
+ | produce conventionally gendered citizens within a rational and objective
+ | cloak of doctrinalism. Legal method is accepted as neutral and authoritative,
+ | not only by the relevant legal hermeneutic community but by the wider
+ | community as well.15 Of course, the authoritative pronouncements of the
+ | judiciary do not operate in a vacuum, but tend to mirror and instantiate the
+ | more conservative views of society.
+blank |
+ |
+text | THE ERASURE OF HER WILL
+blank |
+text | Freedom of contract was the significant marker of the transition from
+ | feudalism to modernity, or from ‘status to contract’,16 in the West. Freedom
+ | of contract, as its emergence from the sixteenth century onwards suggests,
+ | also facilitated commerce and the development of capitalism.17 While
+ | freedom of contract, or contractualism, became the norm for commercial
+ | life, it did not transform marriage, despite the fact that a specialised family
+ | law was one of the significant common law developments of the nineteenth
+ | century.18 Instead, marriage retained significant characteristics of status,19 in
+ | respect of which it was assumed that the conditions were non-negotiable. I
+ | do not wish to suggest that marriage has not changed,20 but that change has
+ | been retarded because of assumptions attaching to marriage as a status.
+ | The marriage contract itself is a very curious form of contract that
+ | contains both status and contractual elements. Carole Pateman argues
+ | that the distinctive element of the marriage contract is not the absence of a
+ | written contract or of a signature, but the sex act.21 The sex act was not
+ | conceptualized as an act of mutuality at common law, but an act in which
+blank |
+meta | 488
+blank |
+meta | © Blackwell Publishers Ltd 1997
+text | the husband had the use of the body of the wife.22 That the wife’s will was
+ | vitiated on marriage is illustrated by the fact that a husband was immune
+ | from prosecution for the rape of a wife until relatively recently.23 Indeed,
+ | sexual intercourse is still an essential element in the constitution of a valid
+ | marriage and the parties cannot simply agree to dispense with it.24 The
+ | consummation requirement illustrates the idea of marriage as a status, for
+ | the requirement is implicit and non-negotiable.
+ | Contract law has been primarily concerned with economic exchange in
+ | the market.25 The contract to marry has not traditionally included the
+ | freedom of the parties to determine legally enforceable terms in accordance
+ | with this model of exchange. Although the parties may draw up a pre-nuptial
+ | agreement specifying the conditions of the marriage, such agreements are
+ | still not legally enforceable under Anglo-Australian law,26 although no longer
+ | void as contrary to public policy in the United States of America.27 ‘Nuptial
+ | contractualism’ has been steadfastly resisted for what one nineteenth-century
+ | American social reformer referred to as the ‘undue assertion of the rights
+ | of the individual at the expense of the rights of society’.28 What these ‘rights’
+ | are is uncertain, but it has been tacitly accepted that there is a public good
+ | in ensuring the perpetuation of monogamous heterosexual marriage. Even
+ | after married women first secured the right to initiate suit in their own right,
+ | courts shied away from enforcing marital agreements, including those of an
+ | economic nature, breached by husbands.
+ | Balfour v. Balfour,29 particularly the judgment of Lord Atkin, has retained
+ | an extraordinary currency in Anglo-Australian jurisprudence for almost
+ | eighty years. In an action by a wife relating to the breach of a maintenance
+ | agreement by her husband, the court found that the constituent elements of
+ | a contract were missing: there was no consideration other than ‘natural love
+ | and affection’ and the husband and wife lacked an ‘intention’ to enter into
+ | legally binding relations. Most significantly, the family was held to be a
+ | domain of privacy in which ‘the King’s writ does not seek to run’. Freeman,
+ | in exposing the weaknesses of these arguments, exhorts a rethink of the
+ | judicial attempt to impose a commercial model of contract in view of the
+ | reality of the trends towards private ordering in domestic relations.30
+ | Ironically, the courts long recognized a cause of action in contract if the
+ | promise to marry were breached, although it has now generally been
+ | abolished.31 Although the action for breach of promise was regarded as
+ | analogous with a commercial breach of contract, it was invariably instituted
+ | by women against men.32 A significant number of such actions were
+ | instituted by Australian women after enfranchisement in the early decades
+ | of the twentieth century. While breach-of-promise actions appear to constitute
+ | evidence of women possessing legal personality and exercising free will in
+ | accordance with the Kantian notion of active citizenship, the ‘will’ theory
+ | of contract was conceptualized in masculinist terms so that the contract to
+ | marry was ‘less binding on women who entered agreements than men’.33
+ | Hence, men were more likely to be held responsible for a breach than women
+blank |
+meta | 489
+blank |
+meta | © Blackwell Publishers Ltd 1997
+text | who, with their rational failings, could be expected to change their minds.
+ | Breach-of-promise suits placed a responsibility on men to ensure that
+ | marriage took place and to ensure that sex was properly confined to
+ | monogamous heterosex. Beyond this, the law evinced little interest in the
+ | substance of an ongoing marriage.
+ | The reforms that have been effected to give women ‘equal rights’ in the
+ | public sphere have deflected attention away from the residual status of
+ | marriage. Indeed, indivisibility of the union was frequently raised as a
+ | justification for opposing reforms intended to improve the status of women
+ | during first-wave feminism. For example, one of the reasons for opposing
+ | the vote for women was that they already exercised it – through men.34
+ | Arguments about the primacy of marriage for women were also used to
+ | delimit their participation in the professions.35 Today, strategies such as
+ | paying women less than men ensure that marriage remains both an economic
+ | and an unequal relationship.36 A neutral veneer of legal rules has been
+ | invoked as part of a complex technology of gender in order to ensure that
+ | masculinity and heterosexuality retain their privileged status.
+blank |
+ |
+text | TELLING TALES OF EQUITY
+blank |
+text | I wish to show how assumptions of indivisibility between married couples
+ | continue to be produced within legal sites today, despite the prevailing
+ | rhetoric of equality and the recognition of separate property regimes.37 I
+ | illustrate my thesis by reference to a series of cases relating to real property
+ | that are not easily subsumed within the conventional categories of ‘property’
+ | or ‘family law’ because they deal with the interests of third parties, usually
+ | creditors. One party is the sole owner of the property but, if it is the wife,
+ | her interest may be trivialized or dismissed by bankers, lawyers, and judges.
+ | In the conceptually more interesting cases, the husband is the legal owner
+ | of the property, and the wife seeks to argue that she is entitled to an equitable
+ | interest based on her unacknowledged years of service as a wife. While the
+ | initiation of cases of this kind underscore attempts to disrupt the gendered
+ | active/passive binarism, the institutional responses simultaneously legitimize
+ | existing power relations with the assistance of the authoritative voice of
+ | law.38 I argue that the positioning of the wife as ‘the other’ to the ‘natural’
+ | subject of law, the husband, continues to detract from the ability of wives
+ | to be accepted as full citizens.39
+ | All of the cases I focus on arose in New South Wales, which has legislation
+ | devoted to revisiting unjust or unconscionable contracts,40 although the
+ | particular issues spill over into the uncertain terrain of equity and the
+ | common law. All of the cases were heard by the New South Wales Court
+ | of Appeal, and are of particular interest because of the inchoate recognition
+ | that an assumption of indivisibility poses an impediment to a wife’s
+ | personhood. In fact, only Kirby P. (now of the Australian High Court) was
+blank |
+meta | 490
+blank |
+meta | © Blackwell Publishers Ltd 1997
+text | prepared to challenge orthodoxy. All of the cases date from the 1990s which
+ | I draw to the reader’s attention because it is commonly assumed that formal
+ | equality between the sexes has been attained.
+ | The concern with property may suggest a middle-class bias, but ownership
+ | of the family home is a working-class, as well as a middle-class norm,
+ | particularly in Australia. A focus on ‘private’ property also suggests an
+ | Anglocentric bias, but I am highlighting the inter-relationship between property,
+ | benchmark men, and active citizenship. ‘Others’, whether they be women
+ | and/or Aboriginal people, are perennially placed in the situation of having
+ | to contest rights to property and citizenship. Property is not some effete
+ | patriarchal concept, for it continues to be symbolically central to liberty and
+ | individual autonomy within liberal societies.41 The noted political theorist,
+ | C.B. Macpherson, goes further in his assertion that the ‘concept of man [sic]
+ | is clearly inextricable from a concept of property’.42
+blank |
+text | 1. Indivisibility and liability
+blank |
+text | Cases dealing with what has been termed ‘sexually transmitted debt’ (STD)43
+ | or ‘emotionally transmitted debt’ (ETD)44 in which women have been
+ | pressured to assume responsibility for the debts of their partners, and/or
+ | other family members, are familiar, although there has been an increase in
+ | the number of cases in which women have challenged the imposition of
+ | liability.45 The wife is frequently a silent partner in a family business,
+ | although not intimately involved in its management. She may have been
+ | unaware of the significance of the documents she has signed or there may
+ | have been fraud or deception on the part of the husband or partner. The
+ | fraud cases are more likely to succeed in an unconscionability action than
+ | one based on undue influence.46
+ | Beneath the seemingly neutral veneer of legal doctrinalism, judges have
+ | tended to depict wives as passive, ill-informed and obedient to the will of
+ | their partners, values that are corrosive of the notion of active citizenship.47
+ | However, the construction of a more companionate and equal relationship
+ | has not necessarily redounded to the benefit of wives when confronted by
+ | the interests of creditors, for the creditors are invariably given priority as a
+ | matter of policy.48 Indeed, the legal presumption that a wife who acts as
+ | guarantor for her husband occupies a position of special disadvantage
+ | because she is under pressure from her husband no longer prevails in
+ | Australia.49 The wife is assumed to be fully cognisant of the legal implications
+ | flowing from her signature, even if she is unaware of the circumstances
+ | surrounding the debt. While the stereotyping of all wives as disadvantaged
+ | is disabling, the ‘equality of women’ argument may also be indirectly
+ | disabling in the STD context, for it does not distinguish between the interests
+ | of women as separate individuals and their husbands vis-Ã -vis corporate
+ | creditors. Thus it is somewhat ironic that a contemporary liberal equality
+ | argument is being used to reproduce an outdated notion of Kantian passivity
+blank |
+meta | 491
+blank |
+meta | © Blackwell Publishers Ltd 1997
+text | for women. The overwhelming significance of the interests of corporate
+ | capital, particularly the role of financial institutions, has exerted pressure to
+ | retain the presumption of indivisibility.
+ | I will begin with a fraud case, for it reveals how widespread are assumptions
+ | of wifely passivity. In Mercantile Mutual Life Insurance v. Gosper,50 the
+ | husband forged the wife’s signature to increase substantially the mortgage
+ | over her home. A cheque was drawn in favour of the wife and paid into a
+ | company controlled by her husband. The sum was then withdrawn by him.
+ | The fraud on the wife came to light only on the death of the husband.
+ | While two of the three judges agreed that the wife’s equitable interest
+ | should be enforced as a result of the forgery, the derisory way in which the
+ | wife was treated by the insurance company, the law firm, and the bank (all
+ | of which had unquestioningly accepted the authority of the husband)
+ | highlights the fragility of active citizenship for wives. The husband, a
+ | barrister, was automatically assigned active citizenship status. The wife, even
+ | though she was the registered owner of the property, was assigned no status
+ | other than that of the passive subject, that is, ‘his wife’.51 Kirby P. was the
+ | one judge to question this assignation:
+ | One can see at work in the facts of this case the remnants of an attitude to a wife, as a
+ | mere extension of the husband’s property and financial interests. (p. 35)
+blank |
+text | Meagher J.A. (dissenting) acknowledged the forgery but adopted a formalistic
+ | approach to the registration of the mortgage, which masked the way in
+ | which the wife’s legal personality had been erased.
+ | In Morris v. Wardley Australian Property Management Limited,52 the
+ | question of the severability of the wife’s interests arose as a result of a
+ | guarantee in respect of a company that collapsed. In this case, there was no
+ | forgery because the wife was alleged to have executed a power of attorney
+ | in favour of the husband who had then signed a guarantee on behalf of
+ | them both. However, the wife sought to argue that she was not liable because
+ | she knew nothing about the business and had dutifully signed every
+ | document that her husband put before her, as she herself testified:
+ | My practice has been that if Theo has asked me to sign a document then I would sign
+ | it without question’. (p. 58,818)
+blank |
+text | Perhaps unsurprisingly, the wife’s argument as to severability was
+ | unsuccessful.53 Evidence of neither undue influence nor unconscionability
+ | was formally established in respect of the power of attorney. The strict legal
+ | presumption that one should not go behind a signature freely given
+ | effectively obscures the peculiarly gendered assumptions that continue to
+ | underpin marriage and that are bolstered by judicial authority.
+ | Kirby P. (dissenting) elaborated upon the argument he articulated in
+ | Gosper that a wife can no longer be regarded as the ‘mere legal appendage
+ | of her husband’ (p. 58,814). He stressed that the wife had the basis for a
+ | defence arising from her separate position and should not have been held
+ | jointly liable for an indemnity agreement she did not execute. She had
+blank |
+meta | 492
+blank |
+meta | © Blackwell Publishers Ltd 1997
+text | received no separate legal advice and was disadvantaged by the assumption
+ | that she should guarantee her husband’s obligations merely because she was
+ | his wife (p. 58,819).
+ | The view of Kirby P. that the interests of the wife might be severed from
+ | that of her husband won little favour with the other judges. Although
+ | Mahoney J.A. agreed that ‘it would be a mistake if courts treated wives who
+ | asserted their separate status as nothing more than the alter egos of their
+ | husbands’ (p. 58,820), he saw no reason to overturn the assessment of the
+ | wife’s evidence by the primary judge. Meagher J.A. was sceptical that the
+ | wife was ignorant about the business and signed everything put in front of
+ | her by her husband. If she did, he saw that as a positive act. As he acerbically
+ | put it: ‘commendable marital obedience to one’s husband has not yet
+ | blossomed into a legal or an equitable defence’ (p. 58,821). Indeed, the stance
+ | of Meagher J.A. reminds us that the shadow of coverture has not entirely
+ | receded.
+ | A variation of Gosper and Morris arose in Gough v. Commonwealth Bank
+ | of Australia,54 in which the majority judges, Mahoney J.A. and Meagher
+ | J.A., found against the wife’s separate interests. As in Gosper, the wife was
+ | the sole owner of the family home, which she had brought into the marriage.
+ | With her husband, she was director of a tyre business, although her actual
+ | role in the business was minimal. Indeed, the evidence revealed that she had
+ | a very limited education and did not read very well. She had nevertheless
+ | signed a mortgage over her home without the benefit of legal advice. The
+ | business collapsed and the bank sought to foreclose on the mortgage. Ms
+ | Gough then claimed that she did not know that the property was mortgaged.
+ | The question was whether the lack of independent legal advice at the time
+ | of the signing of the mortgage made its foreclosure unjust. The majority
+ | found that it did not.
+ | Mahoney J.A. was prepared to accept the evidence of the bank manager
+ | rather than that of the husband and wife regarding the casual manner in
+ | which the mortgage was signed. He found it ‘unlikely that he [the bank
+ | manager] would have had a mortgage signed by a mortgagor in such a way
+ | that she did not know that what she was signing was a mortgage’ (p. 58,852).
+ | Meagher J.A. also placed more faith in the socially authoritative voice of
+ | the bank manager and in the formal weight of the wife’s signature. He was
+ | sceptical about Ms Gough’s limited understanding: ‘the plaintiff may not
+ | be extremely sophisticated or well-lettered, but she is no gaping rustic’ [my
+ | italics] (p. 58,856). (In this case, the classism is as disturbing as the sexism.)
+ | Kirby P. (dissenting) again challenged the fact that ‘some women are still
+ | treated by some financial institutions as appendages of their husbands’ (p.
+ | 58,843). In fact, the transcript of the primary hearing suggests that the
+ | husband himself treated his wife as an appendage:
+ | Q: But it was her home as well?
+ | H: Yes, that is right.
+ | Q: And indeed, it was her house, but that was a matter which you discussed with her?
+blank |
+meta | 493
+blank |
+meta | © Blackwell Publishers Ltd 1997
+text | H: No it wasn’t . . .
+ | Q: And you told (Mr Rule) [the bank manager] the house would be available?
+ | H: Yes
+ | Q: Did you tell him your wife would agree to that?
+ | H: She would just sign it because I would just ask her to sign (p. 58,838).
+blank |
+text | As with Morris, Gough clearly reveals how marriage can operate to
+ | diminish the legal personhood of a wife; no other legal proprietor would be
+ | similarly treated. I am not suggesting that obtaining independent legal advice
+ | would necessarily have resolved the problem, for lawyers have been no more
+ | solicitous of the financial and property interests of women in intimate
+ | relationships with men than husbands, bank managers or judges, even if the
+ | wives are their clients, as Gosper reveals. What I am suggesting is that the
+ | failure to recommend independent legal advice underscored the presumption
+ | of indivisibility of the wife’s interests.55
+blank |
+text | 2. Indivisibility and affectivity
+blank |
+text | Registration of the family property in the husband’s name alone reflects his
+ | traditional role as paterfamilias in separate property regimes. This situation
+ | has been destabilized by recent attempts to argue that the wife has an
+ | equitable interest that should be legally recognized. There are two strands
+ | to the equity argument. The first is that because the wife has contributed to
+ | the value of the property in a material way (for example, by working on the
+ | farm or effecting home improvements), it would be unjust for the husband
+ | to enrich himself at his wife’s expense.56 The second, and the more radical
+ | idea, is that the wife’s interest in the property should be recognized because
+ | the ability of the husband to earn income has been predicated on the wife
+ | undertaking the conventional role of carer and homemaker.57 For the
+ | purposes of my argument regarding active citizenship, it is also apparent
+ | that the husband’s acquisition of wealth and property has enabled him to
+ | acquire social capital within the market and civil society which has translated
+ | into active citizenship for him, but not for his wife. The legal recognition of
+ | the non-financial contributions of the wife is now well accepted in effecting
+ | an equitable property settlement at the time of divorce in separate property
+ | regimes,58 but not during the marriage when, somewhat paradoxically, unity
+ | of interests is assumed.
+ | In Bryson v. Bryant,59 the family home was registered in the name of the
+ | husband, who had been married to the wife for sixty years. The wife died
+ | first and left her estate to her brother. The husband died a few months later,
+ | leaving his estate to a charity. The brother was the plaintiff in an action
+ | which endeavoured to establish that the wife had a severable interest in the
+ | property through a resulting or constructive trust.60
+ | The majority of the New South Wales Court of Appeal (per Sheller J.A.
+ | and Samuels A-J.A.) rejected the plaintiff’s claim that the wife was entitled
+ | to an equitable half-share in the property. Relying on the well-known legal
+blank |
+meta | 494
+blank |
+meta | © Blackwell Publishers Ltd 1997
+text | fiction of intent, the majority judges found that the parties had not ‘intended’
+ | to create such a trust for the wife at the time the property was acquired
+ | almost sixty years before. The material contributions of the wife were
+ | discounted, including the making of curtains and other furnishings, as well
+ | as the help she gave with the building of the house. Neither were the majority
+ | judges prepared to accord economic value to the period during the Depression
+ | when the wife was the sole breadwinner. There were no children, but the
+ | wife provided the husband with ‘complete domestic support’ (p. 214).
+ | The reliance on the wife’s domestic contributions to ground an interest
+ | in property was the most interesting aspect of the claim. Unsurprisingly, this
+ | work was not deemed sufficient to ground an intention to create a trust: ‘I
+ | am by no means persuaded that a resulting trust can be presumed in a case
+ | where the contribution to the acquisition of the property is other than
+ | financial’ (p. 227, per Samuels A-J.A.). The suggestion is that the legal
+ | personhood of the wife could be recognized only if her contribution were
+ | conceptualized in severable economic, or conventionally masculinist, terms.
+ | That is, had it been established that the wife had contributed a certain
+ | amount of money towards the purchase price, an equitable interest might
+ | conceivably have been acknowledged although, given the history of the
+ | judicial handling of marital property, one suspects that even monetary
+ | contributions would not have sufficed.
+ | Kirby P. (dissenting) acknowledged the difficulty courts have had in
+ | recognizing the conventional contributions made by a wife compared with
+ | commercial or stranger relations. He acknowledged that there should not
+ | be a preoccupation with material contributions in an endeavour to analogize
+ | the marital relationship with a commercial relationship. Kirby P. was
+ | prepared to find the retention of the whole of the property by the husband
+ | (and his heirs) to be unconscionable.61 In other words, caring and housework
+ | should ground a severable interest in the property. The approach of Kirby
+ | P. is described as the broadest to date in relation to ‘contributions’ in the
+ | form of domestic services.62
+ | Housework and caring work, conceptualized as arising from ‘love and
+ | affection’, have historically been discounted as consideration in contract
+ | because there is no reciprocal exchange, it is averred; such contributions are
+ | simply gifts freely given. It is assumed, no doubt rightly, that the domestic
+ | sphere should not be subjected to the values of the market. If it is, ‘wifing
+ | services’ are invariably devalued.63 The imposition of the market norm is
+ | the problem. However, the highflown language of affectivity ensures that
+ | the ‘private’ carapace continues to envelope the domestic so that scrutiny is
+ | resisted.64 The maintenance of the public/private boundary, through
+ | adjudicative and bureaucratic technologies, enables the husband to maintain
+ | his position as the active citizen. He can leave the home and participate in
+ | the market, civil society, and the polity as he chooses. The homemaker wife
+ | is caught by the characterization of her labour as that which is done for
+ | love and affection, which translates into passive citizenship in the Kantian
+blank |
+meta | 495
+blank |
+meta | © Blackwell Publishers Ltd 1997
+text | sense, for it assumes economic dependency on an active citizen. This is the
+ | case even when the work done for ‘love and affection’ directly generates
+ | income, as in the case of farm work, which I shall now illustrate.
+ | In Lorna Pianta v. National Australia Bank Ltd.,65 the husband and son
+ | were the registered owners of a farm. The respondent bank foreclosed on
+ | the mortgage. In an attempt to resist foreclosure, the wife argued that her
+ | relationship with her husband of fifty years was not one of dependency,
+ | since she had worked on the farm in addition to having lived there.
+ | Accordingly, she argued, her material contributions to the farm gave rise to
+ | an equitable interest that should have been legally protected. The question
+ | was whether the bank knew, or should have known, of Ms Pianta’s interest.
+ | The majority rejected her appeal. Mahoney J.A. found that there was ‘no
+ | arguable case’ in favour of an equitable interest. Handley J.A. also ruled
+ | out the possibility of an equitable interest in the absence of a formal
+ | relationship: ‘There is no suggestion that the relationship of banker and
+ | customer existed between the claimant and this bank which predated the
+ | purchase of the subject property’ (p. 8). In any case, a formal relationship
+ | of this nature would not necessarily have helped Ms Pianta to establish that
+ | she was, in fact, the business partner of her husband and son: ‘because a
+ | passive partner [my italics] is bound by the acts of the other partners who
+ | deal with third parties in good faith’ (p 8). The reference by Handley J.A.
+ | to the ‘passivity’ of Ms Pianta may be a reference to a dormant partner in
+ | a commercial relationship, but he can also be seen to be echoing the Kantian
+ | view of woman as passive citizen who should be represented through her
+ | husband. Despite the fiction of dormancy, Ms Pianta had contributed
+ | actively to the partnership for fifty years. Under the rubric of ‘love and
+ | affection’, her work counted for nothing in the face of a formally executed
+ | mortgage to a powerful corporation. Kirby P. (dissenting) once again argued
+ | that the wife’s interests should be separately considered, for the issue is one
+ | that goes to the heart of equity:
+ | Sadly, this pattern of indifference to the separate interests of a vulnerable (usually female)
+ | member of a relationship when it comes to disposing of property in which that person
+ | asserts an equity is all too common. Indeed, this is the nature of vulnerability and
+ | occasions the need for the protection of equity (p. 3).
+blank |
+text | The paradigmatic contract involves two unrelated persons who come
+ | together for commercial purposes. Legal relations are then unproblematic
+ | in the event of a breach. The ‘breach’ within a non-commercial contract or
+ | ‘services for love and affection’, that is, conventional marriage, has little
+ | chance of success within a judicial forum where it is accepted that a
+ | commercial contract is the norm, as I have already pointed out. The
+ | ‘otherness’ of the contributions of a homemaker wife cannot be evaluated
+ | in the light of the commercial analogue. These contributions are deemed
+ | insubstantial when contrasted with the normative financial contributions of
+ | the man of property, the benchmark citizen.
+ | If wives, in any of the above instances, or in similar scenarios, had sought
+blank |
+meta | 496
+blank |
+meta | © Blackwell Publishers Ltd 1997
+text | to divorce their husbands, their interests would have been dealt with differently.
+ | At the point of formal separation, it is recognized that the wife’s legal
+ | interests are about to crystallize as separate and divisible, albeit contestable.66
+ | It is then accepted that cognisance should be taken of her unpaid labour
+ | during the marriage. However, it would appear that formal recognition of
+ | the divisibility of interests during marriage is more dangerous than when
+ | the relationship has broken down. This observation echoes Mary Lyndon
+ | Shanley’s view of the reason for antipathy towards married women’s
+ | property legislation in England in the nineteenth century:
+ | Indeed, the idea of married women’s property rights posed a much greater threat to the
+ | notion of family unity than did the provisions for divorce itself. Divorce simply gave
+ | legal recognition to de facto marital breakdown. A married woman’s property law, on
+ | the other hand, would have recognized the existence of two separate wills within an
+ | ongoing marriage.67
+blank |
+text | It is apparent that the struggle to recognize two separate wills within
+ | marriage has still not been juridically resolved, despite a century of Married
+ | Women’s Property Acts, enfranchisement, remedial legislation, and dramatic
+ | social change. In the stories I have related, the wives were cohabiting with
+ | their husbands, unless separated by death and, in all cases, marriage created
+ | a presumption of indivisibility against the interests of a third party. It is this
+ | question of divisibility of a wife’s interests during marriage that has been
+ | accorded scant attention.
+blank |
+ |
+text | CONCLUSION
+blank |
+text | The modernist elements of contract and the prevailing philosophy of liberal
+ | individualism are corrosive of the presumption of indivisibility in marriage,68
+ | as are claims that housework and caring work should ground a beneficial
+ | interest in property. Although never openly articulated, moves towards
+ | recognition of divisibility of interests generate a resistance so that judicial
+ | sites of power are activated. From their authoritative positions as arbiters
+ | of truth, judges are empowered to reproduce conventional marital relations.
+ | As legal knowledge producers, we have seen how they can sanction the
+ | actions of husbands who demand that their wives sign documents without
+ | explanation, and they can sanction similar actions by financial institutions
+ | and lawyers. Judges may claim to be mere interpreters of the law of trusts,
+ | dispassionately ascertaining the ‘intention of the parties’ but, if this intention
+ | has to be determined as it was sixty years earlier when the couple eloped,
+ | one would think that divine inspiration would have been necessary to assist
+ | them in the task.69 Judges, however, possess an authority that endows their
+ | words with the imprimatur of legitimacy; their utterances are not dismissed
+ | as fictions – a fate that may still befall a wife’s evidence. I have endeavoured
+ | to show how the rational voice may be deployed to disqualify the affective
+ | one in a rearguard attempt to maintain conventional gender relations.70
+blank |
+meta | 497
+blank |
+meta | © Blackwell Publishers Ltd 1997
+text | My purpose has not been to validate juridical flights of fancy, nor to
+ | embark on an excursus as to the subtle differences between resulting and
+ | constructive trusts, or the respective merits of separate property versus
+ | community property regimes; rather, it has been to show how the status of
+ | marriage continues to detract from the ability of married women to be active
+ | citizens. The legal stories that I have recounted reveal that marriage is a
+ | terrain of contestation as wives struggle to have their legal personality
+ | recognized. Although not all judges share the view that women should be
+ | properly ‘manned’ within heterosexual relationships, that remains the
+ | dominant view.
+ | The dramatic changes that have occurred in women’s lives over the past
+ | century render it impossible to avoid the progressivist narratives of feminist
+ | history,71 thereby averting a bleak conclusion. Nevertheless, as Martha
+ | Fineman reminds us, ‘the functioning family remains the most gendered of
+ | our social institutions’.72 Her solution is to abolish marriage altogether as a
+ | legal category.73 Instead of sexual intimacy as the basis of the family, she
+ | argues for caretaking, as exemplified by, but not restricted to, the mother/child
+ | dyad. Nevertheless, abolition is not presently a viable option, as Fineman
+ | herself recognizes, despite its appeal as a revisioning strategy. Despite the
+ | decreasing popularity of marriage, there are earnest moves to retain it as a
+ | legal institution, albeit it in a somewhat different form.
+ | First, marriage is invoked as the template for legal recognition of de facto
+ | heterosexual relationships.74 The assimilation of de facto and de jure marriage
+ | is one of the notable social phenomena of our times. Indeed, it may be hard
+ | to tell the difference when similar arrangements are made about property
+ | and its management, particularly if there are children. Secondly, marriage
+ | is aspired to as a model for other non-traditional relationships. Some lobbies
+ | within the gay and lesbian communities argue that the refusal of the state
+ | to recognize homosexual marriage amounts to discrimination,75 while others
+ | argue for a re-definition of de facto relationships to include lesbian and gay
+ | relationships.76 The concerns regarding property and familial obligations on
+ | separation or death raise similar issues in both heterosexual and homosexual
+ | relationships. The focus of marriage-like arrangements tends to be directed
+ | to the material consequences of separation. During the relationship, an
+ | equitable argument would undoubtedly be easier to formulate without marriage
+ | because the notion of divisibility is less likely to be impeded by the gendered
+ | asymmetry associated with marriage. Such issues, together with the cases I
+ | have considered, are reminders of the critical role of marriage in safeguarding
+ | property – the basis of civil society and, in turn, active citizenship. Marriage
+ | is more than a ‘significant personal relationship’.77
+ | However, I do not wish to suggest that the key to change necessarily
+ | resides in contractualism, for the production of gender relations is pervasive.
+ | While sloughing off the status dimensions of marriage would be a positive
+ | step, pre-nuptial, nuptial, and ex-nuptial contracts are also inherently
+ | problematic, in part because they are subject to judicial scrutiny;78 they are
+blank |
+meta | 498
+blank |
+meta | © Blackwell Publishers Ltd 1997
+text | not private. Their validity is dependent on judicial readings of prevailing
+ | legal and social norms. Thus, the privileging of the interests of financial
+ | institutions, for example, may reflect the economic rationalism of the times.
+ | While there is always scope for innovation and responsiveness to changing
+ | social mores, the crucial role of interpretation may also legitimate the
+ | masculinist and heterosexed status quo which, for a majority of judges,
+ | constitutes normal life.
+ | The power of law in actively constituting gendered citizens should not be
+ | underestimated, despite the rhetoric of formal equality. I have sought to
+ | show that adjudication is the ostensibly neutral site where partial accounts
+ | may be legitimized for reproduction by financiers, bankers, and lawyers, to
+ | say nothing of men and women themselves. In this way, we see the Foucauldian
+ | notion of power in perpetual motion, operating at multiple sites, reproducing
+ | conventionally gendered citizens within heterosexual relationships behind a
+ | façade of universality.
+blank |
+ |
+text | NOTES AND REFERENCES
+blank |
+ref | 1 A. Phillips, ‘Citizenship and Feminist Politics’ in Citizenship, ed. G. Andrews (1991) 77.
+ | 2 T. Brennan and C. Pateman, ‘“Mere Auxiliaries to the Commonwealthâ€: Women and the
+ | Origins of Liberalism’ (1979) 27 Political Studies 183.
+ | 3 M. Sawer and M. Simms, A Woman’s Place: Women and Politics in Australia (2nd ed.,
+ | 1993).
+ | 4 I have explored the gendered nature of citizenship at greater length in two complementary
+ | papers: ‘Embodying the Citizen’ in Public and Private: Feminist Legal Debates, ed. M.
+ | Thornton (1995) and ‘Historicising Citizenship: Remembering Broken Promises’ (1996) 20
+ | Melbourne University Law Rev. 1072.
+ | 5 S. Walby, ‘Is Citizenship Gendered?’ (1994) 28 Sociology 379.
+ | 6 I. Kant, ‘Metaphysical First Principles of the Doctrine of Right’ [1785] in The Metaphysics
+ | of Morals (trans. M. Gregor, 1991) 125–6, s. 146.
+ | 7 U. Vogel, ‘Marriage and the Boundaries of Citizenship’ in The Condition of Citizenship,
+ | ed. B. van Steenbergen (1994) 75.
+ | 8 N. Fraser and L. Gordon, ‘Civil Citizenship against Social Citizenship?’ in id., p. 97.
+ | 9 Vogel, id., p. 79.
+ | 10 Sir William Blackstone’s famous statement about the position of a married woman under
+ | coverture makes clear the erasure of her legal personality:
+blank |
+text | By marriage, the husband and wife are one person in law: that is, the very being or
+ | legal existence of the woman is suspended during the marriage, or at least is
+ | incorporated and consolidated into that of the husband; under whose wing, protection,
+ | and cover, she performs every thing.
+blank |
+ref | W. Blackstone, Commentaries (Facsimile of 1st. ed. of 1765–69, 1979) 442.
+ | 11 Vogel, op. cit., n. 7, pp. 80–1.
+ | 12 F. Haug (ed.), Female Sexualization: A Collective Work of Memory (1987) 196.
+ | 13 A. Bottomley, ‘Self and Subjectivities: Languages of Claim in Property Law’ (1993) 20 J.
+ | of Law and Society 56, 61.
+ | 14 D. West, ‘Power and Formation: New Foundations for a Radical Concept of Power’ (1987)
+ | 30 Inquiry 137, 145. Compare M. Foucault, Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and
+ | Other Writings 1972–1977, ed. C. Gordon (1980) 98.
+blank |
+meta | 499
+blank |
+meta | © Blackwell Publishers Ltd 1997
+ref | 15 For a detailed analysis of legal method and the political role it plays, see M.J. Mossman,
+ | ‘Feminism, and Legal Method: The Difference it Makes’ (1986) 3 Aust. J. of Law and
+ | Society 30.
+ | 16 H.S. Maine, Ancient Law: Its Connection with the Early History of Society and its Relation
+ | to Modern Ideas (10th ed., 1912) 174.
+ | 17 This was particularly the case in the United States of America. See M.J. Horwitz, The
+ | Transformation of American Law, 1780–1860 (1977) 160.
+ | 18 M. Grossberg, Governing the Hearth: Law and the Family in Nineteenth-Century America
+ | (1985) ix.
+ | 19 Staves postulates that the position was somewhat more complicated in that marriage, as
+ | a status, crumbled in response to contract ideology in the seventeenth century but, by the
+ | end of the eighteenth century, deeper patriarchal structures were re-imposed. See S. Staves,
+ | Married Women’s Separate Property in England, 1660–1833 (1990) 4, 220.
+ | 20 Siegel presents a valuable study of the changing norms of marriage in the context of wife
+ | beating. See R.B. Siegel, ‘“The Rule of Loveâ€: Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy’
+ | (1996) 105 Yale Law J. 2117.
+ | 21 C. Pateman, The Sexual Contract (1988). For further analysis of the marriage contract,
+ | see K. O’Donovan, Family Matters (1993), especially 43–59.
+ | 22 Pateman, id., p. 172.
+ | 23 Crimes (Sexual Assault) Amendment Act 1981 (N.S.W.); Criminal Law Consolidation Act
+ | Amendment Act 1976 (S.A.); Criminal Code (Sexual Offences) Act 1987 (Tas.); Crimes
+ | (Sexual Offences) Act 1991 (Vic.); Acts Amendment (Sexual Assault) Act 1985 (W.A.).
+ | The High Court upheld the validity of the South Australian law in 1991 (see R. v. L.
+ | (1991) 103 A.L.R. 577), the same year that the House of Lords abolished the immunity
+ | (see R. v. R. [1991] 2 All E.R. 257).
+ | 24 M. Freeman, ‘Contracting in the Haven: Balfour v. Balfour Revisited’ in Exploring the
+ | Boundaries of Contract, ed. R. Halson (1996) 74; R. Collier, Masculinity, Law and the
+ | Family (1995) 127 and throughout. See Collier further for a comprehensive study of
+ | sexuality in marriage.
+ | 25 P.S. Atiyah, An Introduction to the Law of Contract (5th ed., 1995) 3.
+ | 26 The Australian Law Reform Commission has addressed the issue and recommended
+ | recognition of prenuptial agreements. See A.L.R.C., Matrimonial Property, report no. 37
+ | (1987); A.L.R.C., Report of the Joint Select Committee on Certain Aspects of the Operation
+ | and Interpretation of the Family Law Act (1992). For critique, see M. Neave, ‘Private
+ | Ordering in Family Law – Will Women Benefit?’ in Thornton, op. cit., n. 4. For a feminist
+ | critique of contract in the American context, see C. Dalton, ‘An Essay in the
+ | Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine’ (1985) 94 Yale Law J. 997.
+ | 27 L. J. Weitzman, The Marriage Contract: Spouses, Lovers, and the Law (1981) 347 ff.
+ | 28 Grossberg, op. cit., n. 18, p. 52.
+ | 29 Balfour v. Balfour [1919] 2 K.B. 571.
+ | 30 Freeman, op. cit., n. 24. While acknowledging the trends towards contractualism and
+ | private ordering, Regan cautions against it, noting that greater freedom to contract invites
+ | greater scrutiny by the courts. More significantly, however, he would rather reclaim the
+ | idea of status by injecting it with new notions of responsibility and relationality, as well
+ | as divesting it of its sexist assumptions. See M.C. Regan Jr., Family Law and the Pursuit
+ | of Intimacy (1993).
+ | 31 For example, Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1970 (U.K.); Domestic
+ | Relations Act 1975 (N.Z.); Marriage Act Amendment Act 1976 (Cwth.).
+ | 32 G.S. Frost, Promises Broken: Courtship, Class, and Gender in Victorian England (1995);
+ | Thornton, op. cit. (1996), n. 4.
+ | 33 Grossberg, op. cit., n. 18, p. 38.
+ | 34 Compare U. Vogel, ‘Is Citizenship Gender-Specific?’ in The Frontiers of Citizenship, eds.
+ | U. Vogel and M. Moran (1991) 59.
+ | 35 See, for example, Bradwell v. Illinois 83 U.S. (16 Wall) 130 (1873).
+blank |
+ |
+meta | 500
+blank |
+ref | © Blackwell Publishers Ltd 1997
+ | 36 Compare J. Pahl, Money and Marriage (1989) 5.
+ | 37 Although Australia, like the United Kingdom, has a separate property regime, the courts
+ | are endowed with broad powers under the Family Law Act 1975 (Cwth.) to distribute
+ | property equitably. For detailed treatment, see S. Parker, P. Parkinson, and J. Behrens,
+ | Australian Family Law in Context: Commentary and Materials (1994). Most civil law
+ | countries and most American states have developed community property regimes which
+ | recognize the joint ownership of property acquired during marriage, but the legal
+ | significance is similarly directed to the time of divorce. For discussion of the position
+ | during marriage, see J.T. Oldham, ‘Management of the Community Estate during an Intact
+ | Marriage’ (1993) 56 Law and Contemporary Problems 99. For a discussion of the genesis
+ | of the two systems, see C. Donahue, Jr., ‘What Causes Fundamental Legal Ideas? Marital
+ | Property in England and France in the Thirteenth Century’ (1979) 78 Michigan Law Rev.
+ | 59.
+ | 38 The legal construction of masculinity and femininity in family law has been the subject of
+ | recent scholarly interest. Notable examples are O’Donovan, op. cit., n. 21 and Collier, op.
+ | cit., n. 24.
+ | 39 For discussion of sex and legal subjecthood, see N. Naffine ‘Sexing the Subject (of Law)’
+ | in Thornton, op. cit. (1995), n. 4.
+ | 40 Contracts Review Act 1980 (N.S.W.).
+ | 41 J. Nedelsky, Private Property and the Limits of American Constitutionalism: The Madisonian
+ | Framework and its Legacy (1990) especially 223 ff.
+ | 42 C.B. Macpherson, Democratic Theory: Essays in Retrieval (1973) 120.
+ | 43 For example, N. Howell, ‘“Sexually Transmitted Debtâ€: A Feminist Analysis of Laws
+ | Regulating Guarantors and Co-Borrowers’ (1995) 4 Aust. Feminist Law J. 93.
+ | 44 P. Baron, ‘The Free Exercise of Her Will: Women and Emotionally Transmitted Debt’
+ | (1995) 13 Law in Context 23.
+ | 45 id., p. 24; B. Fehlberg, ‘The Husband, the Bank, the Wife and Her Signature’ (1994) 57
+ | Modern Law Rev. 467, 468. See, also, Barclays Bank v. O’Brien [1994] 1 A.C. 180, at 185,
+ | per Brown-Wilkinson L.
+ | 46 Baron, op. cit., n. 44, p. 34; M. Richardson, ‘Protecting Women who provide Security for
+ | a Husband’s, Partner’s or Child’s Debts. The Value and Limits of an Economic Perspective’
+ | (1996) 16 Legal Studies 368.
+ | 47 Examples are legion, and by no means confined to the more sensational criminal law cases
+ | picked up by the media, such as R. v. Johns, Supreme Court of South Australia, 26 August
+ | 1992 (unreported) in which Bollen J. stated that it was acceptable for a husband to resort
+ | to ‘rougher than usual handling’ to persuade his wife to have sex with him. For examples
+ | relating to STD, see Howell, op. cit., n. 43.
+ | 48 B. Fehlberg, ‘The Husband, the Bank, the Wife and Her Signature – the Sequel’ (1996)
+ | 59 Modern Law Rev. 675.
+ | 49 National Australia Bank Ltd v. Garcia (1996) 39 N.S.W.L.R. 577 (N.S.W.C.A.).
+ | 50 (1991) 25 N.S.W.L.R. 32 (C.A.).
+text | 51 It is still frequently the case in joint property dealings today for a man to be accorded an
+ | occupational designation and for a woman to be described as ‘his wife’, regardless of her
+ | occupation. Reversing the positions and assigning the woman an occupational designation
+ | and relegating the man to the passive subject position as ‘her husband’ would be regarded
+ | as a provocative act.
+ref | 52 (1994) A.S.C. 56–268 (N.S.W.C.A.).
+ | 53 Based on the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cwth.), s. 52, and the Contracts Review Act 1980
+ | (N.S.W.).
+ | 54 (1994) A.S.C. 56–270 (N.S.W.C.A.).
+ | 55 A number of recent English cases have also turned on the question of whether the wife
+ | received independent legal advice. The House of Lords considered the issue in Barclays
+ | Bank v. O’Brien [1994] 1 A.C. 180. See, also, Banco Exterior Internacional v. Mann [1995]
+ | 1 All E.R. 936.
+blank |
+ |
+meta | 501
+blank |
+meta | © Blackwell Publishers Ltd 1997
+text | 56 Predictably, unconscionability has been construed narrowly between spouses, even if one
+ | spouse has obtained a windfall as a result of the contributions or services of the other.
+ref | See I.J. Hardingham and M.A. Neave, Australian Family Property Law (1984) 94.
+ | 57 Compare K. O’Donovan, Sexual Divisions in Law (1985), especially 112–18.
+ | 58 Although Reich’s work on the conceptualization of non-traditional sources of wealth, such
+ | as employment and professional qualifications, as forms of ‘new property’ has been
+ | influential, he did not broach the subject of caring work. See C.A. Reich, ‘The New
+ | Property’ (1964) 73 Yale Law J. 733. Despite a greater sensitivity to the interests of women,
+ | as well as writing almost two decades later, Glendon also fails to address the question of
+ | unpaid work as a form of property. See M.A. Glendon, The New Family and the New
+ | Property (1981).
+ | 59 (1992) 29 N.S.W.L.R. 188 (C.A.).
+text | 60 Trusts of this kind have been judicially created in order to obviate injustice. Ironically,
+ | such devices have been commonly utilized over the last twenty years or so in property
+ | disputes arising out of de facto relationships, where divisibility has permitted separate
+ | interests to crystallize in ways not recognized within marriage. For a discussion of recent
+ref | trends in Australia, see P. Parkinson, ‘Property Rights and Third Party Creditors – the
+ | Scope and Limitations of Equitable Doctrines’ (1997) 11 Australian J. Family Law 100.
+ | 61 For discussion, see J. Riley, ‘The Property Rights of Home-Makers under General Law:
+ | Bryson v. Bryant’ (1994) 16 Sydney Law Rev. 412.
+ | 62 The Hon. Justice T. E. Lindenmayer and P.A. Doolan, ‘When Bankruptcy and Family Law
+ | Collide’ (1994) 8 Aust. J. Family Law 111, 133.
+ | 63 B. Bennett, ‘The Economics of Wifing Services: Law and Economics on the Family’ (1991)
+ | 18 J. of Law and Society 206.
+ | 64 O’Donovan, op. cit., n. 57; Thornton, op. cit. (1995), n. 4.
+ | 65 N.S.W.C.A., unreported, 23 May 1994.
+ | 66 For detailed discussion of the ramifications, see L.J. Weitzman, The Divorce Revolution:
+ | The Unexpected Social and Economic Consequences for Women and Children in America
+ | (1985).
+ | 67 M.L. Shanley, Feminism, Marriage, and the Law in Victorian England, 1850–1895 (1989)
+ | 46.
+ | 68 The move to contract as the governing principle of family law has been noted by
+ | commentators. See, for example, Freeman, op. cit., n. 24; Neave, op. cit., n. 26; Regan, op.
+ | cit., n. 30.
+ | 69 Bryson v. Bryant in respect of which, it might be noted, the High Court refused leave to
+ | appeal. Marcia Neave notes the ‘artificiality’ of the concept of intention in a discussion of
+ | the constructive trust in the context of de facto spouses. See M. Neave, ‘Three Approaches
+ | to Family Law Disputes – Intention/Belief, Unjust Enrichment and Unconscionability’ in
+ | Equity, Fiduciaries and Trusts, ed. T.G. Youdan (1989) 262–4.
+ | 70 For an interesting case study of this phenomenon, see L. Sarmas, ‘Storytelling and the
+ | Law: A Case Study of Louth v. Diprose’ (1994) 19 Melbourne University Law Rev. 701.
+text | Although Ms Louth played a more ‘active’ role in seeking to retain ownership of the
+ | disputed property, being ‘active’ is constituted negatively in the case of a woman, for Ms
+ | Louth is depicted as venal, calculating, and untrustworthy.
+ref | 71 C. Colebrook, ‘Feminist Ethics and Historicism’ (1996) 11 Aust. Feminist Studies 295, 300.
+ | 72 M. Albertson Fineman, The Neutered Mother, the Sexual Family and Other Twentieth
+ | Century Tragedies (1995) 7.
+ | 73 Compare K. O’Donovan, ‘Should all Maintenance of Spouses be abolished?’ (1982) 45
+ | Modern Law Rev. 424, 431–3.
+ | 74 For example, De Facto Relationships Act 1984 (N.S.W.). For detailed analysis of the
+ | policy considerations, see M.D.A. Freeman and C.M. Lyon, Cohabitation without
+ | Marriage: An Essay in Law and Social Policy (1983); New South Wales Law Reform
+ | Commission, De Facto Relationships: Issues Paper (1981).
+ | 75 Eds. of the Harvard Law Review, Sexual Orientation and the Law (1990); Dean v. District
+blank |
+meta | 502
+blank |
+meta | © Blackwell Publishers Ltd 1997
+ref | of Columbia 653 U.S. App. D.C 307 (1995); C. Overington, ‘Why can’t They Marry?’ The
+ | Age, 26 April 1997.
+ | 76 For example, Lesbian and Gay Rights Service, The Bride Wore Pink; Legal Recognition
+ | of Our Relationships (1994).
+ | 77 id., p. 3.
+ | 78 Above, n. 30.
+blank |
+ |
+ |
+ |
+meta | 503
+blank |
+meta | © Blackwell Publishers Ltd 1997
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/convert-anystyle-data/in/10.1111_1467-6478.00057.xml b/convert-anystyle-data/in/10.1111_1467-6478.00057.xml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..fb75158bb66ff01c4201acdf7d14f7238f770523
--- /dev/null
+++ b/convert-anystyle-data/in/10.1111_1467-6478.00057.xml
@@ -0,0 +1,723 @@
+<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
+<dataset>
+ <sequence>
+ <citation-number>1</citation-number>
+ <author>A. Phillips,</author>
+ <title>‘Citizenship and Feminist Politics’</title>
+ <container-title>in Citizenship,</container-title>
+ <editor>ed. G. Andrews</editor>
+ <date>(1991)</date>
+ <pages>77.</pages>
+ </sequence>
+ <sequence>
+ <citation-number>2</citation-number>
+ <author>T. Brennan and C. Pateman,</author>
+ <title>‘“Mere Auxiliaries to the Commonwealthâ€: Women and the Origins of Liberalism’</title>
+ <date>(1979)</date>
+ <volume>27</volume>
+ <journal>Political Studies</journal>
+ <pages>183.</pages>
+ </sequence>
+ <sequence>
+ <citation-number>3</citation-number>
+ <author>M. Sawer and M. Simms,</author>
+ <title>A Woman’s Place: Women and Politics in Australia</title>
+ <edition>(2nd ed.,</edition>
+ <date>1993).</date>
+ </sequence>
+ <sequence>
+ <citation-number>4</citation-number>
+ <note>I have explored the gendered nature of citizenship at greater length in two complementary papers:</note>
+ <title>‘Embodying the Citizen’</title>
+ <container-title>in Public and Private: Feminist Legal Debates,</container-title>
+ <editor>ed. M. Thornton</editor>
+ <date>(1995)</date>
+ <signal>and </signal>
+ <title>‘Historicising Citizenship: Remembering Broken Promises’</title>
+ <date>(1996)</date>
+ <volume>20</volume>
+ <journal>Melbourne University Law Rev.</journal>
+ <pages>1072.</pages>
+ </sequence>
+ <sequence>
+ <citation-number>5</citation-number>
+ <author>S. Walby,</author>
+ <title>‘Is Citizenship Gendered?’</title>
+ <date>(1994)</date>
+ <volume>28</volume>
+ <journal>Sociology</journal>
+ <pages>379</pages>.
+ </sequence>
+ <sequence>
+ <citation-number>6</citation-number>
+ <author>I. Kant,</author>
+ <title>‘Metaphysical First Principles of the Doctrine of Right’</title>
+ <original-date>[1785]</original-date>
+ <container-title>in The Metaphysics of Morals</container-title>
+ <note>(trans. M. Gregor,</note>
+ <date>1991)</date>
+ <pages>125–6, s. 146.</pages>
+ </sequence>
+ <sequence>
+ <citation-number>7</citation-number>
+ <author>U. Vogel,</author>
+ <title>‘Marriage and the Boundaries of Citizenship’</title>
+ <container-title>in The Condition of Citizenship,</container-title>
+ <editor>ed. B. van Steenbergen</editor>
+ <date>(1994)</date>
+ <pages>75.</pages>
+ </sequence>
+ <sequence>
+ <citation-number>8</citation-number>
+ <author>N. Fraser and L. Gordon,</author>
+ <title>‘Civil Citizenship against Social Citizenship?’</title>
+ <backref>in id.,</backref>
+ <pages>p. 97. </pages>
+ </sequence>
+ <sequence>
+ <citation-number>9</citation-number>
+ <author>Vogel,</author>
+ <backref>id., </backref>
+ <pages>p. 79.</pages>
+ <author>W. Blackstone,</author>
+ <title>Commentaries</title>
+ <note>(Facsimile of 1st. ed. of 1765–69,</note>
+ <date>1979)</date>
+ <pages>442.</pages>
+ </sequence>
+ <sequence>
+ <citation-number>11</citation-number>
+ <author>Vogel,</author>
+ <backref>op. cit., n. 7,</backref>
+ <pages>pp. 80–1.</pages>
+ </sequence>
+ <sequence>
+ <citation-number>12</citation-number>
+ <editor>F. Haug (ed.),</editor>
+ <title>Female Sexualization: A Collective Work of Memory</title>
+ <date>(1987)</date>
+ <pages>196.</pages>
+ </sequence>
+ <sequence>
+ <citation-number>13</citation-number>
+ <author>A. Bottomley,</author>
+ <title>‘Self and Subjectivities: Languages of Claim in Property Law’</title>
+ <date>(1993)</date>
+ <volume>20</volume>
+ <journal>J. of Law and Society</journal>
+ <pages>56, 61.</pages>
+ </sequence>
+ <sequence>
+ <citation-number>14</citation-number>
+ <author>D. West,</author>
+ <title>‘Power and Formation: New Foundations for a Radical Concept of Power’</title>
+ <date>(1987)</date>
+ </sequence>
+ <sequence>
+ <citation-number>30</citation-number>
+ <title>Inquiry 137,</title>
+ <pages>145.</pages>
+ <signal>Compare</signal>
+ <author>M. Foucault,</author>
+ <title>Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972–1977,</title>
+ <editor>ed. C. Gordon</editor>
+ <date>(1980)</date>
+ <pages>98.</pages>
+ </sequence>
+ <sequence>
+ <citation-number>15</citation-number>
+ <signal>For a detailed analysis of legal method and the political role it plays, see</signal>
+ <author>M.J. Mossman,</author>
+ <title>‘Feminism, and Legal Method: The Difference it Makes’</title>
+ <date>(1986)</date>
+ <volume>3</volume>
+ <journal>Aust. J. of Law and Society</journal>
+ <pages>30.</pages>
+ </sequence>
+ <sequence>
+ <citation-number>16</citation-number>
+ <author>H.S. Maine,</author>
+ <title>Ancient Law: Its Connection with the Early History of Society and its Relation to Modern Ideas</title>
+ <edition>(10th ed.,</edition>
+ <date>1912)</date>
+ <pages>174.</pages>
+ </sequence>
+ <sequence>
+ <citation-number>17</citation-number>
+ <note>This was particularly the case in the United States of America.</note>
+ <signal>See</signal>
+ <author>M.J. Horwitz,</author>
+ <title>The Transformation of American Law, 1780–1860</title>
+ <date>(1977)</date>
+ <pages>160.</pages>
+ </sequence>
+ <sequence>
+ <citation-number>18</citation-number>
+ <author>M. Grossberg,</author>
+ <title>Governing the Hearth: Law and the Family in Nineteenth-Century America</title>
+ <date>(1985)</date>
+ <pages>ix.</pages>
+ </sequence>
+ <sequence>
+ <citation-number>19</citation-number>
+ <note>Staves postulates that the position was somewhat more complicated in that marriage, as a status, crumbled in response to contract ideology in the seventeenth century but, by the end of the eighteenth century, deeper patriarchal structures were re-imposed.</note>
+ <signal>See</signal>
+ <author>S. Staves,</author>
+ <title>Married Women’s Separate Property in England, 1660–1833</title>
+ <date>(1990)</date>
+ <volume>4,</volume>
+ <pages>220.</pages>
+ </sequence>
+ <sequence>
+ <citation-number>20</citation-number>
+ <note>Siegel presents a valuable study of the changing norms of marriage in the context of wife beating.</note>
+ <signal>See</signal>
+ <author>R.B. Siegel,</author>
+ <title>‘“The Rule of Loveâ€: Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy’</title>
+ <date>(1996)</date>
+ <volume>105</volume>
+ <journal>Yale Law J.</journal>
+ <pages>2117.</pages>
+ </sequence>
+ <sequence>
+ <citation-number>21</citation-number>
+ <author>C. Pateman,</author>
+ <title>The Sexual Contract</title>
+ <date>(1988).</date>
+ <signal>For further analysis of the marriage contract, see</signal>
+ <author>K. O’Donovan,</author>
+ <title>Family Matters</title>
+ <date>(1993),</date>
+ <pages>especially 43–59.</pages>
+ </sequence>
+ <sequence>
+ <citation-number>23</citation-number>
+ <legal-ref>Crimes (Sexual Assault) Amendment Act</legal-ref>
+ <date>1981</date>
+ <location>(N.S.W.);</location>
+ <legal-ref>Criminal Law Consolidation Act Amendment Act</legal-ref>
+ <date>1976</date>
+ <location>(S.A.);</location>
+ <legal-ref>Criminal Code (Sexual Offences) Act</legal-ref>
+ <date>1987</date>
+ <location>(Tas.);</location>
+ <legal-ref>Crimes (Sexual Offences)</legal-ref>
+ <date>1991</date>
+ <location>(Vic.);</location>
+ <legal-ref>Acts Amendment (Sexual Assault) Act</legal-ref>
+ <date>1985</date>
+ <location>(W.A.).</location>
+ <note>The High Court upheld the validity of the South Australian law in 1991</note>
+ <signal>(see</signal>
+ <legal-ref>R. v. L.</legal-ref>
+ <date>(1991)</date>
+ <legal-ref>103 A.L.R. 577),</legal-ref>
+ <note>the same year that the House of Lords abolished the immunity (</note>
+ <signal>see</signal>
+ <legal-ref>R. v. R.</legal-ref>
+ <date>[1991]</date>
+ <volume>2</volume>
+ <journal>All E.R.</journal>
+ <legal-ref>257).</legal-ref>
+ </sequence>
+ <sequence>
+ <citation-number>24</citation-number>
+ <author>M. Freeman,</author>
+ <title>‘Contracting in the Haven: Balfour v. Balfour Revisited’</title>
+ <container-title>in Exploring the Boundaries of Contract,</container-title>
+ <editor>ed. R. Halson</editor>
+ <date>(1996)</date>
+ <pages>74;</pages>
+ <author>R. Collier,</author>
+ <title>Masculinity, Law and the Family</title>
+ <date>(1995)</date>
+ <pages>127 and throughout.</pages>
+ <signal>See</signal>
+ <author>Collier</author>
+ <signal>further for a comprehensive study of sexuality in marriage.</signal>
+ </sequence>
+ <sequence>
+ <citation-number>25</citation-number>
+ <author>P.S. Atiyah,</author>
+ <title>An Introduction to the Law of Contract</title>
+ <edition>(5th ed.,</edition>
+ <date>1995)</date>
+ <pages>3.</pages>
+ </sequence>
+ <sequence>
+ <citation-number>26</citation-number>
+ <note>The Australian Law Reform Commission has addressed the issue and recommended recognition of prenuptial agreements.</note>
+ <signal>See</signal>
+ <title>A.L.R.C., Matrimonial Property,</title>
+ <journal>report no. 37</journal>
+ <date>(1987);</date>
+ <author>A.L.R.C.,</author>
+ <title>Report of the Joint Select Committee on Certain Aspects of the Operation and Interpretation of the Family Law Act</title>
+ <date>(1992).</date>
+ <signal>For critique, see</signal>
+ <author>M. Neave,</author>
+ <title>‘Private Ordering in Family Law – Will Women Benefit?’</title>
+ <container-title>in Thornton,</container-title>
+ <backref>op. cit., n. 4.</backref>
+ <signal>For a feminist critique of contract in the American context, see</signal>
+ <author>C. Dalton,</author>
+ <title>‘An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine’</title>
+ <date>(1985)</date>
+ <volume>94</volume>
+ <journal>Yale Law J.</journal>
+ <pages>997.</pages>
+ </sequence>
+ <sequence>
+ <citation-number>27</citation-number>
+ <author>L. J. Weitzman,</author>
+ <title>The Marriage Contract: Spouses, Lovers, and the Law</title>
+ <date>(1981)</date>
+ <pages>347 ff.</pages>
+ </sequence>
+ <sequence>
+ <citation-number>28</citation-number>
+ <author>Grossberg,</author>
+ <backref>op. cit., n. 18,</backref>
+ <pages>p. 52.</pages>
+ </sequence>
+ <sequence>
+ <citation-number>29</citation-number>
+ <author>Balfour v. Balfour</author>
+ <date>[1919]</date>
+ <pages>2 K.B. 571.</pages>
+ </sequence>
+ <sequence>
+ <citation-number>30</citation-number>
+ <author>Freeman,</author>
+ <backref>op. cit., n. 24.</backref>
+ <note>While acknowledging the trends towards contractualism and private ordering, Regan cautions against it, noting that greater freedom to contract invites greater scrutiny by the courts. More significantly, however, he would rather reclaim the idea of status by injecting it with new notions of responsibility and relationality, as well as divesting it of its sexist assumptions.</note>
+ <signal>See</signal>
+ <author>M.C. Regan Jr.,</author>
+ <title>Family Law and the Pursuit of Intimacy</title>
+ <date>(1993).</date>
+ </sequence>
+ <sequence>
+ <citation-number>31</citation-number>
+ <author>For example,</author>
+ <legal-ref>Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act</legal-ref>
+ <date>1970</date>
+ <location>(U.K.);</location>
+ <legal-ref>Domestic Relations Act</legal-ref>
+ <date>1975</date>
+ <location>(N.Z.);</location>
+ <legal-ref>Marriage Act Amendment Act</legal-ref>
+ <date>1976</date>
+ <location>(Cwth.)</location>.
+ </sequence>
+ <sequence>
+ <citation-number>32</citation-number>
+ <author>G.S. Frost,</author>
+ <title>Promises Broken: Courtship, Class, and Gender in Victorian England (1995);</title>
+ <author>Thornton,</author>
+ <backref>op. cit.</backref>
+ <date>(1996), n. 4.</date>
+ </sequence>
+ <sequence>
+ <citation-number>33</citation-number>
+ <author>Grossberg,</author>
+ <backref>op. cit., n. 18,</backref>
+ <pages>p. 38.</pages>
+ </sequence>
+ <sequence>
+ <citation-number>34</citation-number>
+ <signal>Compare</signal>
+ <author>U. Vogel,</author>
+ <title>‘Is Citizenship Gender-Specific?’</title>
+ <container-title>in The Frontiers of Citizenship,</container-title>
+ <editor>eds. U. Vogel and M. Moran</editor>
+ <date>(1991)</date>
+ <pages>59.</pages>
+ </sequence>
+ <sequence>
+ <citation-number>35</citation-number>
+ <signal>See, for example,</signal>
+ <legal-ref>Bradwell v. Illinois 83 U.S. (16 Wall) 130</legal-ref>
+ <date>(1873).</date>
+ </sequence>
+ <sequence>
+ <citation-number>36</citation-number>
+ <signal>Compare</signal>
+ <author>J. Pahl,</author>
+ <title>Money and Marriage</title>
+ <date>(1989)</date>
+ <pages>5.</pages>
+ </sequence>
+ <sequence>
+ <citation-number>37</citation-number>
+ <author>Although</author>
+ <note>Australia, like the United Kingdom, has a separate property regime, the courts are endowed with broad powers under the Family Law Act 1975 (Cwth.) to distribute property equitably.</note>
+ <signal>For detailed treatment, see</signal>
+ <author>S. Parker, P. Parkinson, and J. Behrens,</author>
+ <title>Australian Family Law in Context: Commentary and Materials</title>
+ <date>(1994).</date>
+ <note>Most civil law countries and most American states have developed community property regimes which recognize the joint ownership of property acquired during marriage, but the legal significance is similarly directed to the time of divorce.</note>
+ <signal>For discussion of the position during marriage, see</signal>
+ <author>J.T. Oldham,</author>
+ <title>‘Management of the Community Estate during an Intact Marriage’</title>
+ <date>(1993)</date>
+ <volume>56</volume>
+ <journal>Law and Contemporary Problems</journal>
+ <pages>99.</pages>
+ <signal>For a discussion of the genesis of the two systems, see</signal>
+ <author>C. Donahue, Jr.,</author>
+ <title>‘What Causes Fundamental Legal Ideas? Marital Property in England and France in the Thirteenth Century’</title>
+ <date>(1979)</date>
+ <volume>78</volume>
+ <journal>Michigan Law Rev.</journal>
+ <pages>59.</pages>
+ </sequence>
+ <sequence>
+ <citation-number>38</citation-number>
+ <note>The legal construction of masculinity and femininity in family law has been the subject of recent scholarly interest.</note>
+ <signal>Notable examples are</signal>
+ <author>O’Donovan,</author>
+ <backref>op. cit., n. 21</backref>
+ <signal>and </signal>
+ <author>Collier,</author>
+ <backref>op. cit., n. 24.</backref>
+ </sequence>
+ <sequence>
+ <citation-number>39</citation-number>
+ <signal>For discussion of sex and legal subjecthood, see</signal>
+ <author>N. Naffine</author>
+ <title>‘Sexing the Subject (of Law)’</title>
+ <editor> in Thornton</editor>
+ <backref>, op. cit.</backref>
+ <date>(1995),</date>
+ <backref>n. 4.</backref>
+ </sequence>
+ <sequence>
+ <citation-number>40</citation-number>
+ <journal>Contracts Review Act</journal>
+ <date>1980</date>
+ <location>(N.S.W.).</location>
+ </sequence>
+ <sequence>
+ <citation-number>41</citation-number>
+ <author>J. Nedelsky,</author>
+ <title>Private Property and the Limits of American Constitutionalism: The Madisonian Framework and its Legacy</title>
+ <date>(1990)</date>
+ <pages>especially 223 ff.</pages>
+ </sequence>
+ <sequence>
+ <citation-number>42</citation-number>
+ <author>C.B. Macpherson,</author>
+ <title>Democratic Theory: Essays in Retrieval</title>
+ <date>(1973)</date>
+ <pages>120.</pages>
+ </sequence>
+ <sequence>
+ <citation-number>43</citation-number>
+ <signal>For example,</signal>
+ <author>N. Howell,</author>
+ <title>‘“Sexually Transmitted Debtâ€: A Feminist Analysis of Laws Regulating Guarantors and Co-Borrowers’</title>
+ <date>(1995)</date>
+ <volume>4</volume>
+ <journal>Aust. Feminist Law J.</journal>
+ <pages>93.</pages>
+ </sequence>
+ <sequence>
+ <citation-number>44</citation-number>
+ <author>P. Baron,</author>
+ <title>‘The Free Exercise of Her Will: Women and Emotionally Transmitted Debt’</title>
+ <date>(1995)</date>
+ <volume>13</volume>
+ <journal>Law in Context</journal>
+ <pages>23.</pages>
+ </sequence>
+ <sequence>
+ <citation-number>45</citation-number>
+ <backref>id.,</backref>
+ <pages>p. 24;</pages>
+ <author>B. Fehlberg,</author>
+ <title>‘The Husband, the Bank, the Wife and Her Signature’</title>
+ <date>(1994)</date>
+ <volume>57</volume>
+ <journal>Modern Law Rev.</journal>
+ <pages>467, 468.</pages>
+ <signal>See, also,</signal>
+ <legal-ref>Barclays Bank v. O’Brien</legal-ref>
+ <date>[1994]</date>
+ <legal-ref>1 A.C. 180,</legal-ref>
+ <pages>at 185,</pages>
+ <author>per Brown-Wilkinson L</author>.
+ </sequence>
+ <sequence>
+ <citation-number>46</citation-number>
+ <author>Baron,</author>
+ <backref>op. cit., n. 44,</backref>
+ <pages>p. 34;</pages>
+ <author>M. Richardson,</author>
+ <title>‘Protecting Women who provide Security for a Husband’s, Partner’s or Child’s Debts. The Value and Limits of an Economic Perspective’</title>
+ <date>(1996)</date>
+ <volume>16</volume>
+ <journal>Legal Studies</journal>
+ <pages>368.</pages>
+ </sequence>
+ <sequence>
+ <citation-number>47</citation-number>
+ <signal>Examples are legion, and by no means confined to the more sensational criminal law cases picked up by the media, such as</signal>
+ <legal-ref>R. v. Johns,</legal-ref>
+ <legal-ref>Supreme Court of South Australia,</legal-ref>
+ <date>26 August 1992</date>
+ <note>(unreported) in which Bollen J. stated that it was acceptable for a husband to resort to ‘rougher than usual handling’ to persuade his wife to have sex with him. For examples relating to STD,</note>
+ <signal>see</signal>
+ <author>Howell,</author>
+ <backref>op. cit., n. 43.</backref>
+ </sequence>
+ <sequence>
+ <citation-number>48</citation-number>
+ <author>B. Fehlberg,</author>
+ <title>‘The Husband, the Bank, the Wife and Her Signature – the Sequel’</title>
+ <date>(1996)</date>
+ <volume>59</volume>
+ <journal>Modern Law Rev.</journal>
+ <pages>675.</pages>
+ </sequence>
+ <sequence>
+ <citation-number>49</citation-number>
+ <legal-ref>National Australia Bank Ltd v. Garcia</legal-ref>
+ <date>(1996)</date>
+ <volume>39</volume>
+ <journal>N.S.W.L.R.</journal>
+ <legal-ref>577 (N.S.W.C.A.). 50</legal-ref>
+ <date>(1991)</date>
+ <legal-ref>25 N.S.W.L.R. 32 (C.A.).</legal-ref>
+ </sequence>
+ <sequence>
+ <citation-number>52</citation-number>
+ <date>(1994)</date>
+ <legal-ref>A.S.C. 56–268 (N.S.W.C.A.).</legal-ref>
+ </sequence>
+ <sequence>
+ <citation-number>53</citation-number>
+ <note>Based on the</note>
+ <legal-ref>Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cwth.),</legal-ref>
+ <pages>s. 52,</pages>
+ <note>and the</note>
+ <legal-ref>Contracts Review Act</legal-ref>
+ <date>1980</date>
+ <location>(N.S.W.).</location>
+ <volume>54</volume>
+ <date>(1994)</date>
+ <pages>A.S.C. 56–270 (N.S.W.C.A.).</pages>
+ </sequence>
+ <sequence>
+ <citation-number>55</citation-number>
+ <note>A number of recent English cases have also turned on the question of whether the wife received independent legal advice. The House of Lords considered the issue</note>
+ <legal-ref>in Barclays Bank v. O’Brien</legal-ref>
+ <date>[1994]</date>
+ <pages>1 A.C. 180.</pages>
+ <signal>See, also,</signal>
+ <legal-ref>Banco Exterior Internacional v. Mann</legal-ref>
+ <date>[1995]</date>
+ <legal-ref>1 All E.R. 936.</legal-ref>
+ </sequence>
+ <sequence>
+ <author>See I.J. Hardingham and M.A. Neave,</author>
+ <title>Australian Family Property Law</title>
+ <date>(1984)</date>
+ <pages>94.</pages>
+ </sequence>
+ <sequence>
+ <citation-number>57</citation-number>
+ <signal>Compare</signal>
+ <author>K. O’Donovan,</author>
+ <title>Sexual Divisions in Law</title>
+ <date>(1985),</date>
+ <pages>especially 112–18.</pages>
+ </sequence>
+ <sequence>
+ <citation-number>58</citation-number>
+ <note>Although Reich’s work on the conceptualization of non-traditional sources of wealth, such as employment and professional qualifications, as forms of ‘new property’ has been influential, he did not broach the subject of caring work.</note>
+ <signal>See</signal>
+ <author>C.A. Reich,</author>
+ <title>‘The New Property’</title>
+ <date>(1964)</date>
+ <volume>73</volume>
+ <journal>Yale Law J.</journal>
+ <pages>733.</pages>
+ <note>Despite a greater sensitivity to the interests of women, as well as writing almost two decades later, Glendon also fails to address the question of unpaid work as a form of property.</note>
+ <signal>See</signal>
+ <author>M.A. Glendon,</author>
+ <title>The New Family and the New Property</title>
+ <date>(1981).</date>
+ <volume>59</volume>
+ <date>(1992)</date>
+ <pages>29 N.S.W.L.R. 188 (C.A.).</pages>
+ </sequence>
+ <sequence>
+ <signal>trends in Australia, see</signal>
+ <author>P. Parkinson,</author>
+ <title>‘Property Rights and Third Party Creditors – the Scope and Limitations of Equitable Doctrines’</title>
+ <date>(1997)</date>
+ <volume>11</volume>
+ <journal>Australian J. Family Law</journal>
+ <pages>100.</pages>
+ </sequence>
+ <sequence>
+ <citation-number>61</citation-number>
+ <signal>For discussion, see</signal>
+ <author>J. Riley,</author>
+ <title>‘The Property Rights of Home-Makers under General Law: Bryson v. Bryant’</title>
+ <date>(1994)</date>
+ <volume>16</volume>
+ <journal>Sydney Law Rev.</journal>
+ <pages>412.</pages>
+ </sequence>
+ <sequence>
+ <citation-number>62</citation-number>
+ <signal>The</signal>
+ <author>Hon. Justice T. E. Lindenmayer and P.A. Doolan,</author>
+ <title>‘When Bankruptcy and Family Law Collide’</title>
+ <date>(1994)</date>
+ <volume>8</volume>
+ <journal>Aust. J. Family Law</journal>
+ <pages>111,</pages>
+ <pages>133.</pages>
+ </sequence>
+ <sequence>
+ <citation-number>63</citation-number>
+ <author>B. Bennett,</author>
+ <title>‘The Economics of Wifing Services: Law and Economics on the Family’</title>
+ <date>(1991)</date>
+ <volume>18</volume>
+ <journal>J. of Law and Society</journal>
+ <pages>206.</pages>
+ </sequence>
+ <sequence>
+ <citation-number>64</citation-number>
+ <author>O’Donovan,</author>
+ <backref>op. cit., n. 57;</backref>
+ <author>Thornton,</author>
+ <backref>op. cit.</backref>
+ <date>(1995), n. 4.</date>
+ </sequence>
+ <sequence>
+ <citation-number>65</citation-number>
+ <note>N.S.W.C.A., unreported,</note>
+ <date>23 May 1994.</date>
+ </sequence>
+ <sequence>
+ <citation-number>66</citation-number>
+ <signal>For detailed discussion of the ramifications, see</signal>
+ <author>L.J. Weitzman,</author>
+ <title>The Divorce Revolution: The Unexpected Social and Economic Consequences for Women and Children in America</title>
+ <date>(1985).</date>
+ </sequence>
+ <sequence>
+ <citation-number>67</citation-number>
+ <author>M.L. Shanley,</author>
+ <title>Feminism, Marriage, and the Law in Victorian England, 1850–1895</title>
+ <date>(1989)</date>
+ <pages>46.</pages>
+ </sequence>
+ <sequence>
+ <citation-number>68</citation-number>
+ <note>The move to contract as the governing principle of family law has been noted by commentators.</note>
+ <signal>See, for example,</signal>
+ <author>Freeman,</author>
+ <backref>op. cit., n. 24;</backref>
+ <author>Neave,</author>
+ <backref>op. cit., n. 26;</backref>
+ <author>Regan,</author>
+ <backref>op. cit., n. 30.</backref>
+ </sequence>
+ <sequence>
+ <citation-number>69</citation-number>
+ <author>Bryson v. Bryant</author>
+ <note>in respect of which, it might be noted, the High Court refused leave to appeal. Marcia Neave notes the ‘artificiality’ of the concept of intention in a discussion of the constructive trust in the context of de facto spouses.</note>
+ <signal>See</signal>
+ <author>M. Neave, ‘</author>
+ <title>Three Approaches to Family Law Disputes – Intention/Belief, Unjust Enrichment and Unconscionability’</title>
+ <container-title>in Equity, Fiduciaries and Trusts,</container-title>
+ <editor>ed. T.G. Youdan</editor>
+ <date>(1989)</date>
+ <pages>262–4.</pages>
+ </sequence>
+ <sequence>
+ <citation-number>70</citation-number>
+ <signal>For an interesting case study of this phenomenon, see</signal>
+ <author>L. Sarmas,</author>
+ <title>‘Storytelling and the Law: A Case Study of Louth v. Diprose’</title>
+ <date>(1994)</date>
+ <volume>19</volume>
+ <journal>Melbourne University Law Rev.</journal>
+ <pages>701.</pages>
+ </sequence>
+ <sequence>
+ <citation-number>71</citation-number>
+ <author>C. Colebrook,</author>
+ <title>‘Feminist Ethics and Historicism’</title>
+ <date>(1996)</date>
+ <volume>11</volume>
+ <journal>Aust. Feminist Studies</journal>
+ <pages>295, 300.</pages>
+ </sequence>
+ <sequence>
+ <citation-number>72</citation-number>
+ <author>M. Albertson Fineman,</author>
+ <title>The Neutered Mother, the Sexual Family and Other Twentieth Century Tragedies</title>
+ <date>(1995)</date>
+ <pages>7.</pages>
+ </sequence>
+ <sequence>
+ <citation-number>73</citation-number>
+ <signal>Compare</signal>
+ <author>K. O’Donovan,</author>
+ <title>‘Should all Maintenance of Spouses be abolished?’</title>
+ <date>(1982)</date>
+ <volume>45</volume>
+ <journal>Modern Law Rev.</journal>
+ <pages>424, 431–3.</pages>
+ </sequence>
+ <sequence>
+ <citation-number>74</citation-number>
+ <signal>For example,</signal>
+ <legal-ref>De Facto Relationships Act</legal-ref>
+ <date>1984</date>
+ <location>(N.S.W.).</location>
+ <signal>For detailed analysis of the policy considerations, see</signal>
+ <author>M.D.A. Freeman and C.M. Lyon,</author>
+ <title>Cohabitation without Marriage: An Essay in Law and Social Policy</title>
+ <date>(1983);</date>
+ <author>New South Wales Law Reform Commission,</author>
+ <title>De Facto Relationships: Issues Paper</title>
+ <date>(1981).</date>
+ </sequence>
+ <sequence>
+ <citation-number>75</citation-number>
+ <author>Eds. of the Harvard Law Review, </author>
+ <title>Sexual Orientation and the Law</title>
+ <date>(1990);</date>
+ <legal-ref>Dean v. District of Columbia 653 U.S. App. D.C</legal-ref>
+ <pages>307</pages>
+ <date>(1995);</date>
+ <author>C. Overington,</author>
+ <title>‘Why can’t They Marry?’</title>
+ <journal>The Age,</journal>
+ <pages>26</pages>
+ <date>April 1997.</date>
+ </sequence>
+ <sequence>
+ <citation-number>76</citation-number>
+ <signal>For example,</signal>
+ <author>Lesbian and Gay Rights Service,</author>
+ <title>The Bride Wore Pink; Legal Recognition of Our Relationships</title>
+ <date>(1994).</date>
+ </sequence>
+ <sequence>
+ <citation-number>77</citation-number>
+ <backref>id.,</backref>
+ <pages>p. 3.</pages>
+ </sequence>
+ <sequence>
+ <citation-number>78</citation-number>
+ <backref>Above, n. 30.</backref>
+ </sequence>
+</dataset>
diff --git a/convert-anystyle-data/in/10.1111_1467-6478.00080.ttx b/convert-anystyle-data/in/10.1111_1467-6478.00080.ttx
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..5637750ace1c78d903c3591f3bebfa7e16f63682
--- /dev/null
+++ b/convert-anystyle-data/in/10.1111_1467-6478.00080.ttx
@@ -0,0 +1,686 @@
+meta | JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIETY
+ | VOLUME 25, NUMBER 1, MARCH 1998
+ | ISSN: 0263–323X, pp. 71–84
+blank |
+ |
+ |
+title | Law as a Parasitic Discipline
+blank |
+ |
+author | ANTHONY BRADNEY*
+blank |
+ |
+text | British university law schools are undergoing a radical change in the
+ | nature of legal research and scholarship. They were once dominated by
+ | pure doctrinal analysis but the new generation of legal scholars are either
+ | abandoning doctrinal work or infusing it with techniques and approaches
+ | drawn from the humanities and the social sciences. This essay argues
+ | that this change will lead to a greater ability to provide law students with
+ | a truly liberal education and will also enable the law school to take a
+ | much greater part in the intellectual debates to be found elsewhere in the
+ | university.
+blank |
+ |
+text | INTRODUCTION
+blank |
+text | The academic doctrinal project which has dominated United Kingdom
+ | university law schools for most of their history, the attempt to explain law
+ | solely through the internal evidence offered by judgements and statutes, is
+ | now entering its final death throes.1 There are few serious scholars of law
+ | under forty who are now attempting such work on any significant scale
+ | except as a student exercise for a doctoral dissertation. This is not to say
+ | that doctrinal work is no longer done. Case-notes are still written.2 Books
+ | using doctrinal technique are produced for students and practising lawyers.
+ | But such works are not a sustained attempt to reveal the underpinning of
+ | principle which Lord Goff identified as the task and goal of the academic
+ | lawyer working in the doctrinal mode.3 Such books as are written purely in
+blank |
+affiliation | * Faculty of Law, University of Leicester, University Road, Leicester LE1
+ | 7RH, England
+ref | 1 For a contrary view, see G. Jones, ‘ “Traditional†Legal Scholarship: a Personal View’ in
+ | What Are Law Schools For?, ed. P. Birks (1996) 14.
+ | 2 Indeed I am preparing one on Fitzpatrick v. Sterling Housing Association at the same time
+ | as writing this article.
+ | 3 R. Goff, ‘The Search for Principle’ (1983) Proceeedings of the British Academy 169, at 171.
+ | This is an amplification of Dicey’s remark that ‘[b]y adequate study and careful thought
+ | whole departments of law can . . . be reduced to order and exhibited under the form of a
+ | few principles which sum up the effect of a hundred cases . . .’. A. Dicey, Can English Law
+ | be taught at the Universities? (1883) 20.
+blank |
+ |
+meta | 71
+blank |
+meta | © Blackwell Publishers Ltd 1998, 108 Cowley Road, Oxford OX4 1JF, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA
+text | the doctrinal mode vary greatly in size depending on the knowledge of the
+ | author and the proposed market for the book. They are all alike, however,
+ | in being simply the cumulation of explications of individual legal rules. In
+ | scholarly writing doctrinal work is now used not on its own but as part of
+ | a broader attempt to understand law. It is used alongside a range of other
+ | methods taken from disciplines in the humanities and social sciences.
+ | Monographs and serious articles may in part be doctrinal (though more and
+ | more frequently they are not doctrinal at all) but the work does not depend
+ | on doctrinal theory for its theoretical underpinning.
+ | The abandonment of the doctrinal project should not be seen as a sudden
+ | volte-face in the intellectual allegiance of the law school. It represents a new
+ | stage in an evolutionary process. In practice in the past doctrinal work has
+ | usually involved the overt use of non-doctrinal material. In seeking to
+ | understand and explain even the narrowest of legal rules doctrinal scholars
+ | have constantly felt it necessary to ask questions which, because they were
+ | political, ethical or sociological, could not be answered by their own chosen
+ | method. Thus, for example, in one of his books on contract law Smith states
+ | that ‘[f]or a thorough understanding of the subject, there is no substitute for
+ | the study of the cases’.4 In the first chapter he then proceeds to discuss what
+ | is ‘practical’, whether the majority of promises are made under seal or not,
+ | ‘the way in which contracts are in fact made’, what would be ‘excessively
+ | inconvenient’ in an auction and so on and so forth.5 Doubtless he is correct
+ | to raise these matters and consideration of them is necessary for an
+ | understanding of contract law. Equally plainly, none of them can be
+ | understood by reference solely to case-law. A thorough analysis of any one
+ | of these issues is only possible through the use of appropriate methods drawn
+ | from the social sciences. Anything else is mere anecdote, hearsay, and
+ | assertion. In such instances an author’s avowal of the doctrinal method has
+ | been a justification for treating non-doctrinal matters without recourse to
+ | the appropriate material available from elsewhere in the academy or an
+ | excuse for using such material in a cursory or ill-informed manner. Equally,
+ | doctrinal work has always been infused with intellectual presumptions and
+ | assumptions that have dominated the doctrinal argument even though the
+ | doctrinal method has concealed their existence.6 Doctrinal method has never
+ | had the purity its partisans ascribed to it. The realization of this, and the
+ | realization that, within the academy, it is unacceptable to deal with any
+ | material or with any question with anything less than full attention, is what
+ | has characterized the new method of working. This has resulted in either
+ | the abandonment of doctrinal method, on the ground that it is incapable of
+blank |
+ |
+ref | 4 J. Smith, The Law of Contract (1989) v.
+ | 5 id., pp. 3–5 and p. 8.
+ | 6 See, for example, D. Kennedy, ‘Form and substance in Private Law Ajudication’ (1976)
+ | 89 Harvard Law Rev. 1685.
+blank |
+ |
+meta | 72
+blank |
+meta | © Blackwell Publishers Ltd 1998
+text | a producing satisfactory answers to any intellectually compelling questions,
+ | or, as frequently, infusing doctrinal method with other techniques.
+ | A number of writers have already noted the new spirit which is beginning
+ | to dominate United Kingdom law schools. In his inaugural lecture at
+ | Cambridge University Hepple argued that law students need to study, among
+ | other things, ‘social sciences, philosophy, ethics, history’ and have ‘the ability
+ | to comprehend the evidence and methods of social sciences’.7 Thomas has
+ | recently asked if there is ‘the emergence of a new paradigm: that of socio-
+ | legal studies’ in university law schools.8 Cotterell has argued that:
+ | [a]ll the centuries of purely doctrinal writing on law have produced less valuable
+ | knowledge about what law is, as a social phenomenon, and what it does than
+ | the relatively few decades of work in sophisticated modern empirical socio-legal studies
+ | . . .9
+blank |
+text | This new spirit does not mean the subjugation of law to sociology. Rather,
+ | it represents the realisation that law can become a site or focus for many
+ | disciplines within the academy and thus the emergence of socio-legal studies.10
+ | This essay will consider the implications this new spirit has for the
+ | university law school. As law becomes not a discipline unique and self-
+ | contained within itself but parasitic in large part on work started elsewhere
+ | in the university, what will be the changes for staff and students not just in
+ | the university law school but in the wider university community? The
+ | disciplinary effects of doctrinal teaching and research have often been the
+ | subject of consideration in the past. This essay will argue that the personal
+ | effect on the intellectual and emotional growth of students and the institutional
+ | effect on the relationship between the law school and the rest of the university
+ | are also important.
+blank |
+ |
+ |
+text | THE WIDER ACADEMIC CONTEXT
+blank |
+text | University law schools do not exist in academic isolation. Estimating
+ | what law schools will or can become must take account of the possibility
+ | of wider changes to higher education. Official and unofficial reports on higher
+ | education in general and legal education in particular are usually largely a
+blank |
+ |
+ref | 7 B. Hepple, ‘The Renewal of the Liberal Law Degree’ (1996) Cambridge Law J. 470, at 485
+ | and 481.
+ | 8 P.A. Thomas, ‘Introduction’ in Socio-Legal Studies, ed. P.A. Thomas (1997) 19.
+ | 9 R. Cotterrell, Law’s Community (1995) 296.
+ | 10 Socio-legal studies has been defined in many different ways. In this essay the term is taken
+ | to indicate the use of ideas ‘from other disciplines primarily but not exclusively from within
+ | the social science and humanities fields’. S. Wheeler, ‘Company Law’ in Thomas, op. cit.,
+ | n. 8, at p. 285.
+blank |
+meta | 73
+blank |
+meta | © Blackwell Publishers Ltd 1998
+text | failure.11 Nevertheless, such reports do have some influence and, particularly
+ | where they are in accord with existing currents in academic thought, can
+ | suggest which roads are more likely to be travelled down. In this respect both
+ | the recent Dearing report on higher education and the Lord Chancellor’s
+ | Advisory Committee on Legal Education and Conduct (ACLEC) report on
+ | legal education must be included in the analysis.12
+ | Central to the arguments in this essay is the consideration that ACLEC
+ | and Dearing have given to the purpose and function of the law school and
+ | higher education; to what the law school is expected to do for the student.
+ | ACLEC’s position in this respect is much clearer than that in Dearing.
+ | ACLEC’s view of the purpose of legal education in universities is that ‘the
+ | [law] degree course should stand as an independent liberal education in the
+ | discipline of law, not tied to any specific vocation’.13 Whilst ACLEC’s report
+ | is alive to the employment prospects of graduates in law and contains
+ | proposals for integrating academic and vocational education, the priority
+ | given to liberal education is plain. Other educational aims, seen as being
+ | valid in their own right, then follow from that.14 ACLEC’s view is in accord
+ | with the majority opinion amongst academics in university law schools who
+ | largely subscribe to a belief in the importance of legal studies providing a
+ | liberal education.15
+ | On the question of the function and purpose of higher education little in
+ | Dearing is new. The report encapsulates debates that have a history of at
+ | least a century. Such novelty as there is lies in the fact that Dearing seeks
+blank |
+ref | 11 Some fail wholly. It is difficult to see any effect on academic legal education that resulted
+ | from Lady Marre’s report A Time for Change (1988). The Jarratt report on universities
+ | produced for the Committee of Vice-Chancellors and Principals (CVCP), Report of the
+ | Steering Committee for Efficiency studies in Universities (1988), produced much comment
+ | but little action. Even those that are thought of as being a success are not wholly
+ | implemented. Despite Ormrod’s recommendations no Institute of Profesional Legal Studies
+ | was set up and the universities and colleges of higher education did not take sole
+ | responsibility for vocational legal training (Report of the Committee on Legal Education
+ | (1971; Cmnd 4595) ch. 9, recs. 40 and 23). There were also other recommendations that
+ | were not implemented. The Robbins report on higher education, Higher Education (1963;
+ | Cmnd. 2154) took it is axiomatic that ‘courses of higher education should be available for
+ | all those who are qualified by ability and attainment to pursue them and wish to do so’
+ | (para. 31). This has yet to happen.
+ | 12 National Committee of Inquiry into Higher Education, Higher Education in the learning
+ | society (1997) (the Dearing report); ACLEC, First Report on Legal Education and Training
+ | (1996). The Government’s White Paper on further and higher education had not been
+ | published at the time of writing this essay.
+ | 13 ACLEC, id., para 4.6.
+ | 14 ACLEC’s proposal is part of an historical process which has gradually seen English
+ | university law schools distance themselves from the legal professions and the legal
+ | professions propose decreasing degrees of control over the content of law degrees. (See A.
+ | Bradney and F. Cownie, ‘Working on the Chain Gang?’ (1996) 2 Contemporary Issues in
+ | Law 15, at 24–6).
+ | 15 J. MacFarlane, M. Jeeves, and A. Boon, ‘Education for Life or for Work?’ (1987) 137 New
+ | Law J. 835, at 836.
+blank |
+ |
+meta | 74
+blank |
+meta | © Blackwell Publishers Ltd 1998
+text | to propose both sides of what have, hitherto, been seen as irreconcilable
+ | arguments. Thus, for example, in 1874, in his rectorial address to St
+ | Andrews, T.H. Huxley stated that faculties such as theology and law were
+ | ‘[t]echnical schools, intended to equip men who received general culture with
+ | the special knowledge which is needed for the proper performance of [their
+ | duties].’16 His words were a response to John Stuart Mill’s earlier rectorial
+ | address, delivered in 1867, in which Mill had stated that the university was
+ | not ‘a place of professional education . . . [its] object is not to make skilful
+ | lawyers . . . but capable and educated human beings.’17 Huxley would be
+ | delighted to find Dearing espousing, in recommendation 18, the notion that
+ | all programmes in higher education should ‘help students to become familiar
+ | with work, and help them reflect on such experience’.18 In turn, Mill would
+ | no doubt support at least one of the four purposes that Dearing sees for
+ | higher education ‘to play a major role in shaping a democratic, civilised and
+ | inclusive society’.19
+ | Dearing does not give liberal educational values the unequivocal support
+ | that is found in ACLEC. Nevertheless, it does allow room for such
+ | education. Given the positions taken in both these reports and given the
+ | stance taken by academics working in university law schools, this essay will
+ | therefore explore the changing nature of the law school in the context of its
+ | adherence to notions of liberal education. It is not clear that either ACLEC
+ | or academics in law schools wholly understand the implications of espousing
+ | law as a liberal education. This essay is premised upon the idea that ‘[t]he
+ | problem [for liberal education] is to produce specialists who are in touch
+ | with a humane centre, and to produce a centre for them to be in touch with
+ | . . .’.20 A liberal education is thus seen as involving both a highly detailed
+ | technical education in an individual discipline and an attempt to facilitate
+ | students’ appreciating the all-imbuing nature of, and involving themselves
+ | in assessing, questions of value and worth.21
+blank |
+ |
+text | THE LAW SCHOOL AND THE SOUL
+blank |
+text | Goodrich has explored the dispiriting effects of a traditional, doctrinal legal
+ | education:
+ref | 16 T.H. Huxley, ‘Universities: Actual and Ideal’ in T.H. Huxley, Collected Essays: Volume III
+ | (1905) 215.
+ | 17 J.S. Mill, ‘Inaugural address to the University of St Andrews’ in Collected Work of John
+ | Stuart Mill: Volume XXI, ed. J.M. Robson (1984) 218.
+ | 18 Dearing, op. cit., n. 12, para. 9.32.
+ | 19 id., para. 5.11.
+ | 20 F.R. Leavis, Education and the University (1948) 28. Leavis’s view was narrowly
+ | nationalistic. For ‘centre’ it would be better to substitute ‘centres’.
+ | 21 See, further, A. Bradney, ‘Liberalising Legal Education’ in The Law School: Global Issues,
+ | Local Questions, ed. F. Cownie (forthcoming).
+blank |
+ |
+meta | 75
+blank |
+meta | © Blackwell Publishers Ltd 1998
+text | Law school stole my hopes of change and robbed me of any surviving sense of
+ | the relevance of my inner world, of poetry, desire or dream, to the life of the institution
+ | . . .22
+blank |
+text | Turow has written to similar effect about the immediate impact of
+ | studying law. Talking about a short holiday he took six weeks after starting
+ | as a student at Harvard Law School he wrote:
+ | I realized for the first time how great the pressure was which I’d been under. I was a
+ | different person here, the man I’d been six weeks ago. I was not trying to keep my
+ | language precise, or analyzing every spoken proposition to find its converse. I could
+ | look at mountains as well as words and books. I could live with nothing but the dull
+ | grey buzz of tranquillity passing through my head.
+ | ‘I’ve stolen away from the brain thieves’, I told Annette.23
+blank |
+text | Whatever its value in training the mind or in building a suitable intellectual
+ | base for the practitioner, there can be little doubt that the essential aridity
+ | of doctrinal study has a disabling effect on most of those who are subject
+ | to it.
+blank |
+ |
+text | DOCTRINAL ARGUMENT AND DOCTRINAL CONCEPTS
+blank |
+text | The disabling effect of doctrinal study arises because of two different, though
+ | related, matters.
+ | First, in most instances, and for most people, doctrinal study teaches the
+ | student to particularize and narrow argument. It teaches close reasoning
+ | and the utmost attention to textual content. In themselves these things are
+ | important intellectual skills. But at the same time doctrinal study also forbids
+ | the making of the connections with the wider questions which lie at the root
+ | of human inquiry. Reasoning in doctrinal study must be about a particular
+ | range of questions. The question which cannot legitimately be answered by
+ | reference to a statute or a judgement lies outside the doctrinal gaze. Doctrinal
+ | study explicitly identifies questions outside the doctrinal range as being
+ | something not relevant for the doctrinal student. It implicitly devalues such
+ | questions and treats them as not being worthy of consideration within the
+ | precise, objective word of the law school. Moreover, the person skilled in
+ | doctrinal techniques is, by virtue of this skill, no better equipped to attend
+ | to non-doctrinal questions. But the student begins life as Aristotle’s human
+ | being, driven and defined essentially by curiosity, by a desire to understand
+ | the world. This curiosity, involving as it does curiosity about questions of
+ | value and issues of assessment, cannot be assuaged by use of the seeming
+ | logic of doctrinal analysis. Kahn-Fruend argued that students ‘must not be
+ | allowed to go around it [doctrinal argument] by escaping into talk about
+blank |
+ref | 22 P. Goodrich, ‘Of Blackstone’s Tower: Metephors of Distance and Histories of the English
+ | Law School’ in Birks, op. cit., n. 1, p. 59.
+ | 23 S. Turow, One L (1977) 106.
+blank |
+ |
+meta | 76
+blank |
+meta | © Blackwell Publishers Ltd 1998
+text | politics . . .’.24 But human beings are, precisely, in Aristotle’s terminology
+ | political animals and cannot give up their constant process of political
+ | inquiry.25 Doctrinal study thus builds a dissonance between the psyche of
+ | the student and his or her academic persona. To become a law student the
+ | student must ignore who he or she is.
+ | The nature of doctrinal study and the effect that it has on students is
+ | highlighted by comparing it with something else in the academy that seems
+ | very similar, the techniques of close reading used in the study of literature
+ | by F.R. Leavis. Here again, as in the doctrinal method, in Leavis’s close
+ | reading, there is the demand that the student pay close attention to the text
+ | and the dismissal of the idea that anything outside the text can be germane
+ | to what goes on in the analysis:
+blank |
+text | It should, by continual insistence and varied exercise in analysis, be enforced that
+ | literature is made of words, and that everything worth saying in criticism of verse and
+ | prose can be related to judgements concerning particular arrangements of words on the
+ | page.26
+ | Literary history, as a matter of ‘facts about’ and accepted critical (or quasi-critical)
+ | description and commentary, is a worthless acquisition; worthless for the student who
+ | cannot as a critic – that is as an intelligent and discerning reader – make a personal
+ | approach to the essential data of the literary historian, the works of literature (an
+ | approach is personal or it is nothing . . .27
+blank |
+ |
+text | However, what Leavis seeks from this close reading is very different from
+ | that which is sought by the doctrinal lawyer:
+blank |
+text | The essential discipline of an English School is the literary-critical . . . It trains, in a way
+ | no other discipline can, intelligence and sensibility together, cultivating a sensitiveness
+ | and precision of response and a delicate integrity of intelligence – intelligence that
+ | integrates as well as analyses and must have pertinacity and staying power as well as
+ | delicacy.28
+blank |
+ |
+text | Doctrinal study, in Leavis’s terminology, trains intelligence. Leavis,
+ | pursuing a liberal education through the vehicle of literary studies, seeks
+ | more, addressing, through the development of sensibility, the questions of
+ | value that doctrinal study leaves out.29
+blank |
+ref | 24 O. Kahn-Freund, ‘Reflections on Legal Education’ (1966) 29 Modern Law Rev. 121, at 129.
+ | 25 Kahn-Freund believed that both doctrinal and non-doctrinal learning were possible
+ | together though he did concede that in the doctrinal method there was ‘the danger that
+ | the discussion gets stuck in the perhaps intellectually very fascinating game of legal
+ | argument . . .’ (Kahn-Freund, id.).
+ | 26 Leavis, op. cit., n. 20, p. 120.
+ | 27 id., p. 68.
+ | 28 id., p. 34.
+ | 29 Leavis has, of course, been widely criticized for the cultural and gender assumptions that
+ | lie behind his selection of material to be studied. (See, for example, M. King, The New
+ | English Literatures (1980) at 216–17.) Whatever the accuracy of these criticisms, they are
+ | criticisms of the application of the method rather than the method itself.
+blank |
+meta | 77
+blank |
+meta | © Blackwell Publishers Ltd 1998
+text | If Leavis’s technique of close reading can allow students to address a wider
+ | range of questions than doctrinal study does this might suggest that doctrinal
+ | study can be adapted or improved so as to permit a wider engagement by
+ | the student. However, doctrinal study is personally disabling for students
+ | not just because of its argumentative technique.
+ | Doctrinal study involves understanding, assimilating, and accepting given
+ | concepts which are particular to the discipline of law. The student must
+ | learn, for example, that the ‘aggregate of a man’s proprietary rights constitutes
+ | his estate, his assets, or his property’ and that ‘[i]t makes no difference . . .
+ | whether a right is jus in rem or jus in personam. Rights of either sort are
+ | proprietary . . .’.30 Such concepts are ways of seeing the world. They are
+ | concepts which are not only different to but also alien from concepts in
+ | other academic disciplines.31 Moreover, they are ways of seeing which are
+ | at odds with what law students have previously experienced and continue
+ | to experience outside their studies. They are complicated, precise, abstruse
+ | and are learnt only at the expense of great personal effort. And their apparent
+ | solidity, objectivity, and neutrality cuts up the world in such a fashion as
+ | to forbid their use in any other kind of argument. Whereas in other
+ | disciplines within the social sciences and humanities concepts travel from
+ | one academic site to another, legal concepts remain isolated and isolating.
+ | The alienating effect of doctrinal concepts has previously been noted in
+ | the context of women students, those from socially disadvantaged back-
+ | grounds, and those who hold radical political views.32 It has, however, a
+ | resonance that is far wider than this. Doctrinal concepts, like the techniques
+ | of doctrinal argument, by their form, forbid all serious political, ethical or
+ | personal thought not just some kinds of such thought. Every student, no
+ | matter what their background and no matter what their political or other
+ | beliefs, is equally disadvantaged by ‘the intellectual strait-jacket that is the
+ | traditional legal method’.33
+ | The above is not to argue that doctrinal concepts do not have a political
+ | content nor is it to deny that that content can, at least in the past, frequently
+ | seem to have been slanted in a particular direction. Thus, for example,
+ | McAuslan may well have been right in arguing that:
+blank |
+ |
+ref | 30 Jurisprudence by Sir John Salmond, ed. G. Willliams (10th ed., 1947) at 256 and 257.
+ | 31 So much so that when other disciplines engage with law they must develop their own
+ | concepts to analyse law rather than rely on the concepts already developed in law. See,
+ | for example, E. Durkheim The Division of Labour in Society (1933) 68.
+ | 32 M. Le Brun and R. Johnstone, The Quiet Revolution: Improving Student Learning in Law
+ | (1994) 65. On the effect on women students, see ‘Define and Empower: Women Students
+ | Consider Feminist Learning’ (1990) I Law and Critique 47 at pp. 54–55. For a survey of
+ | CLS and feminist literature on this general point, see W. Conklin, ‘The Invisible Author
+ | of Legal Authority’ (1996) VII Law and Critique 173 at pp. 173–6.
+ | 33 R. Collier, ‘Masculinism, Law and Law Teaching’ (1991) 19 International J. of the Sociology
+ | of Law 427, at 429.
+blank |
+ |
+meta | 78
+blank |
+meta | © Blackwell Publishers Ltd 1998
+text | the courts’ general approach to judicial review in these matters [of health care and
+ | housing] – that it can all be reduced to a matter of individual rights versus the bureaucracy
+ | is very much in line with the ideology of the present [Conservative] government . . .34
+blank |
+text | Doctrinal concepts may well be inherently individualistic. They may well be
+ | patriachical. But to deplore their individualism or patriachy is to miss the
+ | point. It is not only those students who oppose or who are disadvantaged
+ | by individualism or patriarchy who are disempowered by the concepts.
+ | Doctrinal concepts not only do not teach us to oppose the philosophies they
+ | echo; they do not allow us to understand or defend the philosophies either.
+ | Because of this, doctrinal concepts are not simply a political difficulty; more
+ | importantly, they are also an educational problem. They reinforce certain
+ | attitudes and beliefs but they act as advertising slogans, not forms of
+ | reflection. If any thinking is to be done about their individualist or
+ | patriarchal nature, students must break through and break away from the
+ | doctrinal concepts they have been at such pains to learn. Thus the concepts
+ | are themselves a barrier to any student’s education.
+blank |
+ |
+text | WIDER LEARNING
+blank |
+text | In their book on the manner in which students learn law, Le Brun and
+ | Johnstone argue that learning is not about the transfer of information from
+ | teacher to student but about students learning to construct knowledge in
+ | the context of a particular culture.35 Learning is not simply learning facts;
+ | it is learning things in a particular context and learning to apply them in a
+ | way legitimated as correct by that social context. ‘[T]o learn law, law students
+ | must engage in activities and enter the community of practitioners and the
+ | culture of law.’36 Le Brun and Johnstone go on to assert that this does not
+ | necessarily involve students ‘buying into’ all the cultural norms of that
+ | community.37 However, many writers have argued that in the traditional
+ | process of legal education there is a strong pressure on students to not only
+ | assimilate but also accept the values of the community that they are studying.
+ | As Goodrich has put it, ‘an institutionally managed trauma gives birth to
+ | a conforming or believing soul’.38
+ | Engagement with socio-legal studies will assist a student in deciding
+ | whether or not to accept the cultural values of the legal community. Variety
+ | makes resistance more possible. This happens in three ways. First, whilst
+ | doctrinal study forbids many types of question, socio-legal studies embraces
+ | them. The range of questions that the socio-legal community asks about law
+blank |
+ref | 34 P. McAuslan, ‘Administrative Law, Collective Consumption and Judicial Policy’ (1983) 46
+ | Modern Law Rev. 1, at 8.
+ | 35 Le Brun and Johnstone, op. cit, n. 32, pp. 71–5.
+ | 36 id., p. 74.
+ | 37 id., p. 75.
+ | 38 Goodrich, op. cit., n. 22.
+blank |
+ |
+meta | 79
+blank |
+meta | © Blackwell Publishers Ltd 1998
+text | is, precisely, the range of questions asked about anything within the
+ | academy. Some of the disciplines the student will study will directly and
+ | explicitly analyse values as one of the schedule of questions that constitutes
+ | the community. Others will raise matters relevant to law as a tangential part
+ | of the enquiry. Secondly, if Le Brun and Johnstone’s analysis of the nature
+ | of learning is correct, in engaging in other disciplines the student will have
+ | to enter into each of the communities that constitutes the discipline. The
+ | hold that the legal community has on them is thus dissipated and other
+ | models of other communities with other values are put before the student.
+ | Finally, by engaging in other disciplines, students are freed to follow their
+ | own lines of enquiry. They are not constrained by the limits of an individual
+ | discipline. Rather, they can mix different disciplines in the way they choose.
+ | This promotes a form of student learning which is increasingly independent
+ | of course tutors and which can in principle continue beyond the life of the
+ | course.
+blank |
+ |
+text | THE LAW SCHOOL AND THE UNIVERSITY
+blank |
+text | Samuelson’s comment on the relationship between American universities
+ | and their law schools, ‘the same zip code often used to be about all the law
+ | school and the university had in common’, is equally applicable to the British
+ | situation.39 Historically, the law school has contributed little to the main
+ | body of the university except to provide large numbers of highly qualified
+ | students taught very cheaply. In particular there has been little curricular
+ | contact or cross-over between the law school and other departments. This
+ | academic isolation has not been not accidental. Rather, it is the logical and
+ | necessary outcome of the doctrinal method and the doctrinal concepts
+ | described above. The law school could not engage in the academic projects
+ | of other departments and disciplines because it lacked the necessary
+ | conceptual apparatus so to do. Other students could not engage in law
+ | because that which they had learned outside law was of no assistance in the
+ | study of law and their studies elsewhere was thought to leave them with
+ | insufficient time to study law adequately.
+ | Superficial examination of British law schools’ activities would seem to
+ | belie any charge of academic isolation. Harris and Jones’ recent survey of
+ | law schools in England, Wales and Northern Ireland showed that, of the
+ | sixty-six law schools responding, only twelve did not have some kind of joint
+ | or mixed degree programme.40 Moreover, there has been a ‘considerable
+blank |
+ |
+ref | 39 P. Samuelson, ‘The Convergence of the Law School and the University’ (1975) 44 The Am.
+ | Scholar 256, at 258.
+ | 40 P. Harris and M. Jones ‘A Survey of Law Schools in the United Kingdom, 1996’ (1997)
+ | 31 The Law Teacher 38, at 46.
+blank |
+meta | 80
+blank |
+meta | © Blackwell Publishers Ltd 1998
+text | increase’ in both the number of mixed and joint degree courses.41 Equally,
+ | other disciplines are sometimes incorporated into the standard LLB
+ | programme and law courses are taught by members of the law school in
+ | other single honours programmes within the university.42 A 1994 survey of
+ | the work of legal academics found that 78 per cent of all teachers taught
+ | non-law degree students.43 However, despite this apparent width and depth
+ | of involvement, examination of the details and experience of such contact
+ | in fact confirms the charge of academic isolation.
+ | Leighton, Mortimer, and Whatley found that 92 per cent of all legal
+ | academics they surveyed preferred to teach either law undergraduates or law
+ | postgraduates to any other form of student.44 Teaching law outside the law
+ | school is often characterized as ‘teaching law to non-lawyers’.45 The teaching
+ | and the students are thus characterized as being both secondary and inferior
+ | to that teaching and those students that are found within the law school.
+ | Participation in courses is usually limited to teaching. Bastin’s early small-
+ | scale study of law teaching in business studies degrees found that where the
+ | law teaching was done by staff from a law department they did not
+ | participate in the administration of the business studies degree even when
+ | they were given the opportunity to do so.46 It is thus not surprising to find
+ | that those teaching law outside the law school ‘are often isolated from
+ | colleagues who teach the core subjects relevant to the degree’.47
+ | The reasons for the isolation identified above are easy to identify. As
+ | Cartan and Vilkinas note in their article on law teaching in MBA courses:
+ | [t]he traditional (and still more common) approach to legal education . . . emphasises
+ | legal rules and includes a plethora of cases’.48
+blank |
+text | Such teaching, which follows on the pattern of traditional doctrinal study,
+ | puts a premium on repetition and in its law school context requires the student
+blank |
+ |
+ref | 41 J. Wilson , ‘A third survey of university legal education’ (1993) 13 Legal Studies 143, at
+ | 152.
+ | 42 Thus, for example, Harris and Jones reported that 59.2 per cent of all particpating
+ | institutions offered foriegn language tuition as part of their standard LLB programme.
+ | (Harris and Jones, op. cit., n. 40, at p. 54).
+ | 43 P. Leighton, T. Mortimer, and N. Whatley, Law Teachers: Lawyers or Academics? (1995)
+ | 34. This would include teaching both non-law degree students and sub-degree students.
+ | 44 id., p 35.
+ | 45 L. Skwarok, ‘Business Law for Non-Lawyers: Setting the Stage for Teaching, Learning
+ | and Assessment at Hong Kong Polytechnic University’ (1995) 29 The Law Teacher 189, at
+ | 189.
+ | 46 N. Bastin, ‘Law, Law Staff and CNAA Business Studies Degree Courses’ (1985) 19 The
+ | Law Teacher 12, at 13.
+ | 47 A. Ridley, ‘Legal Skills for Non-Law Students: Added Value or Irrelevant Diversion?’
+ | (1994) 28 The Law Teacher 281, at 282.
+ | 48 G. Cartan and T. Vilkinas, ‘Legal Literacy for Managers: The Role of the Educator’ (1990)
+ | 24 The Law Teacher 246, at 248.
+blank |
+ |
+meta | 81
+blank |
+meta | © Blackwell Publishers Ltd 1998
+text | to immerse themselves in law. Outside the law school, the student finds that
+ | law is only a small part of his or her course. They have little opportunity
+ | to engage in the repetition and no possibility of giving themselves wholly
+ | over to the study of law. The result is that study can become reduced to the
+ | rote learning of legal ‘facts’ where there is ‘[n]o real understanding of legal
+ | concepts [and] . . . no subtlety in the analysis of law . . .’.49
+ | Teaching law as part of a joint or mixed degree is not the same as teaching
+ | law as one or two units within another programme. However, there is much
+ | in the normal pattern of teaching on joint or mixed degrees that replicates
+ | the experience above. Lecturers from the different disciplines that constitute
+ | the joint or mixed degree will rarely meet. There is usually little attempt to
+ | integrate the individual parts of the degree. The students learn something
+ | of law and something of another discipline. If there are any specific
+ | connections between the two, the student is left to find them.50 If the degree
+ | is to be accredited by the Law Society and Bar Council for professional
+ | purposes then, under existing arrangements, the course must contain the
+ | seven foundation subjects. If the degree is to allow students an opportunity
+ | to study discipline other than law then it will frequently contain no more
+ | law than those seven subjects. The degree may then be criticized from within
+ | the law school on the ground that consideration of the law is carried on
+ | only at a superficial level.51 Once again, these failings in contact between the
+ | law school and the rest of the university and the criticism of the content of
+ | mixed degrees stem from the same background of a theory of doctrinal study
+ | and the nature of doctrinal concepts. The degree, albeit that it is mixed or
+ | joint, is seen as being there to teach students some law. Law is perceived as
+ | a discrete, doctrinal subject. Contact with other departments who will be
+ | teaching the same student history or politics or whatever is thus otiose. The
+ | only question is whether or not the student can be taught enough law within
+ | the constraints of the joint or mixed syllabus.
+ | New developments in teaching law to non-law students demonstrate some
+ | of the possibilities for new contacts between law schools and other
+ | departments if law is treated as a parasitic discipline. Ridley notes that, in
+ | the context of teaching law to accountancy students, studying law in its
+ | ‘broader social and political context’, rather than from a doctrinal
+ | perspective, resulted in a 6 per cent rise in those students who ‘definitely’
+ | saw law as being relevant to their studies.52 Similarly Cartan and Vilkinas
+ | have observed a change in the style of teaching law to managers. The new
+ | approach to teaching:
+blank |
+ref | 49 Ridley, op. cit., n. 47, at p. 284.
+ | 50 This, of course, is not always the case. For example, the BA Economics and Law degree
+ | at Leicester has a special course in each year given over to the consideration of the
+ | relationship between economics and law.
+ | 51 P. Birks, ‘Short Cuts’ in Pressing Problems in the Law, ed. P. Birks (1994) 10–24.
+ | 52 Ridley, op. cit., n. 47, p. 283.
+blank |
+meta | 82
+blank |
+meta | © Blackwell Publishers Ltd 1998
+text | views law as a living entity which has a future as well as a present and recognises law
+ | as an evolving process with important elements of history, sociology, politics and
+ | economics.53
+blank |
+text | The evidence presented by changes such as the above is limited but
+ | suggestive. Once law is presented in terms that students outside the law
+ | school can recognize its relevance to their studies becomes obvious. This is
+ | not surprising. If we believe that:
+ | empirically, law is a component part of the wider social and political structure, is
+ | inextricably related to it in an infinite variety of ways, and can therefore only be properly
+ | understood if studied in that context54
+blank |
+text | then the reverse proposition also logically follows. If law is a component
+ | part of the wider social and political structure, those who study that structure
+ | elsewhere in the university must, if they are to properly understand what
+ | they study, see the place that law has in the object of their study. Law, far
+ | from being an abstruse, technical discipline marginal to the university, is
+ | intricately involved in all that study in the university which involves either
+ | humanity, society or the state. This is not to say that law is, or should be,
+ | of dominant concern elsewhere. Nevertheless, it is part of the picture and,
+ | if it is painted using techniques and methods drawn from outside the law
+ | school, its place can become clear to non-law students.
+ | ACLEC’s support for the law degree as a form of liberal education
+ | underscores the need for the law school to use socio-legal material in teaching
+ | its students, Similarly, some of the conclusions of the Dearing report
+ | emphasize the need for the law school to use socio-legal techniques and thus
+ | involve itself in the curriculum of courses outside the law school. Dearing
+ | repeats the Robbins call for a wider range of degree programmes and states
+ | that:
+ | while many students will continue to welcome the opportunity to pursue a relatively
+ | narrow field of knowledge in great depth, there will be many others for whom this will
+ | neither be attractive, nor useful in career terms, nor suitable. In a world which changes
+ | rapidly, the nation will need people with broad perspectives.55
+blank |
+text | Law teaching using socio-legal material is ideally placed to play a part in
+ | such broader degree programmes.
+blank |
+ |
+text | CONCLUSION
+blank |
+text | The abandonment of the doctrinal project is seen to greatest effect in the
+ | research work of the law school. It continues to pervade much teaching and
+blank |
+ref | 53 Cartan and Vilkinas, op. cit., n. 48, p. 248.
+ | 54 P. Harris, ‘Curriculum Development in Legal Studies’ (1986) 20 The Law Teacher 110, at
+ | 112.
+ | 55 Dearing, op. cit., n. 12, para 9.3.
+blank |
+ |
+meta | 83
+blank |
+meta | © Blackwell Publishers Ltd 1998
+text | doubtless will do so for some years. As it gradually looses its grip on the law
+ | school so the law school will be able to take its proper place in the academy.
+ | The university, whatever else it is, is a conversation: a place for different
+ | people, and different discourses, to meet and, by their exchange, grow
+ | richer.56 ‘The carnival of understanding and judgement is open to all.’57
+ | Doctrinal study has held both students and the law school back from that
+ | conversation. Law as a parasitic discipline offers a much brighter future.
+blank |
+ |
+ |
+ |
+text | 56 This is so, whether the exchange is characterized in enlightenment or in postmodern terms.
+ref | 57 G. Steiner, Errata: An Examined Life (1997) 20.
+blank |
+meta | 84
+blank |
+meta | © Blackwell Publishers Ltd 1998
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/convert-anystyle-data/in/10.1111_1467-6478.00080.xml b/convert-anystyle-data/in/10.1111_1467-6478.00080.xml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..e15f4f995ca1450d29fe077bc002c9615d42d894
--- /dev/null
+++ b/convert-anystyle-data/in/10.1111_1467-6478.00080.xml
@@ -0,0 +1,420 @@
+<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
+<dataset>
+ <sequence>
+ <citation-number>1</citation-number>
+ <signal>For a contrary view, see</signal>
+ <author>G. Jones,</author>
+ <title>‘ “Traditional†Legal Scholarship: a Personal View’</title>
+ <container-title>in What Are Law Schools For?,</container-title>
+ <editor>ed. P. Birks</editor>
+ <date>(1996)</date>
+ <pages>14.</pages>
+ </sequence>
+ <sequence>
+ <citation-number>3</citation-number>
+ <author>R. Goff,</author>
+ <title>‘The Search for Principle’</title>
+ <date>(1983)</date>
+ <journal>Proceeedings of the British Academy</journal>
+ <volume>169,</volume>
+ <pages>at 171.</pages>
+ <note>This is an amplification of Dicey’s remark that ‘[b]y adequate study and careful thought whole departments of law can . . . be reduced to order and exhibited under the form of a few principles which sum up the effect of a hundred cases . . .’.</note>
+ <author>A. Dicey,</author>
+ <title>Can English Law be taught at the Universities?</title>
+ <date>(1883)</date>
+ <pages>20.</pages>
+ </sequence>
+ <sequence>
+ <citation-number>4</citation-number>
+ <author>J. Smith,</author>
+ <title>The Law of Contract</title>
+ <date>(1989)</date>
+ </sequence>
+ <sequence>
+ <citation-number>6</citation-number>
+ <signal>See, for example,</signal>
+ <author>D. Kennedy,</author>
+ <title>‘Form and substance in Private Law Ajudication’</title>
+ <date>(1976)</date>
+ <volume>89</volume>
+ <journal>Harvard Law Rev.</journal>
+ <pages>1685.</pages>
+ </sequence>
+ <sequence>
+ <citation-number>7</citation-number>
+ <author>B. Hepple,</author>
+ <title>‘The Renewal of the Liberal Law Degree’</title>
+ <date>(1996)</date>
+ <journal>Cambridge Law J.</journal>
+ <pages>470, at 485 and 481.</pages>
+ </sequence>
+ <sequence>
+ <citation-number>8</citation-number>
+ <author>P.A. Thomas,</author>
+ <title>‘Introduction’</title>
+ <container-title>in Socio-Legal Studies,</container-title>
+ <editor>ed. P.A. Thomas</editor>
+ <date>(1997)</date>
+ <pages>19.</pages>
+ </sequence>
+ <sequence>
+ <citation-number>9</citation-number>
+ <author>R. Cotterrell,</author>
+ <title>Law’s Community</title>
+ <date>(1995)</date>
+ <pages>296.</pages>
+ </sequence>
+ <sequence>
+ <citation-number>10</citation-number>
+ <note>Socio-legal studies has been defined in many different ways. In this essay the term is taken to indicate the use of ideas ‘from other disciplines primarily but not exclusively from within the social science and humanities fields’.</note>
+ <authority>S. Wheeler,</authority>
+ <title>‘Company Law’</title>
+ <editor> in Thomas,</editor>
+ <backref>op. cit., n. 8,</backref>
+ <pages>at p. 285.</pages>
+ </sequence>
+ <sequence>
+ <citation-number>11</citation-number>
+ <note>Some fail wholly. It is difficult to see any effect on academic legal education that resulted from</note>
+ <author>Lady Marre’s</author>
+ <title>report A Time for Change</title>
+ <date>(1988).</date>
+ <note>The Jarratt report on universities produced for the Committee of Vice-Chancellors and Principals (CVCP), Report of the Steering Committee for Efficiency studies in Universities</note>
+ <date>(1988),</date>
+ <note>produced much comment but little action. Even those that are thought of as being a success are not wholly implemented. Despite Ormrod’s recommendations no Institute of Profesional Legal Studies was set up and the universities and colleges of higher education did not take sole responsibility for vocational legal training</note>
+ <title>(Report of the Committee on Legal Education</title>
+ <date>(1971;</date>
+ <legal-ref>Cmnd 4595) </legal-ref>
+ <pages>ch. 9, recs. 40 and 23).</pages>
+ <note>There were also other recommendations that were not implemented.</note>
+ <title>The Robbins report on higher education, Higher Education</title>
+ <date>(1963;</date>
+ <legal-ref>Cmnd. 2154)</legal-ref>
+ <note>took it is axiomatic that ‘courses of higher education should be available for all those who are qualified by ability and attainment to pursue them and wish to do so’</note>
+ <pages>(para. 31).</pages>
+ <note>This has yet to happen.</note>
+ </sequence>
+ <sequence>
+ <citation-number>12</citation-number>
+ <author>National Committee of Inquiry into Higher Education,</author>
+ <title>Higher Education in the learning society</title>
+ <date>(1997)</date>
+ <note>(the Dearing report);</note>
+ <author>ACLEC,</author>
+ <title>First Report on Legal Education and Training</title>
+ <date>(1996).</date>
+ <note>The Government’s White Paper on further and higher education had not been published at the time of writing this essay.</note>
+ <citation-number>13</citation-number>
+ <author>ACLEC,</author>
+ <backref>id.,</backref>
+ <pages>para 4.6.</pages>
+ </sequence>
+ <sequence>
+ <citation-number>14</citation-number>
+ <note>ACLEC’s proposal is part of an historical process which has gradually seen English university law schools distance themselves from the legal professions and the legal professions propose decreasing degrees of control over the content of law degrees.</note>
+ <signal>(See</signal>
+ <author>A. Bradney and F. Cownie,</author>
+ <title>‘Working on the Chain Gang?’</title>
+ <date>(1996)</date>
+ <volume>2</volume>
+ <journal>Contemporary Issues in Law</journal>
+ <pages>15, at 24–6).</pages>
+ </sequence>
+ <sequence>
+ <citation-number>15</citation-number>
+ <author>J. MacFarlane, M. Jeeves, and A. Boon,</author>
+ <title>‘Education for Life or for Work?’</title>
+ <date>(1987)</date>
+ <volume>137</volume>
+ <journal>New Law J.</journal>
+ <pages>835, at 836.</pages>
+ </sequence>
+ <sequence>
+ <citation-number>16</citation-number>
+ <author>T.H. Huxley,</author>
+ <title>‘Universities: Actual and Ideal’</title>
+ <container-title>in T.H. Huxley, Collected Essays:</container-title>
+ <volume>Volume III</volume>
+ <date>(1905)</date>
+ <pages>215.</pages>
+ </sequence>
+ <sequence>
+ <citation-number>17</citation-number>
+ <author>J.S. Mill,</author>
+ <title>‘Inaugural address to the University of St Andrews’</title>
+ <container-title>in Collected Work of John Stuart Mill: Volume</container-title>
+ <volume>XXI,</volume>
+ <editor>ed. J.M. Robson</editor>
+ <date>(1984)</date>
+ <pages>218.</pages>
+ </sequence>
+ <sequence>
+ <citation-number>18</citation-number>
+ <author>Dearing,</author>
+ <backref>op. cit., n. 12,</backref>
+ <pages>para. 9.32.</pages>
+ </sequence>
+ <sequence>
+ <citation-number>19</citation-number>
+ <backref>id.,</backref>
+ <pages>para. 5.11.</pages>
+ </sequence>
+ <sequence>
+ <citation-number>20</citation-number>
+ <author>F.R. Leavis,</author>
+ <title>Education and the University</title>
+ <date>(1948)</date>
+ <volume>28.</volume>
+ <note>Leavis’s view was narrowly nationalistic. For ‘centre’ it would be better to substitute ‘centres’.</note>
+ </sequence>
+ <sequence>
+ <citation-number>21</citation-number>
+ <signal>See, further,</signal>
+ <author>A. Bradney,</author>
+ <title>‘Liberalising Legal Education’</title>
+ <container-title>in The Law School: Global Issues, Local Questions,</container-title>
+ <note>ed. F. Cownie (forthcoming).</note>
+ </sequence>
+ <sequence>
+ <citation-number>22</citation-number>
+ <author>P. Goodrich, ‘</author>
+ <title>Of Blackstone’s Tower: Metephors of Distance and Histories of the English Law School’</title>
+ <backref>in Birks, op. cit., n. 1,</backref>
+ <pages>p. 59. 23</pages>
+ <journal>S. Turow, One L</journal>
+ <date>(1977)</date>
+ <pages>106.</pages>
+ </sequence>
+ <sequence>
+ <citation-number>24</citation-number>
+ <author>O. Kahn-Freund,</author>
+ <title>‘Reflections on Legal Education’</title>
+ <date>(1966)</date>
+ <volume>29</volume>
+ <journal>Modern Law Rev.</journal>
+ <pages>121, at 129.</pages>
+ </sequence>
+ <sequence>
+ <citation-number>25</citation-number>
+ <note>Kahn-Freund believed ... legal argument</note>
+ <author>(Kahn-Freund,</author>
+ <backref>id.).</backref>
+ </sequence>
+ <sequence>
+ <citation-number>26</citation-number>
+ <author>Leavis,</author>
+ <backref>op. cit., n. 20,</backref>
+ <pages>p. 120.</pages>
+ </sequence>
+ <sequence>
+ <citation-number>29</citation-number>
+ <note>Leavis has, of course, been widely criticized for the cultural and gender assumptions that lie behind his selection of material to be studied.</note>
+ <signal>(See, for example,</signal>
+ <author>M. King,</author>
+ <title>The New English Literatures</title>
+ <date>(1980)</date>
+ <pages>at 216–17.)</pages>
+ <note>Whatever the accuracy of these criticisms, they are criticisms of the application of the method rather than the method itself.</note>
+ </sequence>
+ <sequence>
+ <citation-number>30</citation-number>
+ <title>Jurisprudence by Sir John Salmond,</title>
+ <editor>ed. G. Willliams (10th ed.,</editor>
+ <date>1947)</date>
+ <pages>at 256 and 257.</pages>
+ </sequence>
+ <sequence>
+ <citation-number>31</citation-number>
+ <note>So much so that when other disciplines engage with law they must develop their own concepts to analyse law rather than rely on the concepts already developed in law.</note>
+ <signal>See, for example,</signal>
+ <author>E. Durkheim</author>
+ <title>The Division of Labour in Society</title>
+ <date>(1933)</date>
+ <pages>68.</pages>
+ </sequence>
+ <sequence>
+ <citation-number>32</citation-number>
+ <author>M. Le Brun and R. Johnstone,</author>
+ <title>The Quiet Revolution: Improving Student Learning in Law</title>
+ <date>(1994)</date>
+ <note>65. On the effect on women students,</note>
+ <signal>see</signal>
+ <title>‘Define and Empower: Women Students Consider Feminist Learning’</title>
+ <date>(1990)</date>
+ <volume>I</volume>
+ <journal>Law and Critique</journal>
+ <pages>47 at pp. 54–55.</pages>
+ <signal>For a survey of CLS and feminist literature on this general point, see</signal>
+ <author>W. Conklin,</author>
+ <title>‘The Invisible Author of Legal Authority’</title>
+ <date>(1996)</date>
+ <volume>VII</volume>
+ <journal>Law and Critique</journal>
+ <pages>173 at pp. 173–6.</pages>
+ </sequence>
+ <sequence>
+ <citation-number>33</citation-number>
+ <author>R. Collier,</author>
+ <title>‘Masculinism, Law and Law Teaching’</title>
+ <date>(1991)</date>
+ <volume>19</volume>
+ <journal>International J. of the Sociology of Law</journal>
+ <pages>427, at 429.</pages>
+ </sequence>
+ <sequence>
+ <citation-number>34</citation-number>
+ <author>P. McAuslan,</author>
+ <title>‘Administrative Law, Collective Consumption and Judicial Policy’</title>
+ <date>(1983)</date>
+ <volume>46</volume>
+ <journal>Modern Law Rev.</journal>
+ <pages>1, at 8.</pages>
+ </sequence>
+ <sequence>
+ <citation-number>35</citation-number>
+ <author>Le Brun and Johnstone,</author>
+ <backref>op. cit, n. 32,</backref>
+ <pages>pp. 71–5.</pages>
+ </sequence>
+ <sequence>
+ <citation-number>38</citation-number>
+ <author>Goodrich,</author>
+ <backref>op. cit., n. 22.</backref>
+ </sequence>
+ <sequence>
+ <citation-number>39</citation-number>
+ <author>P. Samuelson,</author>
+ <title>‘The Convergence of the Law School and the University’</title>
+ <date>(1975)</date>
+ <volume>44</volume>
+ <journal>The Am. Scholar</journal>
+ <pages>256, at 258.</pages>
+ </sequence>
+ <sequence>
+ <citation-number>40</citation-number>
+ <author>P. Harris and M. Jones</author>
+ <title>‘A Survey of Law Schools in the United Kingdom, 1996’</title>
+ <date>(1997)</date>
+ <volume>31</volume>
+ <journal>The Law Teacher</journal>
+ <pages>38, at 46.</pages>
+ </sequence>
+ <sequence>
+ <citation-number>41</citation-number>
+ <author>J. Wilson ,</author>
+ <title>‘A third survey of university legal education’</title>
+ <date>(1993)</date>
+ <volume>13</volume>
+ <journal>Legal Studies</journal>
+ <pages>143, at 152.</pages>
+ </sequence>
+ <sequence>
+ <citation-number>42</citation-number>
+ <note>Thus, for example, Harris and Jones reported that 59.2 per cent of all particpating institutions offered foriegn language tuition as part of their standard LLB programme.</note>
+ <signal>(Harris and</signal>
+ <author>Jones,</author>
+ <backref>op. cit., n. 40,</backref>
+ <pages>at p. 54).</pages>
+ </sequence>
+ <sequence>
+ <citation-number>43</citation-number>
+ <author>P. Leighton, T. Mortimer, and N. Whatley,</author>
+ <title>Law Teachers: Lawyers or Academics?</title>
+ <date>(1995)</date>
+ </sequence>
+ <sequence>
+ <citation-number>34.</citation-number>
+ <note>This would include teaching both non-law degree students and sub-degree students.</note>
+ <backref>44 id.,</backref>
+ <pages>p 35</pages>
+ </sequence>
+ <sequence>
+ <citation-number>45</citation-number>
+ <author>L. Skwarok,</author>
+ <title>‘Business Law for Non-Lawyers: Setting the Stage for Teaching, Learning and Assessment at Hong Kong Polytechnic University’</title>
+ <date>(1995)</date>
+ <volume>29</volume>
+ <journal>The Law Teacher</journal>
+ <pages>189, at 189.</pages>
+ </sequence>
+ <sequence>
+ <citation-number>46</citation-number>
+ <author>N. Bastin,</author>
+ <title>‘Law, Law Staff and CNAA Business Studies Degree Courses’</title>
+ <date>(1985)</date>
+ <volume>19</volume>
+ <journal>The Law Teacher</journal>
+ <pages>12, at 13.</pages>
+ </sequence>
+ <sequence>
+ <citation-number>47</citation-number>
+ <author>A. Ridley,</author>
+ <title>‘Legal Skills for Non-Law Students: Added Value or Irrelevant Diversion?’</title>
+ <date>(1994)</date>
+ <volume>28</volume>
+ <journal>The Law Teacher</journal>
+ <pages>281, at 282.</pages>
+ </sequence>
+ <sequence>
+ <citation-number>48</citation-number>
+ <author>G. Cartan and T. Vilkinas,</author>
+ <title>‘Legal Literacy for Managers: The Role of the Educator’</title>
+ <date>(1990)</date>
+ <volume>24</volume>
+ <journal>The Law Teacher</journal>
+ <pages>246, at 248.</pages>
+ </sequence>
+ <sequence>
+ <citation-number>49</citation-number>
+ <author>Ridley,</author>
+ <backref>op. cit., n. 47,</backref>
+ <pages>at p. 284.</pages>
+ </sequence>
+ <sequence>
+ <citation-number>50</citation-number>
+ <note>This, of course, is not always the case. For example, the BA Economics and Law degree at Leicester has a special course in each year given over to the consideration of the relationship between economics and law.</note>
+ </sequence>
+ <sequence>
+ <citation-number>51</citation-number>
+ <author>P. Birks,</author>
+ <title>‘Short Cuts’</title>
+ <container-title>in Pressing Problems in the Law,</container-title>
+ <editor>ed. P. Birks</editor>
+ <date>(1994)</date>
+ <pages>10–24.</pages>
+ </sequence>
+ <sequence>
+ <citation-number>52</citation-number>
+ <author>Ridley,</author>
+ <backref>op. cit., n. 47,</backref>
+ <pages>p. 283.</pages>
+ </sequence>
+ <sequence>
+ <citation-number>53</citation-number>
+ <author>Cartan and Vilkinas,</author>
+ <backref>op. cit., n. 48,</backref>
+ <pages>p. 248.</pages>
+ </sequence>
+ <sequence>
+ <citation-number>54</citation-number>
+ <author>P. Harris,</author>
+ <title>‘Curriculum Development in Legal Studies’</title>
+ <date>(1986)</date>
+ <volume>20</volume>
+ <journal>The Law Teacher</journal>
+ <pages>110, at 112.</pages>
+ </sequence>
+ <sequence>
+ <citation-number>55</citation-number>
+ <author>Dearing,</author>
+ <backref>op. cit., n. 12,</backref>
+ <pages>para 9.3.</pages>
+ </sequence>
+ <sequence>
+ <citation-number>57</citation-number>
+ <author>G. Steiner,</author>
+ <title>Errata: An Examined Life</title>
+ <date>(1997)</date>
+ <pages>20.</pages>
+ </sequence>
+</dataset>
diff --git a/convert-anystyle-data/in/10.1515_zfrs-1980-0104.xml b/convert-anystyle-data/in/10.1515_zfrs-1980-0104.xml
index c0f04ff24d7813177e343fc4ae5c4a61be261dc8..55c930c3828850e78f481a86f50baea759ac5429 100644
--- a/convert-anystyle-data/in/10.1515_zfrs-1980-0104.xml
+++ b/convert-anystyle-data/in/10.1515_zfrs-1980-0104.xml
@@ -585,9 +585,10 @@
</sequence>
<sequence>
<citation-number>52</citation-number>
- <authority>IDE-International Research Group,</authority>
+ <author>IDE-International Research Group,</author>
<title>Industrial Democracy in Europe</title>
- <journal>(erscheint bei Oxford University Press,</journal>
+ <note>(erscheint bei</note>
+ <publisher>Oxford University Press,</publisher>
<location>London</location>
<date>1980)</date>
<pages>Chapter VIII.</pages>
diff --git a/convert-anystyle-data/out/10.1111_1467-6478.00057.jsonl b/convert-anystyle-data/out/10.1111_1467-6478.00057.jsonl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..475ed3f75f6722f7523a6463562ced89b76ce82b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/convert-anystyle-data/out/10.1111_1467-6478.00057.jsonl
@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
+{"in": "1 A. Phillips, \u2018Citizenship and Feminist Politics\u2019 in Citizenship, ed. G. Andrews (1991) 77.", "out": [{"citation-number": "1", "author": "A. Phillips", "title": "Citizenship and Feminist Politics", "container-title": "Citizenship", "editor": "G. Andrews", "date": "1991"}]}
+{"in": "2 T. Brennan and C. Pateman, \u2018\u201cMere Auxiliaries to the Commonwealth\u201d: Women and the Origins of Liberalism\u2019 (1979) 27 Political Studies 183.", "out": [{"citation-number": "2", "author": "T. Brennan and C. Pateman", "title": "Mere Auxiliaries to the Commonwealth\u201d: Women and the Origins of Liberalism", "date": "1979", "journal": "Political Studies"}]}
+{"in": "3 M. Sawer and M. Simms, A Woman\u2019s Place: Women and Politics in Australia (2nd ed., 1993).", "out": [{"citation-number": "3", "author": "M. Sawer and M. Simms", "title": "A Woman\u2019s Place: Women and Politics in Australia", "date": "1993"}]}
+{"in": "4 I have explored the gendered nature of citizenship at greater length in two complementary papers: \u2018Embodying the Citizen\u2019 in Public and Private: Feminist Legal Debates, ed. M. Thornton (1995) and \u2018Historicising Citizenship: Remembering Broken Promises\u2019 (1996) 20 Melbourne University Law Rev. 1072.", "out": [{"citation-number": "4", "title": "Embodying the Citizen", "container-title": "Public and Private: Feminist Legal Debates", "editor": "M. Thornton", "date": "1995"}, {"citation-number": "4", "title": "Historicising Citizenship: Remembering Broken Promises", "date": "1996", "journal": "Melbourne University Law Rev"}]}
+{"in": "5 S. Walby, \u2018Is Citizenship Gendered?\u2019 (1994) 28 Sociology 379", "out": [{"citation-number": "5", "author": "S. Walby", "title": "Is Citizenship Gendered", "date": "1994", "journal": "Sociology"}]}
+{"in": "6 I. Kant, \u2018Metaphysical First Principles of the Doctrine of Right\u2019 [1785] in The Metaphysics of Morals (trans. M. Gregor, 1991) 125\u20136, s. 146.", "out": [{"citation-number": "6", "author": "I. Kant", "title": "Metaphysical First Principles of the Doctrine of Right", "container-title": "The Metaphysics of Morals", "date": "1991"}]}
+{"in": "7 U. Vogel, \u2018Marriage and the Boundaries of Citizenship\u2019 in The Condition of Citizenship, ed. B. van Steenbergen (1994) 75.", "out": [{"citation-number": "7", "author": "U. Vogel", "title": "Marriage and the Boundaries of Citizenship", "container-title": "The Condition of Citizenship", "editor": "B. van Steenbergen", "date": "1994"}]}
+{"in": "8 N. Fraser and L. Gordon, \u2018Civil Citizenship against Social Citizenship?\u2019 in id., p. 97.", "out": [{"citation-number": "8", "author": "N. Fraser and L. Gordon", "title": "Civil Citizenship against Social Citizenship", "backref": "in id"}]}
+{"in": "9 Vogel, id., p. 79. W. Blackstone, Commentaries (Facsimile of 1st. ed. of 1765\u201369, 1979) 442.", "out": [{"citation-number": "9", "author": "Vogel", "backref": "id.,"}, {"citation-number": "9", "author": "W. Blackstone", "title": "Commentaries", "date": "1979"}]}
+{"in": "11 Vogel, op. cit., n. 7, pp. 80\u20131.", "out": [{"citation-number": "11", "author": "Vogel", "backref": "op. cit., n. 7"}]}
+{"in": "12 F. Haug (ed.), Female Sexualization: A Collective Work of Memory (1987) 196.", "out": [{"citation-number": "12", "editor": "F. Haug ()", "title": "Female Sexualization: A Collective Work of Memory", "date": "1987"}]}
+{"in": "13 A. Bottomley, \u2018Self and Subjectivities: Languages of Claim in Property Law\u2019 (1993) 20 J. of Law and Society 56, 61.", "out": [{"citation-number": "13", "author": "A. Bottomley", "title": "Self and Subjectivities: Languages of Claim in Property Law", "date": "1993", "journal": "J. of Law and Society"}]}
+{"in": "14 D. West, \u2018Power and Formation: New Foundations for a Radical Concept of Power\u2019 (1987)", "out": [{"citation-number": "14", "author": "D. West", "title": "Power and Formation: New Foundations for a Radical Concept of Power", "date": "1987"}]}
+{"in": "30 Inquiry 137, 145. Compare M. Foucault, Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972\u20131977, ed. C. Gordon (1980) 98.", "out": [{"citation-number": "30", "title": "Inquiry 137", "author": "M. Foucault"}, {"citation-number": "30", "title": "Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972\u20131977", "editor": "C. Gordon", "date": "1980"}]}
+{"in": "15 For a detailed analysis of legal method and the political role it plays, see M.J. Mossman, \u2018Feminism, and Legal Method: The Difference it Makes\u2019 (1986) 3 Aust. J. of Law and Society 30.", "out": [{"citation-number": "15", "author": "M.J. Mossman", "title": "Feminism, and Legal Method: The Difference it Makes", "date": "1986", "journal": "Aust. J. of Law and Society"}]}
+{"in": "16 H.S. Maine, Ancient Law: Its Connection with the Early History of Society and its Relation to Modern Ideas (10th ed., 1912) 174.", "out": [{"citation-number": "16", "author": "H.S. Maine", "title": "Ancient Law: Its Connection with the Early History of Society and its Relation to Modern Ideas", "date": "1912"}]}
+{"in": "17 This was particularly the case in the United States of America. See M.J. Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law, 1780\u20131860 (1977) 160.", "out": [{"citation-number": "17", "author": "M.J. Horwitz", "title": "The Transformation of American Law, 1780\u20131860", "date": "1977"}]}
+{"in": "18 M. Grossberg, Governing the Hearth: Law and the Family in Nineteenth-Century America (1985) ix.", "out": [{"citation-number": "18", "author": "M. Grossberg", "title": "Governing the Hearth: Law and the Family in Nineteenth-Century America", "date": "1985"}]}
+{"in": "19 Staves postulates that the position was somewhat more complicated in that marriage, as a status, crumbled in response to contract ideology in the seventeenth century but, by the end of the eighteenth century, deeper patriarchal structures were re-imposed. See S. Staves, Married Women\u2019s Separate Property in England, 1660\u20131833 (1990) 4, 220.", "out": [{"citation-number": "19", "author": "S. Staves", "title": "Married Women\u2019s Separate Property in England, 1660\u20131833", "date": "1990"}]}
+{"in": "20 Siegel presents a valuable study of the changing norms of marriage in the context of wife beating. See R.B. Siegel, \u2018\u201cThe Rule of Love\u201d: Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy\u2019 (1996) 105 Yale Law J. 2117.", "out": [{"citation-number": "20", "author": "R.B. Siegel", "title": "The Rule of Love\u201d: Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy", "date": "1996", "journal": "Yale Law J"}]}
+{"in": "21 C. Pateman, The Sexual Contract (1988). For further analysis of the marriage contract, see K. O\u2019Donovan, Family Matters (1993), especially 43\u201359.", "out": [{"citation-number": "21", "author": "C. Pateman", "title": "The Sexual Contract", "date": "1988"}, {"citation-number": "21", "author": "K. O\u2019Donovan", "title": "Family Matters", "date": "1993"}]}
+{"in": "23 Crimes (Sexual Assault) Amendment Act 1981 (N.S.W.); Criminal Law Consolidation Act Amendment Act 1976 (S.A.); Criminal Code (Sexual Offences) Act 1987 (Tas.); Crimes (Sexual Offences) 1991 (Vic.); Acts Amendment (Sexual Assault) Act 1985 (W.A.). The High Court upheld the validity of the South Australian law in 1991 (see R. v. L. (1991) 103 A.L.R. 577), the same year that the House of Lords abolished the immunity ( see R. v. R. [1991] 2 All E.R. 257).", "out": [{"citation-number": "23", "legal-ref": "Crimes (Sexual Assault) Amendment Act", "date": "1981"}, {"citation-number": "23", "legal-ref": "Criminal Law Consolidation Act Amendment Act", "date": "1976"}, {"citation-number": "23", "legal-ref": "Criminal Code (Sexual Offences) Act", "date": "1987"}, {"citation-number": "23", "legal-ref": "Crimes (Sexual Offences)", "date": "1991"}, {"citation-number": "23", "legal-ref": "Acts Amendment (Sexual Assault) Act", "date": "1985"}, {"citation-number": "23", "legal-ref": "R. v. L", "date": "1991"}, {"citation-number": "23", "legal-ref": "103 A.L.R. 577)"}, {"citation-number": "23", "legal-ref": "R. v. R", "date": "1991", "journal": "All E.R"}, {"citation-number": "23", "legal-ref": "257)"}]}
+{"in": "24 M. Freeman, \u2018Contracting in the Haven: Balfour v. Balfour Revisited\u2019 in Exploring the Boundaries of Contract, ed. R. Halson (1996) 74; R. Collier, Masculinity, Law and the Family (1995) 127 and throughout. See Collier further for a comprehensive study of sexuality in marriage.", "out": [{"citation-number": "24", "author": "M. Freeman", "title": "Contracting in the Haven: Balfour v. Balfour Revisited", "container-title": "Exploring the Boundaries of Contract", "editor": "R. Halson", "date": "1996"}, {"citation-number": "24", "author": "R. Collier", "title": "Masculinity, Law and the Family", "date": "1995"}, {"citation-number": "24", "author": "Collier"}]}
+{"in": "25 P.S. Atiyah, An Introduction to the Law of Contract (5th ed., 1995) 3.", "out": [{"citation-number": "25", "author": "P.S. Atiyah", "title": "An Introduction to the Law of Contract", "date": "1995"}]}
+{"in": "26 The Australian Law Reform Commission has addressed the issue and recommended recognition of prenuptial agreements. See A.L.R.C., Matrimonial Property, report no. 37 (1987); A.L.R.C., Report of the Joint Select Committee on Certain Aspects of the Operation and Interpretation of the Family Law Act (1992). For critique, see M. Neave, \u2018Private Ordering in Family Law \u2013 Will Women Benefit?\u2019 in Thornton, op. cit., n. 4. For a feminist critique of contract in the American context, see C. Dalton, \u2018An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine\u2019 (1985) 94 Yale Law J. 997.", "out": [{"citation-number": "26", "title": "A.L.R.C., Matrimonial Property", "journal": "report no. 37", "date": "1987"}, {"citation-number": "26", "author": "A.L.R.C", "title": "Report of the Joint Select Committee on Certain Aspects of the Operation and Interpretation of the Family Law Act", "date": "1992"}, {"citation-number": "26", "author": "M. Neave", "title": "Private Ordering in Family Law \u2013 Will Women Benefit", "container-title": "Thornton", "backref": "op. cit., n. 4"}, {"citation-number": "26", "author": "C. Dalton", "title": "An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine", "date": "1985", "journal": "Yale Law J"}]}
+{"in": "27 L. J. Weitzman, The Marriage Contract: Spouses, Lovers, and the Law (1981) 347 ff.", "out": [{"citation-number": "27", "author": "L. J. Weitzman", "title": "The Marriage Contract: Spouses, Lovers, and the Law", "date": "1981"}]}
+{"in": "28 Grossberg, op. cit., n. 18, p. 52.", "out": [{"citation-number": "28", "author": "Grossberg", "backref": "op. cit., n. 18"}]}
+{"in": "29 Balfour v. Balfour [1919] 2 K.B. 571.", "out": [{"citation-number": "29", "author": "Balfour v. Balfour", "date": "1919"}]}
+{"in": "30 Freeman, op. cit., n. 24. While acknowledging the trends towards contractualism and private ordering, Regan cautions against it, noting that greater freedom to contract invites greater scrutiny by the courts. More significantly, however, he would rather reclaim the idea of status by injecting it with new notions of responsibility and relationality, as well as divesting it of its sexist assumptions. See M.C. Regan Jr., Family Law and the Pursuit of Intimacy (1993).", "out": [{"citation-number": "30", "author": "Freeman", "backref": "op. cit., n. 24"}, {"citation-number": "30", "author": "M.C. Regan Jr", "title": "Family Law and the Pursuit of Intimacy", "date": "1993"}]}
+{"in": "31 For example, Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1970 (U.K.); Domestic Relations Act 1975 (N.Z.); Marriage Act Amendment Act 1976 (Cwth.)", "out": [{"citation-number": "31", "author": "For example", "legal-ref": "Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act", "date": "1970"}, {"citation-number": "31", "legal-ref": "Domestic Relations Act", "date": "1975"}, {"citation-number": "31", "legal-ref": "Marriage Act Amendment Act", "date": "1976"}]}
+{"in": "32 G.S. Frost, Promises Broken: Courtship, Class, and Gender in Victorian England (1995); Thornton, op. cit. (1996), n. 4.", "out": [{"citation-number": "32", "author": "G.S. Frost", "title": "Promises Broken: Courtship, Class, and Gender in Victorian England (1995)"}, {"citation-number": "32", "author": "Thornton", "backref": "op. cit", "date": "1996"}]}
+{"in": "33 Grossberg, op. cit., n. 18, p. 38.", "out": [{"citation-number": "33", "author": "Grossberg", "backref": "op. cit., n. 18"}]}
+{"in": "34 Compare U. Vogel, \u2018Is Citizenship Gender-Specific?\u2019 in The Frontiers of Citizenship, eds. U. Vogel and M. Moran (1991) 59.", "out": [{"citation-number": "34", "author": "U. Vogel", "title": "Is Citizenship Gender-Specific", "container-title": "The Frontiers of Citizenship", "editor": "U. Vogel and M. Moran", "date": "1991"}]}
+{"in": "35 See, for example, Bradwell v. Illinois 83 U.S. (16 Wall) 130 (1873).", "out": [{"citation-number": "35", "legal-ref": "Bradwell v. Illinois 83 U.S. (16 Wall) 130", "date": "1873"}]}
+{"in": "36 Compare J. Pahl, Money and Marriage (1989) 5.", "out": [{"citation-number": "36", "author": "J. Pahl", "title": "Money and Marriage", "date": "1989"}]}
+{"in": "37 Although Australia, like the United Kingdom, has a separate property regime, the courts are endowed with broad powers under the Family Law Act 1975 (Cwth.) to distribute property equitably. For detailed treatment, see S. Parker, P. Parkinson, and J. Behrens, Australian Family Law in Context: Commentary and Materials (1994). Most civil law countries and most American states have developed community property regimes which recognize the joint ownership of property acquired during marriage, but the legal significance is similarly directed to the time of divorce. For discussion of the position during marriage, see J.T. Oldham, \u2018Management of the Community Estate during an Intact Marriage\u2019 (1993) 56 Law and Contemporary Problems 99. For a discussion of the genesis of the two systems, see C. Donahue, Jr., \u2018What Causes Fundamental Legal Ideas? Marital Property in England and France in the Thirteenth Century\u2019 (1979) 78 Michigan Law Rev. 59.", "out": [{"citation-number": "37", "author": "Although"}, {"citation-number": "37", "author": "S. Parker, P. Parkinson, and J. Behrens", "title": "Australian Family Law in Context: Commentary and Materials", "date": "1994"}, {"citation-number": "37", "author": "J.T. Oldham", "title": "Management of the Community Estate during an Intact Marriage", "date": "1993", "journal": "Law and Contemporary Problems"}, {"citation-number": "37", "author": "C. Donahue, Jr", "title": "What Causes Fundamental Legal Ideas? Marital Property in England and France in the Thirteenth Century", "date": "1979", "journal": "Michigan Law Rev"}]}
+{"in": "38 The legal construction of masculinity and femininity in family law has been the subject of recent scholarly interest. Notable examples are O\u2019Donovan, op. cit., n. 21 and Collier, op. cit., n. 24.", "out": [{"citation-number": "38", "author": "O\u2019Donovan", "backref": "op. cit., n. 21"}, {"citation-number": "38", "author": "Collier", "backref": "op. cit., n. 24"}]}
+{"in": "39 For discussion of sex and legal subjecthood, see N. Naffine \u2018Sexing the Subject (of Law)\u2019 in Thornton , op. cit. (1995), n. 4.", "out": [{"citation-number": "39", "author": "N. Naffine", "title": "Sexing the Subject (of Law)", "editor": "in Thornton", "backref": "op. cit", "date": "1995"}, {"citation-number": "39", "backref": "n. 4"}]}
+{"in": "40 Contracts Review Act 1980 (N.S.W.).", "out": [{"citation-number": "40", "journal": "Contracts Review Act", "date": "1980"}]}
+{"in": "41 J. Nedelsky, Private Property and the Limits of American Constitutionalism: The Madisonian Framework and its Legacy (1990) especially 223 ff.", "out": [{"citation-number": "41", "author": "J. Nedelsky", "title": "Private Property and the Limits of American Constitutionalism: The Madisonian Framework and its Legacy", "date": "1990"}]}
+{"in": "42 C.B. Macpherson, Democratic Theory: Essays in Retrieval (1973) 120.", "out": [{"citation-number": "42", "author": "C.B. Macpherson", "title": "Democratic Theory: Essays in Retrieval", "date": "1973"}]}
+{"in": "43 For example, N. Howell, \u2018\u201cSexually Transmitted Debt\u201d: A Feminist Analysis of Laws Regulating Guarantors and Co-Borrowers\u2019 (1995) 4 Aust. Feminist Law J. 93.", "out": [{"citation-number": "43", "author": "N. Howell", "title": "Sexually Transmitted Debt\u201d: A Feminist Analysis of Laws Regulating Guarantors and Co-Borrowers", "date": "1995", "journal": "Aust. Feminist Law J"}]}
+{"in": "44 P. Baron, \u2018The Free Exercise of Her Will: Women and Emotionally Transmitted Debt\u2019 (1995) 13 Law in Context 23.", "out": [{"citation-number": "44", "author": "P. Baron", "title": "The Free Exercise of Her Will: Women and Emotionally Transmitted Debt", "date": "1995", "journal": "Law in Context"}]}
+{"in": "45 id., p. 24; B. Fehlberg, \u2018The Husband, the Bank, the Wife and Her Signature\u2019 (1994) 57 Modern Law Rev. 467, 468. See, also, Barclays Bank v. O\u2019Brien [1994] 1 A.C. 180, at 185, per Brown-Wilkinson L", "out": [{"citation-number": "45", "backref": "id", "author": "B. Fehlberg", "title": "The Husband, the Bank, the Wife and Her Signature", "date": "1994", "journal": "Modern Law Rev"}, {"citation-number": "45", "legal-ref": "Barclays Bank v. O\u2019Brien", "date": "1994"}, {"citation-number": "45", "legal-ref": "1 A.C. 180", "author": "per Brown-Wilkinson L"}]}
+{"in": "46 Baron, op. cit., n. 44, p. 34; M. Richardson, \u2018Protecting Women who provide Security for a Husband\u2019s, Partner\u2019s or Child\u2019s Debts. The Value and Limits of an Economic Perspective\u2019 (1996) 16 Legal Studies 368.", "out": [{"citation-number": "46", "author": "Baron", "backref": "op. cit., n. 44"}, {"citation-number": "46", "author": "M. Richardson", "title": "Protecting Women who provide Security for a Husband\u2019s, Partner\u2019s or Child\u2019s Debts. The Value and Limits of an Economic Perspective", "date": "1996", "journal": "Legal Studies"}]}
+{"in": "47 Examples are legion, and by no means confined to the more sensational criminal law cases picked up by the media, such as R. v. Johns, Supreme Court of South Australia, 26 August 1992 (unreported) in which Bollen J. stated that it was acceptable for a husband to resort to \u2018rougher than usual handling\u2019 to persuade his wife to have sex with him. For examples relating to STD, see Howell, op. cit., n. 43.", "out": [{"citation-number": "47", "legal-ref": "R. v. Johns"}, {"citation-number": "47", "legal-ref": "Supreme Court of South Australia", "date": "1992"}, {"citation-number": "47", "author": "Howell", "backref": "op. cit., n. 43"}]}
+{"in": "48 B. Fehlberg, \u2018The Husband, the Bank, the Wife and Her Signature \u2013 the Sequel\u2019 (1996) 59 Modern Law Rev. 675.", "out": [{"citation-number": "48", "author": "B. Fehlberg", "title": "The Husband, the Bank, the Wife and Her Signature \u2013 the Sequel", "date": "1996", "journal": "Modern Law Rev"}]}
+{"in": "49 National Australia Bank Ltd v. Garcia (1996) 39 N.S.W.L.R. 577 (N.S.W.C.A.). 50 (1991) 25 N.S.W.L.R. 32 (C.A.).", "out": [{"citation-number": "49", "legal-ref": "National Australia Bank Ltd v. Garcia", "date": "1996", "journal": "N.S.W.L.R"}, {"citation-number": "49", "legal-ref": "577 (N.S.W.C.A.). 50", "date": "1991"}, {"citation-number": "49", "legal-ref": "25 N.S.W.L.R. 32 (C.A.)"}]}
+{"in": "52 (1994) A.S.C. 56\u2013268 (N.S.W.C.A.).", "out": [{"citation-number": "52", "date": "1994"}, {"citation-number": "52", "legal-ref": "A.S.C. 56\u2013268 (N.S.W.C.A.)"}]}
+{"in": "53 Based on the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cwth.), s. 52, and the Contracts Review Act 1980 (N.S.W.). 54 (1994) A.S.C. 56\u2013270 (N.S.W.C.A.).", "out": [{"citation-number": "53", "legal-ref": "Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cwth.)"}, {"citation-number": "53", "legal-ref": "Contracts Review Act", "date": "1980"}, {"citation-number": "53", "date": "1994"}]}
+{"in": "55 A number of recent English cases have also turned on the question of whether the wife received independent legal advice. The House of Lords considered the issue in Barclays Bank v. O\u2019Brien [1994] 1 A.C. 180. See, also, Banco Exterior Internacional v. Mann [1995] 1 All E.R. 936.", "out": [{"citation-number": "55", "legal-ref": "in Barclays Bank v. O\u2019Brien", "date": "1994"}, {"citation-number": "55", "legal-ref": "Banco Exterior Internacional v. Mann", "date": "1995"}, {"citation-number": "55", "legal-ref": "1 All E.R. 936"}]}
+{"in": "See I.J. Hardingham and M.A. Neave, Australian Family Property Law (1984) 94.", "out": [{"author": "See I.J. Hardingham and M.A. Neave", "title": "Australian Family Property Law", "date": "1984"}]}
+{"in": "57 Compare K. O\u2019Donovan, Sexual Divisions in Law (1985), especially 112\u201318.", "out": [{"citation-number": "57", "author": "K. O\u2019Donovan", "title": "Sexual Divisions in Law", "date": "1985"}]}
+{"in": "58 Although Reich\u2019s work on the conceptualization of non-traditional sources of wealth, such as employment and professional qualifications, as forms of \u2018new property\u2019 has been influential, he did not broach the subject of caring work. See C.A. Reich, \u2018The New Property\u2019 (1964) 73 Yale Law J. 733. Despite a greater sensitivity to the interests of women, as well as writing almost two decades later, Glendon also fails to address the question of unpaid work as a form of property. See M.A. Glendon, The New Family and the New Property (1981). 59 (1992) 29 N.S.W.L.R. 188 (C.A.).", "out": [{"citation-number": "58", "author": "C.A. Reich", "title": "The New Property", "date": "1964", "journal": "Yale Law J"}, {"citation-number": "58", "author": "M.A. Glendon", "title": "The New Family and the New Property", "date": "1981"}, {"citation-number": "58", "date": "1992"}]}
+{"in": "trends in Australia, see P. Parkinson, \u2018Property Rights and Third Party Creditors \u2013 the Scope and Limitations of Equitable Doctrines\u2019 (1997) 11 Australian J. Family Law 100.", "out": [{"author": "P. Parkinson", "title": "Property Rights and Third Party Creditors \u2013 the Scope and Limitations of Equitable Doctrines", "date": "1997", "journal": "Australian J. Family Law"}]}
+{"in": "61 For discussion, see J. Riley, \u2018The Property Rights of Home-Makers under General Law: Bryson v. Bryant\u2019 (1994) 16 Sydney Law Rev. 412.", "out": [{"citation-number": "61", "author": "J. Riley", "title": "The Property Rights of Home-Makers under General Law: Bryson v. Bryant", "date": "1994", "journal": "Sydney Law Rev"}]}
+{"in": "62 The Hon. Justice T. E. Lindenmayer and P.A. Doolan, \u2018When Bankruptcy and Family Law Collide\u2019 (1994) 8 Aust. J. Family Law 111, 133.", "out": [{"citation-number": "62", "author": "Hon. Justice T. E. Lindenmayer and P.A. Doolan", "title": "When Bankruptcy and Family Law Collide", "date": "1994", "journal": "Aust. J. Family Law"}]}
+{"in": "63 B. Bennett, \u2018The Economics of Wifing Services: Law and Economics on the Family\u2019 (1991) 18 J. of Law and Society 206.", "out": [{"citation-number": "63", "author": "B. Bennett", "title": "The Economics of Wifing Services: Law and Economics on the Family", "date": "1991", "journal": "J. of Law and Society"}]}
+{"in": "64 O\u2019Donovan, op. cit., n. 57; Thornton, op. cit. (1995), n. 4.", "out": [{"citation-number": "64", "author": "O\u2019Donovan", "backref": "op. cit., n. 57"}, {"citation-number": "64", "author": "Thornton", "backref": "op. cit", "date": "1995"}]}
+{"in": "65 N.S.W.C.A., unreported, 23 May 1994.", "out": [{"citation-number": "65", "date": "1994"}]}
+{"in": "66 For detailed discussion of the ramifications, see L.J. Weitzman, The Divorce Revolution: The Unexpected Social and Economic Consequences for Women and Children in America (1985).", "out": [{"citation-number": "66", "author": "L.J. Weitzman", "title": "The Divorce Revolution: The Unexpected Social and Economic Consequences for Women and Children in America", "date": "1985"}]}
+{"in": "67 M.L. Shanley, Feminism, Marriage, and the Law in Victorian England, 1850\u20131895 (1989) 46.", "out": [{"citation-number": "67", "author": "M.L. Shanley", "title": "Feminism, Marriage, and the Law in Victorian England, 1850\u20131895", "date": "1989"}]}
+{"in": "68 The move to contract as the governing principle of family law has been noted by commentators. See, for example, Freeman, op. cit., n. 24; Neave, op. cit., n. 26; Regan, op. cit., n. 30.", "out": [{"citation-number": "68", "author": "Freeman", "backref": "op. cit., n. 24"}, {"citation-number": "68", "author": "Neave", "backref": "op. cit., n. 26"}, {"citation-number": "68", "author": "Regan", "backref": "op. cit., n. 30"}]}
+{"in": "69 Bryson v. Bryant in respect of which, it might be noted, the High Court refused leave to appeal. Marcia Neave notes the \u2018artificiality\u2019 of the concept of intention in a discussion of the constructive trust in the context of de facto spouses. See M. Neave, \u2018 Three Approaches to Family Law Disputes \u2013 Intention/Belief, Unjust Enrichment and Unconscionability\u2019 in Equity, Fiduciaries and Trusts, ed. T.G. Youdan (1989) 262\u20134.", "out": [{"citation-number": "69", "author": "Bryson v. Bryant"}, {"citation-number": "69", "author": "M. Neave,", "title": "Three Approaches to Family Law Disputes \u2013 Intention/Belief, Unjust Enrichment and Unconscionability", "container-title": "Equity, Fiduciaries and Trusts", "editor": "T.G. Youdan", "date": "1989"}]}
+{"in": "70 For an interesting case study of this phenomenon, see L. Sarmas, \u2018Storytelling and the Law: A Case Study of Louth v. Diprose\u2019 (1994) 19 Melbourne University Law Rev. 701.", "out": [{"citation-number": "70", "author": "L. Sarmas", "title": "Storytelling and the Law: A Case Study of Louth v. Diprose", "date": "1994", "journal": "Melbourne University Law Rev"}]}
+{"in": "71 C. Colebrook, \u2018Feminist Ethics and Historicism\u2019 (1996) 11 Aust. Feminist Studies 295, 300.", "out": [{"citation-number": "71", "author": "C. Colebrook", "title": "Feminist Ethics and Historicism", "date": "1996", "journal": "Aust. Feminist Studies"}]}
+{"in": "72 M. Albertson Fineman, The Neutered Mother, the Sexual Family and Other Twentieth Century Tragedies (1995) 7.", "out": [{"citation-number": "72", "author": "M. Albertson Fineman", "title": "The Neutered Mother, the Sexual Family and Other Twentieth Century Tragedies", "date": "1995"}]}
+{"in": "73 Compare K. O\u2019Donovan, \u2018Should all Maintenance of Spouses be abolished?\u2019 (1982) 45 Modern Law Rev. 424, 431\u20133.", "out": [{"citation-number": "73", "author": "K. O\u2019Donovan", "title": "Should all Maintenance of Spouses be abolished", "date": "1982", "journal": "Modern Law Rev"}]}
+{"in": "74 For example, De Facto Relationships Act 1984 (N.S.W.). For detailed analysis of the policy considerations, see M.D.A. Freeman and C.M. Lyon, Cohabitation without Marriage: An Essay in Law and Social Policy (1983); New South Wales Law Reform Commission, De Facto Relationships: Issues Paper (1981).", "out": [{"citation-number": "74", "legal-ref": "De Facto Relationships Act", "date": "1984"}, {"citation-number": "74", "author": "M.D.A. Freeman and C.M. Lyon", "title": "Cohabitation without Marriage: An Essay in Law and Social Policy", "date": "1983"}, {"citation-number": "74", "author": "New South Wales Law Reform Commission", "title": "De Facto Relationships: Issues Paper", "date": "1981"}]}
+{"in": "75 Eds. of the Harvard Law Review, Sexual Orientation and the Law (1990); Dean v. District of Columbia 653 U.S. App. D.C 307 (1995); C. Overington, \u2018Why can\u2019t They Marry?\u2019 The Age, 26 April 1997.", "out": [{"citation-number": "75", "author": "Eds. of the Harvard Law Review,", "title": "Sexual Orientation and the Law", "date": "1990"}, {"citation-number": "75", "legal-ref": "Dean v. District of Columbia 653 U.S. App. D.C", "date": "1995"}, {"citation-number": "75", "author": "C. Overington", "title": "Why can\u2019t They Marry", "journal": "The Age", "date": "1997"}]}
+{"in": "76 For example, Lesbian and Gay Rights Service, The Bride Wore Pink; Legal Recognition of Our Relationships (1994).", "out": [{"citation-number": "76", "author": "Lesbian and Gay Rights Service", "title": "The Bride Wore Pink; Legal Recognition of Our Relationships", "date": "1994"}]}
+{"in": "77 id., p. 3.", "out": [{"citation-number": "77", "backref": "id"}]}
+{"in": "78 Above, n. 30.", "out": [{"citation-number": "78", "backref": "Above, n. 30"}]}
diff --git a/convert-anystyle-data/out/10.1111_1467-6478.00080.jsonl b/convert-anystyle-data/out/10.1111_1467-6478.00080.jsonl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..02f38fc9889b618286921f837142a43ae6d146ca
--- /dev/null
+++ b/convert-anystyle-data/out/10.1111_1467-6478.00080.jsonl
@@ -0,0 +1,588 @@
+{
+ "in": "1 For a contrary view, see G. Jones, \u2018 \u201cTraditional\u201d Legal Scholarship: a Personal View\u2019 in What Are Law Schools For?, ed. P. Birks (1996) 14.",
+ "out": [
+ {
+ "citation-number": "1",
+ "author": "G. Jones",
+ "title": "\u201cTraditional\u201d Legal Scholarship: a Personal View",
+ "container-title": "What Are Law Schools For",
+ "editor": "P. Birks",
+ "date": "1996"
+ }
+ ]
+}
+{
+ "in": "3 R. Goff, \u2018The Search for Principle\u2019 (1983) Proceeedings of the British Academy 169, at 171. This is an amplification of Dicey\u2019s remark that \u2018[b]y adequate study and careful thought whole departments of law can . . . be reduced to order and exhibited under the form of a few principles which sum up the effect of a hundred cases . . .\u2019. A. Dicey, Can English Law be taught at the Universities? (1883) 20.",
+ "out": [
+ {
+ "citation-number": "3",
+ "author": "R. Goff",
+ "title": "The Search for Principle",
+ "date": "1983",
+ "journal": "Proceeedings of the British Academy"
+ },
+ {
+ "citation-number": "3",
+ "author": "A. Dicey",
+ "title": "Can English Law be taught at the Universities",
+ "date": "1883"
+ }
+ ]
+}
+{
+ "in": "4 J. Smith, The Law of Contract (1989)",
+ "out": [
+ {
+ "citation-number": "4",
+ "author": "J. Smith",
+ "title": "The Law of Contract",
+ "date": "1989"
+ }
+ ]
+}
+{
+ "in": "6 See, for example, D. Kennedy, \u2018Form and substance in Private Law Ajudication\u2019 (1976) 89 Harvard Law Rev. 1685.",
+ "out": [
+ {
+ "citation-number": "6",
+ "author": "D. Kennedy",
+ "title": "Form and substance in Private Law Ajudication",
+ "date": "1976",
+ "journal": "Harvard Law Rev"
+ }
+ ]
+}
+{
+ "in": "7 B. Hepple, \u2018The Renewal of the Liberal Law Degree\u2019 (1996) Cambridge Law J. 470, at 485 and 481.",
+ "out": [
+ {
+ "citation-number": "7",
+ "author": "B. Hepple",
+ "title": "The Renewal of the Liberal Law Degree",
+ "date": "1996",
+ "journal": "Cambridge Law J"
+ }
+ ]
+}
+{
+ "in": "8 P.A. Thomas, \u2018Introduction\u2019 in Socio-Legal Studies, ed. P.A. Thomas (1997) 19.",
+ "out": [
+ {
+ "citation-number": "8",
+ "author": "P.A. Thomas",
+ "title": "Introduction",
+ "container-title": "Socio-Legal Studies",
+ "editor": "P.A. Thomas",
+ "date": "1997"
+ }
+ ]
+}
+{
+ "in": "9 R. Cotterrell, Law\u2019s Community (1995) 296.",
+ "out": [
+ {
+ "citation-number": "9",
+ "author": "R. Cotterrell",
+ "title": "Law\u2019s Community",
+ "date": "1995"
+ }
+ ]
+}
+{
+ "in": "10 Socio-legal studies has been defined in many different ways. In this essay the term is taken to indicate the use of ideas \u2018from other disciplines primarily but not exclusively from within the social science and humanities fields\u2019. S. Wheeler, \u2018Company Law\u2019 in Thomas, op. cit., n. 8, at p. 285.",
+ "out": [
+ {
+ "citation-number": "10",
+ "author": "S. Wheeler",
+ "title": "Company Law",
+ "editor": "in Thomas",
+ "backref": "op. cit., n. 8"
+ }
+ ]
+}
+{
+ "in": "11 Some fail wholly. It is difficult to see any effect on academic legal education that resulted from Lady Marre\u2019s report A Time for Change (1988). The Jarratt report on universities produced for the Committee of Vice-Chancellors and Principals (CVCP), Report of the Steering Committee for Efficiency studies in Universities (1988), produced much comment but little action. Even those that are thought of as being a success are not wholly implemented. Despite Ormrod\u2019s recommendations no Institute of Profesional Legal Studies was set up and the universities and colleges of higher education did not take sole responsibility for vocational legal training (Report of the Committee on Legal Education (1971; Cmnd 4595) ch. 9, recs. 40 and 23). There were also other recommendations that were not implemented. The Robbins report on higher education, Higher Education (1963; Cmnd. 2154) took it is axiomatic that \u2018courses of higher education should be available for all those who are qualified by ability and attainment to pursue them and wish to do so\u2019 (para. 31). This has yet to happen.",
+ "out": [
+ {
+ "citation-number": "11",
+ "author": "Lady Marre\u2019s",
+ "title": "report A Time for Change",
+ "date": "1988"
+ },
+ {
+ "citation-number": "11",
+ "date": "1988",
+ "title": "Report of the Committee on Legal Education"
+ },
+ {
+ "citation-number": "11",
+ "date": "1971"
+ },
+ {
+ "citation-number": "11",
+ "legal-ref": "Cmnd 4595)",
+ "title": "The Robbins report on higher education, Higher Education",
+ "date": "1963"
+ },
+ {
+ "citation-number": "11",
+ "legal-ref": "Cmnd. 2154)"
+ }
+ ]
+}
+{
+ "in": "12 National Committee of Inquiry into Higher Education, Higher Education in the learning society (1997) (the Dearing report); ACLEC, First Report on Legal Education and Training (1996). The Government\u2019s White Paper on further and higher education had not been published at the time of writing this essay. 13 ACLEC, id., para 4.6.",
+ "out": [
+ {
+ "citation-number": "12",
+ "author": "National Committee of Inquiry into Higher Education",
+ "title": "Higher Education in the learning society",
+ "date": "1997"
+ },
+ {
+ "citation-number": "12",
+ "author": "ACLEC",
+ "title": "First Report on Legal Education and Training",
+ "date": "1996"
+ },
+ {
+ "citation-number": "13",
+ "author": "ACLEC",
+ "backref": "id"
+ }
+ ]
+}
+{
+ "in": "14 ACLEC\u2019s proposal is part of an historical process which has gradually seen English university law schools distance themselves from the legal professions and the legal professions propose decreasing degrees of control over the content of law degrees. (See A. Bradney and F. Cownie, \u2018Working on the Chain Gang?\u2019 (1996) 2 Contemporary Issues in Law 15, at 24\u20136).",
+ "out": [
+ {
+ "citation-number": "14",
+ "author": "A. Bradney and F. Cownie",
+ "title": "Working on the Chain Gang",
+ "date": "1996",
+ "journal": "Contemporary Issues in Law"
+ }
+ ]
+}
+{
+ "in": "15 J. MacFarlane, M. Jeeves, and A. Boon, \u2018Education for Life or for Work?\u2019 (1987) 137 New Law J. 835, at 836.",
+ "out": [
+ {
+ "citation-number": "15",
+ "author": "J. MacFarlane, M. Jeeves, and A. Boon",
+ "title": "Education for Life or for Work",
+ "date": "1987",
+ "journal": "New Law J"
+ }
+ ]
+}
+{
+ "in": "16 T.H. Huxley, \u2018Universities: Actual and Ideal\u2019 in T.H. Huxley, Collected Essays: Volume III (1905) 215.",
+ "out": [
+ {
+ "citation-number": "16",
+ "author": "T.H. Huxley",
+ "title": "Universities: Actual and Ideal",
+ "container-title": "T.H. Huxley, Collected Essays",
+ "date": "1905"
+ }
+ ]
+}
+{
+ "in": "17 J.S. Mill, \u2018Inaugural address to the University of St Andrews\u2019 in Collected Work of John Stuart Mill: Volume XXI, ed. J.M. Robson (1984) 218.",
+ "out": [
+ {
+ "citation-number": "17",
+ "author": "J.S. Mill",
+ "title": "Inaugural address to the University of St Andrews",
+ "container-title": "Collected Work of John Stuart Mill: Volume",
+ "editor": "J.M. Robson",
+ "date": "1984"
+ }
+ ]
+}
+{
+ "in": "18 Dearing, op. cit., n. 12, para. 9.32.",
+ "out": [
+ {
+ "citation-number": "18",
+ "author": "Dearing",
+ "backref": "op. cit., n. 12"
+ }
+ ]
+}
+{
+ "in": "19 id., para. 5.11.",
+ "out": [
+ {
+ "citation-number": "19",
+ "backref": "id"
+ }
+ ]
+}
+{
+ "in": "20 F.R. Leavis, Education and the University (1948) 28. Leavis\u2019s view was narrowly nationalistic. For \u2018centre\u2019 it would be better to substitute \u2018centres\u2019.",
+ "out": [
+ {
+ "citation-number": "20",
+ "author": "F.R. Leavis",
+ "title": "Education and the University",
+ "date": "1948"
+ }
+ ]
+}
+{
+ "in": "21 See, further, A. Bradney, \u2018Liberalising Legal Education\u2019 in The Law School: Global Issues, Local Questions, ed. F. Cownie (forthcoming).",
+ "out": [
+ {
+ "citation-number": "21",
+ "author": "A. Bradney",
+ "title": "Liberalising Legal Education",
+ "container-title": "The Law School: Global Issues, Local Questions"
+ }
+ ]
+}
+{
+ "in": "22 P. Goodrich, \u2018 Of Blackstone\u2019s Tower: Metephors of Distance and Histories of the English Law School\u2019 in Birks, op. cit., n. 1, p. 59. 23 S. Turow, One L (1977) 106.",
+ "out": [
+ {
+ "citation-number": "22",
+ "author": "P. Goodrich,",
+ "title": "Of Blackstone\u2019s Tower: Metephors of Distance and Histories of the English Law School",
+ "backref": "in Birks, op. cit., n. 1",
+ "journal": "S. Turow, One L",
+ "date": "1977"
+ }
+ ]
+}
+{
+ "in": "24 O. Kahn-Freund, \u2018Reflections on Legal Education\u2019 (1966) 29 Modern Law Rev. 121, at 129.",
+ "out": [
+ {
+ "citation-number": "24",
+ "author": "O. Kahn-Freund",
+ "title": "Reflections on Legal Education",
+ "date": "1966",
+ "journal": "Modern Law Rev"
+ }
+ ]
+}
+{
+ "in": "25 Kahn-Freund believed ... legal argument (Kahn-Freund, id.).",
+ "out": [
+ {
+ "citation-number": "25",
+ "author": "Kahn-Freund",
+ "backref": "id.)"
+ }
+ ]
+}
+{
+ "in": "26 Leavis, op. cit., n. 20, p. 120.",
+ "out": [
+ {
+ "citation-number": "26",
+ "author": "Leavis",
+ "backref": "op. cit., n. 20"
+ }
+ ]
+}
+{
+ "in": "29 Leavis has, of course, been widely criticized for the cultural and gender assumptions that lie behind his selection of material to be studied. (See, for example, M. King, The New English Literatures (1980) at 216\u201317.) Whatever the accuracy of these criticisms, they are criticisms of the application of the method rather than the method itself.",
+ "out": [
+ {
+ "citation-number": "29",
+ "author": "M. King",
+ "title": "The New English Literatures",
+ "date": "1980"
+ }
+ ]
+}
+{
+ "in": "30 Jurisprudence by Sir John Salmond, ed. G. Willliams (10th ed., 1947) at 256 and 257.",
+ "out": [
+ {
+ "citation-number": "30",
+ "title": "Jurisprudence by Sir John Salmond",
+ "editor": "G. Willliams (10th",
+ "date": "1947"
+ }
+ ]
+}
+{
+ "in": "31 So much so that when other disciplines engage with law they must develop their own concepts to analyse law rather than rely on the concepts already developed in law. See, for example, E. Durkheim The Division of Labour in Society (1933) 68.",
+ "out": [
+ {
+ "citation-number": "31",
+ "author": "E. Durkheim",
+ "title": "The Division of Labour in Society",
+ "date": "1933"
+ }
+ ]
+}
+{
+ "in": "32 M. Le Brun and R. Johnstone, The Quiet Revolution: Improving Student Learning in Law (1994) 65. On the effect on women students, see \u2018Define and Empower: Women Students Consider Feminist Learning\u2019 (1990) I Law and Critique 47 at pp. 54\u201355. For a survey of CLS and feminist literature on this general point, see W. Conklin, \u2018The Invisible Author of Legal Authority\u2019 (1996) VII Law and Critique 173 at pp. 173\u20136.",
+ "out": [
+ {
+ "citation-number": "32",
+ "author": "M. Le Brun and R. Johnstone",
+ "title": "The Quiet Revolution: Improving Student Learning in Law",
+ "date": "1994"
+ },
+ {
+ "citation-number": "32",
+ "title": "Define and Empower: Women Students Consider Feminist Learning",
+ "date": "1990",
+ "journal": "Law and Critique"
+ },
+ {
+ "citation-number": "32",
+ "author": "W. Conklin",
+ "title": "The Invisible Author of Legal Authority",
+ "date": "1996",
+ "journal": "Law and Critique"
+ }
+ ]
+}
+{
+ "in": "33 R. Collier, \u2018Masculinism, Law and Law Teaching\u2019 (1991) 19 International J. of the Sociology of Law 427, at 429.",
+ "out": [
+ {
+ "citation-number": "33",
+ "author": "R. Collier",
+ "title": "Masculinism, Law and Law Teaching",
+ "date": "1991",
+ "journal": "International J. of the Sociology of Law"
+ }
+ ]
+}
+{
+ "in": "34 P. McAuslan, \u2018Administrative Law, Collective Consumption and Judicial Policy\u2019 (1983) 46 Modern Law Rev. 1, at 8.",
+ "out": [
+ {
+ "citation-number": "34",
+ "author": "P. McAuslan",
+ "title": "Administrative Law, Collective Consumption and Judicial Policy",
+ "date": "1983",
+ "journal": "Modern Law Rev"
+ }
+ ]
+}
+{
+ "in": "35 Le Brun and Johnstone, op. cit, n. 32, pp. 71\u20135.",
+ "out": [
+ {
+ "citation-number": "35",
+ "author": "Le Brun and Johnstone",
+ "backref": "op. cit, n. 32"
+ }
+ ]
+}
+{
+ "in": "38 Goodrich, op. cit., n. 22.",
+ "out": [
+ {
+ "citation-number": "38",
+ "author": "Goodrich",
+ "backref": "op. cit., n. 22"
+ }
+ ]
+}
+{
+ "in": "39 P. Samuelson, \u2018The Convergence of the Law School and the University\u2019 (1975) 44 The Am. Scholar 256, at 258.",
+ "out": [
+ {
+ "citation-number": "39",
+ "author": "P. Samuelson",
+ "title": "The Convergence of the Law School and the University",
+ "date": "1975",
+ "journal": "The Am. Scholar"
+ }
+ ]
+}
+{
+ "in": "40 P. Harris and M. Jones \u2018A Survey of Law Schools in the United Kingdom, 1996\u2019 (1997) 31 The Law Teacher 38, at 46.",
+ "out": [
+ {
+ "citation-number": "40",
+ "author": "P. Harris and M. Jones",
+ "title": "A Survey of Law Schools in the United Kingdom, 1996",
+ "date": "1997",
+ "journal": "The Law Teacher"
+ }
+ ]
+}
+{
+ "in": "41 J. Wilson , \u2018A third survey of university legal education\u2019 (1993) 13 Legal Studies 143, at 152.",
+ "out": [
+ {
+ "citation-number": "41",
+ "author": "J. Wilson",
+ "title": "A third survey of university legal education",
+ "date": "1993",
+ "journal": "Legal Studies"
+ }
+ ]
+}
+{
+ "in": "42 Thus, for example, Harris and Jones reported that 59.2 per cent of all particpating institutions offered foriegn language tuition as part of their standard LLB programme. (Harris and Jones, op. cit., n. 40, at p. 54).",
+ "out": [
+ {
+ "citation-number": "42",
+ "author": "Jones",
+ "backref": "op. cit., n. 40"
+ }
+ ]
+}
+{
+ "in": "43 P. Leighton, T. Mortimer, and N. Whatley, Law Teachers: Lawyers or Academics? (1995)",
+ "out": [
+ {
+ "citation-number": "43",
+ "author": "P. Leighton, T. Mortimer, and N. Whatley",
+ "title": "Law Teachers: Lawyers or Academics",
+ "date": "1995"
+ }
+ ]
+}
+{
+ "in": "34. This would include teaching both non-law degree students and sub-degree students. 44 id., p 35",
+ "out": [
+ {
+ "citation-number": "34.",
+ "backref": "44 id"
+ }
+ ]
+}
+{
+ "in": "45 L. Skwarok, \u2018Business Law for Non-Lawyers: Setting the Stage for Teaching, Learning and Assessment at Hong Kong Polytechnic University\u2019 (1995) 29 The Law Teacher 189, at 189.",
+ "out": [
+ {
+ "citation-number": "45",
+ "author": "L. Skwarok",
+ "title": "Business Law for Non-Lawyers: Setting the Stage for Teaching, Learning and Assessment at Hong Kong Polytechnic University",
+ "date": "1995",
+ "journal": "The Law Teacher"
+ }
+ ]
+}
+{
+ "in": "46 N. Bastin, \u2018Law, Law Staff and CNAA Business Studies Degree Courses\u2019 (1985) 19 The Law Teacher 12, at 13.",
+ "out": [
+ {
+ "citation-number": "46",
+ "author": "N. Bastin",
+ "title": "Law, Law Staff and CNAA Business Studies Degree Courses",
+ "date": "1985",
+ "journal": "The Law Teacher"
+ }
+ ]
+}
+{
+ "in": "47 A. Ridley, \u2018Legal Skills for Non-Law Students: Added Value or Irrelevant Diversion?\u2019 (1994) 28 The Law Teacher 281, at 282.",
+ "out": [
+ {
+ "citation-number": "47",
+ "author": "A. Ridley",
+ "title": "Legal Skills for Non-Law Students: Added Value or Irrelevant Diversion",
+ "date": "1994",
+ "journal": "The Law Teacher"
+ }
+ ]
+}
+{
+ "in": "48 G. Cartan and T. Vilkinas, \u2018Legal Literacy for Managers: The Role of the Educator\u2019 (1990) 24 The Law Teacher 246, at 248.",
+ "out": [
+ {
+ "citation-number": "48",
+ "author": "G. Cartan and T. Vilkinas",
+ "title": "Legal Literacy for Managers: The Role of the Educator",
+ "date": "1990",
+ "journal": "The Law Teacher"
+ }
+ ]
+}
+{
+ "in": "49 Ridley, op. cit., n. 47, at p. 284.",
+ "out": [
+ {
+ "citation-number": "49",
+ "author": "Ridley",
+ "backref": "op. cit., n. 47"
+ }
+ ]
+}
+{
+ "in": "50 This, of course, is not always the case. For example, the BA Economics and Law degree at Leicester has a special course in each year given over to the consideration of the relationship between economics and law.",
+ "out": [
+ {
+ "citation-number": "50"
+ }
+ ]
+}
+{
+ "in": "51 P. Birks, \u2018Short Cuts\u2019 in Pressing Problems in the Law, ed. P. Birks (1994) 10\u201324.",
+ "out": [
+ {
+ "citation-number": "51",
+ "author": "P. Birks",
+ "title": "Short Cuts",
+ "container-title": "Pressing Problems in the Law",
+ "editor": "P. Birks",
+ "date": "1994"
+ }
+ ]
+}
+{
+ "in": "52 Ridley, op. cit., n. 47, p. 283.",
+ "out": [
+ {
+ "citation-number": "52",
+ "author": "Ridley",
+ "backref": "op. cit., n. 47"
+ }
+ ]
+}
+{
+ "in": "53 Cartan and Vilkinas, op. cit., n. 48, p. 248.",
+ "out": [
+ {
+ "citation-number": "53",
+ "author": "Cartan and Vilkinas",
+ "backref": "op. cit., n. 48"
+ }
+ ]
+}
+{
+ "in": "54 P. Harris, \u2018Curriculum Development in Legal Studies\u2019 (1986) 20 The Law Teacher 110, at 112.",
+ "out": [
+ {
+ "citation-number": "54",
+ "author": "P. Harris",
+ "title": "Curriculum Development in Legal Studies",
+ "date": "1986",
+ "journal": "The Law Teacher"
+ }
+ ]
+}
+{
+ "in": "55 Dearing, op. cit., n. 12, para 9.3.",
+ "out": [
+ {
+ "citation-number": "55",
+ "author": "Dearing",
+ "backref": "op. cit., n. 12"
+ }
+ ]
+}
+{
+ "in": "57 G. Steiner, Errata: An Examined Life (1997) 20.",
+ "out": [
+ {
+ "citation-number": "57",
+ "author": "G. Steiner",
+ "title": "Errata: An Examined Life",
+ "date": "1997"
+ }
+ ]
+}
diff --git a/convert-anystyle-data/out/10.1515_zfrs-1980-0103.jsonl b/convert-anystyle-data/out/10.1515_zfrs-1980-0103.jsonl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..fff80e407362e1d1109541695c11ad5ba863de0b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/convert-anystyle-data/out/10.1515_zfrs-1980-0103.jsonl
@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+{"in": "1 Geiger 1964, insbesondere S. 65\u201483.", "out": [{"citation-number": "1", "author": "Geiger", "date": "1964"}]}
+{"in": "2 Vgl. Feest/Blankenburg, 1972. Die Konsequenz einer gr\u00f6\u00dferen Dunkelziffer bei den von der Polizei selbst entdeckten Straftaten entwickle ich ausf\u00fchrlicher in meinem Beitrag \u00fcber ,Nichtkriminalisierung als Struktur und Routine', 1976.", "out": [{"citation-number": "2", "author": "Feest/Blankenburg", "date": "1972"}, {"citation-number": "2", "author": "ich", "title": "Nichtkriminalisierung als Struktur und Routine", "date": "1976"}]}
+{"in": "3 Angaben aus einer Befragung von Peter MacNaughton-Smith und Richard Rosellen zur 'Bereitschaft zur Anzeigeerstattung' Manuskript Max-Planck-Institut f\u00fcr Strafrecht, Freiburg 1978. Der ausf\u00fchrliche Forschungsbericht von Richard Rosellen erscheint in K\u00fcrze unter dem Titel .Private Verbrechenskontrolle \u2014 eine empirische Untersuchung zur Anzeigeerstattung', Berlin, voraussichtlich 1980.", "out": [{"citation-number": "3", "author": "Peter MacNaughton-Smith und Richard Rosellen", "title": "Bereitschaft zur Anzeigeerstattung", "date": "1978"}, {"citation-number": "3", "author": "Richard Rosellen", "title": "Private Verbrechenskontrolle \u2014 eine empirische Untersuchung zur Anzeigeerstattung", "date": "1980"}]}
+{"in": "4 Vgl. Blankenburg/Sessar/Steffen, 1978, S. 66-85.", "out": [{"citation-number": "4", "author": "Blankenburg/Sessar/Steffen", "date": "1978"}]}
+{"in": "5 Black 1973, S. 125 ff.", "out": [{"citation-number": "5", "author": "Black", "date": "1973"}]}
+{"in": "6 Zur h\u00f6heren Wahrscheinlichkeit der Normierung von Verhalten in weniger komplexen Beziehungen vgl. die Konflikttheorie von Gessner 1976, insbesondere S. 170\u2014183.", "out": [{"citation-number": "6", "author": "Gessner", "date": "1976"}]}
+{"in": "7 Zum Konzept der .Thematisierung von Recht' vgl. Luhmann 1980, S. 99\u2014112.", "out": [{"citation-number": "7", "author": "Luhmann", "date": "1980"}]}
+{"in": "8 Ausf\u00fchrlicher bei Gessner 1976", "out": [{"citation-number": "8", "author": "Gessner", "date": "1976"}]}
+{"in": "9 Vgl. Sch\u00f6nholz 1980.", "out": [{"citation-number": "9", "author": "Sch\u00f6nholz", "date": "1980"}]}
+{"in": "10 Blankenburg/Sch\u00f6nholz; Rogowski 1979, S. 64 ff.", "out": [{"citation-number": "10", "author": "Blankenburg/Sch\u00f6nholz; Rogowski", "date": "1979"}]}
+{"in": "11 Hilden 1976, S. 64 ff.", "out": [{"citation-number": "11", "author": "Hilden", "date": "1976"}]}
+{"in": "12 Koch 1975, S. 75, der allerdings nur streitige Urteile und Vergleiche untersucht hat.", "out": [{"citation-number": "12", "author": "Koch", "date": "1975"}]}
+{"in": "13 F\u00fcr Angaben der Z\u00e4hlkartenstatistik f\u00fcr die Familiengerichte siehe: Statistisches Bundesamt Wiesbaden, Fachserie 10 (Rechtspflege) Reihe 2.1, Tabelle 10, Wiesbaden 1978.", "out": [{"citation-number": "13", "author": "Statistisches Bundesamt Wiesbaden", "title": "Fachserie 10 (Rechtspflege) Reihe 2.1, Tabelle 10", "date": "1978"}]}
+{"in": "14 Blankenburg/Sch\u00f6nholz; Rogowski 1979, S. 78 ff.", "out": [{"citation-number": "14", "author": "Blankenburg/Sch\u00f6nholz; Rogowski", "date": "1979"}]}
+{"in": "15 Steinbach 1979 hat in einer Erhebung von 1144 Amtsgerichtsprozessen in der Bundesrepublik ohne Berlin in den Jahren 1974\u20141976 ein Verh\u00e4ltnis von 1 R\u00e4umungsklage je 1,2 Forderungsklagen, in Berlin allerdings von 1 R\u00e4umungsklage je 0,12 Forderungsklagen ermittelt. Im folgenden auch als GMD-Erhebung zitiert.", "out": [{"citation-number": "15"}]}
+{"in": "16 Johnson 1979 berichtet von dem erfolgreichen Versuch einer Unfall-Schadensregulierung ohne Ber\u00fccksichtigung einer Schuldzuschreibung in Neuseeland (no fault accident compensation), S. 90 ff.", "out": [{"citation-number": "16", "author": "Johnson", "date": "1979"}]}
+{"in": "17 Steinbach 1979, S. 66 ff.; Blankenburg/Blankenburg/Morasch 1972, S. 82 ff.", "out": [{"citation-number": "17", "author": "Steinbach", "date": "1979"}, {"citation-number": "17", "author": "Blankenburg/Blankenburg/Morasch", "date": "1972"}]}
+{"in": "18 Projektbericht ,Rechtshilfebed\u00fcrfnisse sozial Schwacher*, (Blankenburg/Gorges/Reifner; Ticmann). Befragt wurden im Januar bis M\u00e4rz 1979 je eine Person in 835 Haushalten Westberlins. Ver\u00f6ffentlichung ist vorgesehen f\u00fcr Ende 1980. Quelle: Eigene Befragung in West-Berlin 1979, Zufallsauswahl aus allen Haushalten mit Deutschen. Mehrfachnennungen, % jeweils bezogen auf Personen, die im jeweiligen Bereich ein Problem nennen.", "out": [{"citation-number": "18", "title": "Projektbericht ,Rechtshilfebed\u00fcrfnisse sozial Schwacher", "author": "Blankenburg/Gorges/Reifner; Ticmann).", "date": "1980"}]}
+{"in": "19 Explizit bei Baumg\u00e4rtei 1976, S. 113-128.", "out": [{"citation-number": "19", "author": "Baumg\u00e4rtei", "date": "1976"}]}
+{"in": "20 Laut einer GMD-Erhebung aus der Z\u00e4hlkartenstatistik wurde in Baden-W\u00fcrttemberg 1978 in", "out": [{"citation-number": "20"}]}
+{"in": "21 Projektbericht Rechtsschutzversicherung*. (Blankenburg; Fiedler), Ver\u00f6ffentlichung voraussichtlich Mitte 1980.", "out": [{"citation-number": "21", "title": "Projektbericht Rechtsschutzversicherung", "author": "Blankenburg; Fiedler)", "date": "1980"}]}
+{"in": "22 Vgl. auch Reifner/Gorges 1980.", "out": [{"citation-number": "22", "author": "Reifner/Gorges", "date": "1980"}]}
+{"in": "23 Reifner 1979.", "out": [{"citation-number": "23", "author": "Reifner", "date": "1979"}]}
+{"in": "24 Klassisch bei Carlin/Howard/Messinger 1967.", "out": [{"citation-number": "24", "author": "Carlin/Howard/Messinger", "date": "1967"}]}
+{"in": "25 Grunds\u00e4tzlich vgl. hierzu den klassischen Beitrag von Galanter 1974, S. 95\u2014160. Die gr\u00f6sseren Chancen von Firmen, insbesondere bei der gro\u00dfen Zahl von vorstreitigen Erledigungen zeigt Sarat 1976, S. 339-375.", "out": [{"citation-number": "25", "author": "Galanter", "date": "1974"}, {"citation-number": "25", "author": "Sarat", "date": "1976"}]}
+{"in": "26 Bender/Schumacher 1980, S. 138.", "out": [{"citation-number": "26", "author": "Bender/Schumacher", "date": "1980"}]}
+{"in": "27 Steinbach 1979, S. 96 ff, vgl. auch Blankenburg/Blankenburg/Morasch 1972, S. 89, Fn. 17,", "out": [{"citation-number": "27", "author": "Steinbach", "date": "1979"}, {"citation-number": "27", "author": "Blankenburg/Blankenburg/Morasch", "date": "1972"}]}
+{"in": "28 Reifner 1978.", "out": [{"citation-number": "28", "author": "Reifner", "date": "1978"}]}
+{"in": "29 Blankenburg/Sch\u00f6nholz; Rogowski 1979, S. 102 ff.", "out": [{"citation-number": "29", "author": "Blankenburg/Sch\u00f6nholz; Rogowski", "date": "1979"}]}
+{"in": "30 Vgl. zum Verrechtlichungsbegriff meinen Beitrag \u00fcber: Recht als gradualisiertes Konzept 1980, S. 83\u201498.", "out": [{"citation-number": "30", "title": "Recht als gradualisiertes Konzept", "date": "1980"}]}
+{"in": "31 Steinbach 1979, S. 35; Bender/Schumacher 1980, S. 24 und S. 49.", "out": [{"citation-number": "31", "author": "Steinbach", "date": "1979"}, {"citation-number": "31", "author": "Bender/Schumacher", "date": "1980"}]}
+{"in": "32 Wanner 1975, S. 293\u2014306 hebt dies deutlich hervor, ebenso Bender/Schumacher 1980, S. 72 ff.; sowie Galanter 1974; Sarat 1976.", "out": [{"citation-number": "32", "author": "Wanner", "date": "1975"}, {"citation-number": "32", "author": "Bender/Schumacher", "date": "1980"}, {"citation-number": "32", "author": "Galanter", "date": "1974"}, {"citation-number": "32", "author": "Sarat", "date": "1976"}]}
+{"in": "33 Blankenburg/Sch\u00f6nholz; Rogowski 1979, S. 78 ff.", "out": [{"citation-number": "33", "author": "Blankenburg/Sch\u00f6nholz; Rogowski", "date": "1979"}]}
+{"in": "34 Ebenda, S. 138-186.", "out": [{"citation-number": "34", "backref": "Ebenda"}]}
+{"in": "35 Luhmann 1969.", "out": [{"citation-number": "35", "author": "Luhmann", "date": "1969"}]}
+{"in": "36 F\u00fcr eine \u00fcberaus positive Bewertung des .Vermeidens1 vgl. Felstiner und Danzig/Lowy in Law and Society Review, vol. 9, 1974/75.", "out": [{"citation-number": "36", "author": "Felstiner und Danzig/Lowy", "journal": "Law and Society Review", "date": "1974"}]}
+{"in": "Baumg\u00e4rtei, Gottfried, 1976: Gleicher Zugang zum Recht f\u00fcr alle. K\u00f6ln.", "out": [{"author": "Baumg\u00e4rtei, Gottfried", "date": "1976", "title": "Gleicher Zugang zum Recht f\u00fcr alle"}]}
+{"in": "Bender, Rolf und Rolf Schumacher, 1980: Erfolgsbarrieren vor Gericht. T\u00fcbingen. Black, Donald, 1973: The Mobilization of Law, in: Journal of Legal Studies 2.", "out": [{"author": "Bender, Rolf und Rolf Schumacher", "date": "1980", "title": "Erfolgsbarrieren vor Gericht."}, {"author": "Black, Donald", "date": "1973", "title": "The Mobilization of Law", "journal": "Journal of Legal Studies"}]}
+{"in": "Blankenburg, Erhard/Blankenburg, Viola/Morasch, Helmut, 1972: Der lange Weg in die Berufung, in: Bender, Rolf (Hrsg.): Tatsachenforschung in der Justiz. T\u00fcbingen.", "out": [{"author": "Blankenburg, Erhard/Blankenburg, Viola/Morasch, Helmut", "date": "1972", "title": "Der lange Weg in die Berufung"}, {"editor": "in: Bender, Rolf (.)", "container-title": "Tatsachenforschung in der Justiz"}]}
+{"in": "Blankenburg, Erhard, 1976: Nichtkriminalisierung als Struktur und Routine, in: G\u00f6ppinger, Hans und G\u00fcnter Kaiser: Kriminologie und Strafverfahren. Stuttgart.", "out": [{"author": "Blankenburg, Erhard", "date": "1976", "title": "Nichtkriminalisierung als Struktur und Routine"}, {"editor": "in: G\u00f6ppinger", "title": "Hans und G\u00fcnter Kaiser: Kriminologie und Strafverfahren"}]}
+{"in": "Blankenburg, Erhard/Sessar, Klaus/Steffen, Wiebke, 1978: Die Staatsanwaltschaft im Proze\u00df strafrechtlicher Sozialkontrolle. Berlin.", "out": [{"author": "Blankenburg, Erhard/Sessar, Klaus/Steffen, Wiebke", "date": "1978", "title": "Die Staatsanwaltschaft im Proze\u00df strafrechtlicher Sozialkontrolle"}]}
+{"in": "Blankenburg, Erhard; Sch\u00f6nholz, Siegfried, unter Mitarbeit von Ralf Rogowski, 1979: Zur Soziologie des Arbeitsgerichtsverfahrens. Neuwied und Darmstadt.", "out": [{"author": "Blankenburg, Erhard; Sch\u00f6nholz, Siegfried, unter Mitarbeit von Ralf Rogowski", "date": "1979", "title": "Zur Soziologie des Arbeitsgerichtsverfahrens"}]}
+{"in": "Blankenburg, Erhard, 1980: Recht als gradualisiertes Konzept, in: Blankenburg, Erhard; Klausa, Ekkehard und Hubert Rottleuthner (Hrsg.): Alternative Rechtsformen und Alternativen zum Recht, Jahrbuch f\u00fcr Rechtssoziologie und Rechtstheorie Bd. 6. Opladen.", "out": [{"author": "Blankenburg, Erhard", "date": "1980", "title": "Recht als gradualisiertes Konzept"}, {"editor": "in: Blankenburg, Erhard; Klausa, Ekkehard und Hubert Rottleuthner (.)", "container-title": "Alternative Rechtsformen und Alternativen zum Recht"}]}
+{"in": "Carlin, Jerome-, Jan Howard und Sheldon Messinger, 1967: Civil Justice and the Poor. New York. Danzig, Richard /Lowy, Michael, 1974/75; Everday Disputes and Mediation in the United States: A Reply to Professor Felstiner, Law and Society Review, vol. 9, pp. 675\u2014694.", "out": [{"author": "Carlin, Jerome-, Jan Howard und Sheldon Messinger", "date": "1967", "title": "Civil Justice and the Poor"}, {"author": "Richard /Lowy, Michael", "date": "1974", "title": "Everday Disputes and Mediation in the United States: A Reply to Professor Felstiner", "journal": "Law and Society Review"}]}
+{"in": "Feest, Johannes/Blankenburg, Erhard, 1972: Die Definitionsmacht der Polizei. D\u00fcsseldorf.", "out": [{"author": "Feest, Johannes/Blankenburg, Erhard", "date": "1972", "title": "Die Definitionsmacht der Polizei"}]}
+{"in": "Felstiner, William L. F., 1974/75: Influences of Social Organization on Dispute processing, in: Law and Society Review, vol. 9, pp. 63\u201494.", "out": [{"author": "Felstiner, William L. F", "date": "1974", "title": "Influences of Social Organization on Dispute processing", "journal": "Law and Society Review"}]}
+{"in": "Felstiner, William L. F., 1974/75: Avoidance as Dispute Processing: An Elaboration, in: Law and Society Review, vol. 9, pp. 695-706.", "out": [{"author": "Felstiner, William L. F", "date": "1974", "title": "Avoidance as Dispute Processing: An Elaboration", "journal": "Law and Society Review"}]}
+{"in": "Galanter, Marc, 1974: Why the ,Haves* Come out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, in: Law and Society Review, vol. 9, pp. 95\u2014160.", "out": [{"author": "Galanter, Marc", "date": "1974", "title": "Why the ,Haves* Come out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change", "journal": "Law and Society Review"}]}
+{"in": "Geiger, Theodor, 1964: Vorstudien zu einer Soziologie des Rechts. Neuwied. Gessner, Volkmar, 1976: Recht und Konflikt. T\u00fcbingen.", "out": [{"author": "Geiger, Theodor", "date": "1964", "title": "Vorstudien zu einer Soziologie des Rechts"}, {"author": "Neuwied. Gessner, Volkmar", "date": "1976", "title": "Recht und Konflikt"}]}
+{"in": "Hilden, Hartmut, 1976: Rechtstatsachen im R\u00e4umungsstreit. Frankfurt/Main.", "out": [{"author": "Hilden, Hartmut", "date": "1976", "title": "Rechtstatsachen im R\u00e4umungsstreit. Frankfurt/Main"}]}
+{"in": "Johnson, Earl, 1979; Thinking about Access: A Preliminary Typology of Possible Strategies. In: Cappelletti, Mauro und Bryant Garth (Hrsg.): Access to Justice, Bd. III. Milan und Alphen/ Rijn.", "out": [{"author": "Johnson, Earl", "date": "1979", "title": "Thinking about Access: A Preliminary Typology of Possible Strategies"}, {"editor": "In: Cappelletti, Mauro und Bryant Garth (.)", "container-title": "Access to Justice"}, {"editor": "Milan und Alphen/ Rijn"}]}
+{"in": "Koch, Hartmut, 1975: Das Gerichtsverfahren als Konfliktl\u00f6sungsproze\u00df \u2014 Einstellung von Kl\u00e4gern und Beklagten zu Mietprozessen. Diss. Hamburg.", "out": [{"author": "Koch, Hartmut", "date": "1975", "title": "Das Gerichtsverfahren als Konfliktl\u00f6sungsproze\u00df \u2014 Einstellung von Kl\u00e4gern und Beklagten zu Mietprozessen"}]}
+{"in": "Luhmann, Niklas, 1969: Legitimation durch Verfahren. Neuwied und Darmstadt.", "out": [{"author": "Luhmann, Niklas", "date": "1969", "title": "Legitimation durch Verfahren"}]}
+{"in": "Luhmann, Niklas, 1980: Kommunikation \u00fcber Recht in Interaktionssystemen, in: Blankenburg, Erhard; Klausa, Ekkehard und Hubert Rottleuthner (Hrsg.): Alternative Rechtsformen und Alternativen zum Recht, Jahrbuch f\u00fcr Rechtssoziologie und Rechtstheorie Bd. 6. Opladen.", "out": [{"author": "Luhmann, Niklas", "date": "1980", "title": "Kommunikation \u00fcber Recht in Interaktionssystemen"}, {"editor": "in: Blankenburg, Erhard; Klausa, Ekkehard und Hubert Rottleuthner (.)", "container-title": "Alternative Rechtsformen und Alternativen zum Recht"}]}
+{"in": "Reifner, Udo, 1978: Rechtshilfebed\u00fcrfnis und Verrechtlichung am Beispiel einer Berliner Mieterinitiative, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin, IIM-dp/78\u201470.", "out": [{"author": "Reifner, Udo", "date": "1978", "title": "Rechtshilfebed\u00fcrfnis und Verrechtlichung am Beispiel einer Berliner Mieterinitiative"}]}
+{"in": "Reifner, Udo, 1979: Gewerkschaftlicher Rechtsschutz \u2014 Geschichte des freigewerkschaftlichen Rechtsschutzes und der Rechtsberatung der Deutschen Arbeitsfront von 1894\u20141945. Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin IIM-dp/79\u2014104.", "out": [{"author": "Reifner, Udo", "date": "1979", "title": "Gewerkschaftlicher Rechtsschutz \u2014 Geschichte des freigewerkschaftlichen Rechtsschutzes und der Rechtsberatung der Deutschen Arbeitsfront von 1894\u20141945"}]}
+{"in": "Reifner, Udo und Irmela Gorges, 1980; Alternativen der Rechtsberatung: Dienstleistung, F\u00fcrsorge und kollektive Selbsthilfe, in: Blankenburg, Erhard; Klausa, Ekkehard und Hubert Rottleuthner (Hrsg.): Alternative Rechtsformen und Alternativen zum Recht, Jahrbuch f\u00fcr Rechtssoziologie und Rechtstheorie Bd. 6. Opladen.", "out": [{"author": "Reifner, Udo und Irmela Gorges", "date": "1980", "title": "Alternativen der Rechtsberatung: Dienstleistung, F\u00fcrsorge und kollektive Selbsthilfe"}, {"editor": "in: Blankenburg, Erhard; Klausa, Ekkehard und Hubert Rottleuthner (.)", "container-title": "Alternative Rechtsformen und Alternativen zum Recht"}]}
+{"in": "Sarat, Austin, 1976: Alternatives in Dispute Processing in a Small Claim Court, in: Law and Society Review, vol. 10, pp. 339\u2014375.", "out": [{"author": "Sarat", "date": "1976", "title": "Alternatives in Dispute Processing in a Small Claim Court", "journal": "Law and Society Review"}]}
+{"in": "Sch\u00f6nholz, Siegfried, 1980: Arbeitsplatzsicherung oder Kompensation - Rechtliche Formen des Bestandsschutzes im Vergleich in: Vereinigung f\u00fcr Rechtssoziologie (Hrsg.): Arbeitslosigkeit und Recht. Baden-Baden.", "out": [{"author": "Sch\u00f6nholz, Siegfried", "date": "1980", "title": "Arbeitsplatzsicherung oder Kompensation - Rechtliche Formen des Bestandsschutzes im Vergleich"}, {"editor": "in: Vereinigung f\u00fcr Rechtssoziologie (.)", "container-title": "Arbeitslosigkeit und Recht"}]}
+{"in": "Steinbach, E., 1979: GMD-Bericht, Manuskript. Gesellschaft f\u00fcr Mathematik und Datenverarbeitung. Birlinghoven bei Bonn.", "out": [{"author": "Steinbach, E", "date": "1979", "title": "GMD-Bericht, Manuskript. Gesellschaft f\u00fcr Mathematik und Datenverarbeitung"}]}
+{"in": "Wanner, Craig, 1975: The Public Ordering of Private Cases; Winning Civil Court Cases, in: Law and Society Review, vol. 9, pp. 293-306.", "out": [{"author": "Wanner, Craig", "date": "1975", "title": "The Public Ordering of Private Cases; Winning Civil Court Cases", "journal": "Law and Society Review"}]}
diff --git a/convert-anystyle-data/out/10.1515_zfrs-1980-0104.jsonl b/convert-anystyle-data/out/10.1515_zfrs-1980-0104.jsonl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..6f71b737078479d47ef129ed320144c5237728a7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/convert-anystyle-data/out/10.1515_zfrs-1980-0104.jsonl
@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
+{"in": "Abgek\u00fcrzt werden zitiert: Armer/Grimshaw (Hrsg.), Comparative Social ResearchMethodological Problems and Strategies (New York, London, Sydney, Tokio 1973); Drobnig/ Rebbinder (Hrsg.), Rechtssoziologie und Rechtsvergleichung (1977); Rokkan (Hrsg.), Compa rative Research Across Cultures and Nations (Paris, Den Haag 1968); Rokkan/Verba/Viet/ Almasy (Hrsg.), Comparative Sutvey Analysis (Den Haag, Paris 1969); Smelser, Comparative Methods in the Social Sciences (Englewood Cliffs, N. J. 1976) ; Szalai/Petrella (Hrsg.), Cross National Comparative Survey Research (Oxford, New York, Toronto, Sydney, Paris, Frank furt 1977); Vallier (Hrsg.), Comparative Methods in Sociology (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London 1971); Zweigert/K\u00f6tz. Einf\u00fchrung in die Rechtsvergleichung Bd. I (1971).", "out": [{"editor": "Armer/Grimshaw (.)", "title": "Comparative Social ResearchMethodological Problems and Strategies", "date": "1973"}, {"editor": "Drobnig/ Rebbinder (.)", "title": "Rechtssoziologie und Rechtsvergleichung", "date": "1977"}, {"editor": "Rokkan (.)", "title": "Compa rative Research Across Cultures and Nations", "date": "1968"}, {"editor": "Rokkan/Verba/Viet/ Almasy (.)", "title": "Comparative Sutvey Analysis", "date": "1969"}, {"author": "Smelser,", "title": "Comparative Methods in the Social Sciences"}, {"author": "Englewood Cliffs, N. J", "date": "1976"}, {"editor": "Szalai/Petrella (.)", "title": "Cross National Comparative Survey Research", "date": "1977"}, {"editor": "Vallier (.)", "title": "Comparative Methods in Sociology", "date": "1971"}, {"author": "Zweigert/K\u00f6tz", "title": "Einf\u00fchrung in die Rechtsvergleichung", "date": "1971"}]}
+{"in": "1 Siehe n\u00e4her Zweigert/K\u00f6tz I 12 ff.", "out": [{"citation-number": "1", "author": "Zweigert/K\u00f6tz"}]}
+{"in": "2 Rabel, Aufgabe und Notwendigkeit der Rechtsvergleichung (1925), abgedruckt in: Rabel, Gesammelte Aufs\u00e4tze III (Hrsg. Leser, 1967) 1 (3).", "out": [{"citation-number": "2", "author": "Rabel", "title": "Aufgabe und Notwendigkeit der Rechtsvergleichung", "date": "1925"}, {"citation-number": "2", "author": "Rabel", "title": "Gesammelte Aufs\u00e4tze", "editor": "Leser", "date": "1967"}]}
+{"in": "3 Siehe insbes. die Beitr\u00e4ge in Drobnig/Rehbinder.", "out": [{"citation-number": "3", "author": "Drobnig/Rehbinder"}]}
+{"in": "4 Dazu R. Abel, Law Books and Books About Law, Stanford Law Rev. 26 (1973) 174 ff.; Benda-Beckmann, Einige Anmerkungen \u00fcber die Beziehung zwischen Rechtssoziologie und Rechtsvergleichung, ZvglRW 78 (1979) 51 ff.", "out": [{"citation-number": "4", "author": "R. Abel", "title": "Law Books and Books About Law", "journal": "Stanford Law Rev", "date": "1973"}, {"citation-number": "4", "author": "Benda-Beckmann", "title": "Einige Anmerkungen \u00fcber die Beziehung zwischen Rechtssoziologie und Rechtsvergleichung", "journal": "ZvglRW", "date": "1979"}]}
+{"in": "5 Carbonnier, L\u2019apport du droit compare \u00e4 la sociologie juridique, in: Livre du centenaire de la Societe de legislation comparee (Paris 1969) 75 (83).", "out": [{"citation-number": "5", "author": "Carbonnier", "title": "L\u2019apport du droit compare \u00e4 la sociologie juridique", "container-title": "Livre du centenaire de la Societe de legislation comparee", "date": "1969"}]}
+{"in": "6 Carbonnier (vorige N.) a.a.O.", "out": [{"citation-number": "6", "author": "Carbonnier", "backref": "vorige N.) a.a.O"}]}
+{"in": "7 Nowak, The Strategy of Cross-National Survey Research for the Development of Social Theory, in: Szalai/Petrella 3 (9 ff.): Rose, Interkulturelle Forschung in der Rechtssoziologie, in: Drobnig/Rehbinder 171 ff.", "out": [{"citation-number": "7", "author": "Nowak", "title": "The Strategy of Cross-National Survey Research for the Development of Social Theory", "editor": "in: Szalai/Petrella"}, {"citation-number": "7", "author": "Rose", "title": "Interkulturelle Forschung in der Rechtssoziologie", "editor": "in: Drobnig/Rehbinder"}]}
+{"in": "8 Dazu n\u00e4her Wirsing, Probleme des interkulturellen Vergleichs in der Ethnologie, Sociologus 25 (1975) 97 ff. - Vgl. auch Poirier, Situation actuelle et Programme de travail de Techno logie juridique, Rev. int. Sc. Soc. 22 (1970) 509 (526).", "out": [{"citation-number": "8", "author": "Wirsing", "title": "Probleme des interkulturellen Vergleichs in der Ethnologie", "journal": "Sociologus", "date": "1975"}, {"citation-number": "8", "author": "Poirier", "title": "Situation actuelle et Programme de travail de Techno logie juridique", "journal": "Rev. int. Sc. Soc", "date": "1970"}]}
+{"in": "9 Macaulay, Elegant Models, Empirical Pictures, and the Complexities of Contract, Law & Soc. Rev. 11 (1977) 507 ff.", "out": [{"citation-number": "9", "author": "Macaulay", "title": "Elegant Models, Empirical Pictures, and the Complexities of Contract", "journal": "Law & Soc. Rev", "date": "1977"}]}
+{"in": "10 Rose (oben N. 7) 175.", "out": [{"citation-number": "10", "author": "Rose", "backref": "oben N. 7)"}]}
+{"in": "11 Dazu Grimshau, Comparative Sociology - In What Ways Different From Other Sociologies?, in: Armer/Grimshaw 3 (18). Auch der Oberbegriff \u201ecross System comparison\" wird vorgeschlagen, Tomasson, Introduction; Comparative Sociology \u2014 The State of the Art, in: Tomasson (Hrsg.), Comparative Studies in Sociology Vol. 1 (Greenwich, Conn. 1978) 1. \u2014 \u00dcber die Methoden interkultureller und internationaler Vergleiche ist inzwischen so viel geschrieben worden, da\u00df nicht nur die F\u00fclle des Materials schon wieder abschreckend wirkt, sondern da\u00df es auch gen\u00fcgt, im Rahmen dieses Aufsatzes nur einige wichtige Aspekte anzusprechen. Bibliographien finden sich etwa bei Rokkan/Verba/Viet/Almasy 117 ff.; Vallier 423 ff.; Almasy/Balandier/Delatte, Comparative Survey Analysis \u2014 An Annotated Bibliography 1967 \u2014 1973 (Beverly Hills, London 1976) sowie bei Marsh, Comparative Sociology (New York, Chicago, San Francisco, Atlanta 1967) 375 ff.", "out": [{"citation-number": "11", "author": "Grimshau", "title": "Comparative Sociology - In What Ways Different From Other Sociologies", "editor": "in: Armer/Grimshaw"}, {"citation-number": "11", "author": "Tomasson", "title": "Introduction; Comparative Sociology \u2014 The State of the Art", "editor": "in: Tomasson (.)", "container-title": "Comparative Studies in Sociology", "date": "1978"}, {"citation-number": "11", "author": "Rokkan/Verba/Viet/Almasy"}, {"citation-number": "11", "author": "Vallier"}, {"citation-number": "11", "author": "Almasy/Balandier/Delatte", "title": "Comparative Survey Analysis \u2014 An Annotated Bibliography 1967 \u2014 1973", "date": "1976"}, {"citation-number": "11", "author": "Marsh", "title": "Comparative Sociology", "date": "1967"}]}
+{"in": "12 Durkheim, Les r\u00e8gles de la methode sociologique (PUF, Paris 1977) 137.", "out": [{"citation-number": "12", "author": "Durkheim", "title": "Les r\u00e8gles de la methode sociologique", "date": "1977"}]}
+{"in": "13 Smelser 2 f. ; Payne, Comparative Sociology \u2014 Some Problems of Theory and Method, Brit. J. Soc. 24 (1973) 13 (15 ff.). - \u00c4hnlich auch Eisenstadt, Social Institutions - Comparative Method, in: International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences Bd. 14 (London 1968) 421 (423).", "out": [{"citation-number": "13", "author": "Smelser"}, {"citation-number": "13", "author": "Payne", "title": "Comparative Sociology \u2014 Some Problems of Theory and Method", "journal": "Brit. J. Soc", "date": "1973"}, {"citation-number": "13", "author": "Eisenstadt", "title": "Social Institutions - Comparative Method", "journal": "International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences", "date": "1968"}]}
+{"in": "14 Boesch/Eckensberger, Methodische Probleme des interkulturellen Vergleichs, in: Graumann (Hrsg.), Handbuch der Psychologie, Bd. Vll 1 (2. Auf], 1969) 514 (520 ff.). \u2014 Zur \u201ecultunit\u201c, die vor allem durch die gemeinsame Sprache und die Zugeh\u00f6rigkeit zu einem Staat bzw. einer interpersonellen Kontaktgruppe gekennzeichnet ist, s. Naroll/Cohen (Hrsg.), A Handbook of Method in Cultural Anthropology (New York, London 1973) sowie Smelser 168 f.; Wirsing (oben N. 8) 115.", "out": [{"citation-number": "14", "author": "Boesch/Eckensberger", "title": "Methodische Probleme des interkulturellen Vergleichs", "editor": "in: Graumann (.)", "container-title": "Handbuch der Psychologie", "date": "1969"}, {"citation-number": "14", "editor": "Naroll/Cohen (.)", "title": "A Handbook of Method in Cultural Anthropology", "date": "1973"}, {"citation-number": "14", "author": "Smelser"}, {"citation-number": "14", "author": "Wirsing", "backref": "oben N. 8)"}]}
+{"in": "15 N\u00e4her dazu Zelditch, Intelligible Comparisons, in: Vallier 267 (270 ff.).", "out": [{"citation-number": "15", "author": "Zelditch", "title": "Intelligible Comparisons", "editor": "in: Vallier"}]}
+{"in": "16 Carbonnier (oben N. 5) 80.", "out": [{"citation-number": "16", "author": "Carbonnier", "backref": "oben N. 5)"}]}
+{"in": "17 Siehe Zweigert, Die soziologische Dimension der Rechtsvergleichung, in: Drobnig/Rebbinder 151 (159).", "out": [{"citation-number": "17", "author": "Zweigert", "title": "Die soziologische Dimension der Rechtsvergleichung", "editor": "in: Drobnig/Rebbinder"}]}
+{"in": "18 Zu entsprechenden Versuchen etwa Merryman, Comparative Law and Scientific Explanation, in: Law in the United States of America in Social and Technological Revolution (Br\u00fcssel 1974) 81 (89 ff.).", "out": [{"citation-number": "18", "author": "Merryman", "title": "Comparative Law and Scientific Explanation", "container-title": "Law in the United States of America in Social and Technological Revolution", "date": "1974"}]}
+{"in": "19 Beispiel von Carbonnier, Sociologie juridique (Paris 1972) 188 N. 1.", "out": [{"citation-number": "19", "author": "Carbonnier", "title": "Sociologie juridique", "date": "1972"}]}
+{"in": "20 Dazu Heidrich, H\u00f6chstrichterliche Rechtsprechung als Triebfehier sozialen Wandels, Jahr buch f\u00fcr Rechtssoziologie und Rechtstheorie 3 (1972) 305 (330 ff.).", "out": [{"citation-number": "20", "author": "Heidrich", "title": "H\u00f6chstrichterliche Rechtsprechung als Triebfehier sozialen Wandels", "date": "1972"}]}
+{"in": "21 Insbesondere Zweigert (oben N. 17) 157 ff.", "out": [{"citation-number": "21", "author": "Zweigert", "backref": "oben N. 17)"}]}
+{"in": "22 Kaiser, Strafrecht und vergleichende Kriminologie, in: Kaiser/Vogler (Hrsg.), Strafrecht, Straf rechtsvergleichung (1975) 79 ff. \u2014 Siehe auch Villmow/Albrecht, Die Vergleichung als Methode der Strafrechtswissenschaft und der Kriminologie, MschrKrim. 62 (1979) 163 ff.", "out": [{"citation-number": "22", "author": "Kaiser", "title": "Strafrecht und vergleichende Kriminologie", "editor": "in: Kaiser/Vogler (.)", "container-title": "Strafrecht, Straf rechtsvergleichung", "date": "1975"}, {"citation-number": "22", "author": "Villmow/Albrecht", "title": "Die Vergleichung als Methode der Strafrechtswissenschaft und der Kriminologie", "journal": "MschrKrim", "date": "1979"}]}
+{"in": "23 So etwa K. H. Neumayer, Ziele und Methoden der Rechtsvergleichung, in: Recueil des travaux suisses pr\u00e9sent\u00e9s au IXe Congr\u00e8s international de droit compare (1976) 45 (48).", "out": [{"citation-number": "23", "author": "K. H. Neumayer", "title": "Ziele und Methoden der Rechtsvergleichung", "container-title": "Recueil des travaux suisses pr\u00e9sent\u00e9s au IXe Congr\u00e8s international de droit compare", "date": "1976"}]}
+{"in": "24 Zur Abgrenzung n\u00e4her Rehbinder, Erkenntnistheoretisches zum Verh\u00e4ltnis von Rechtssoziologie und Rechtsvergleichung, in: Drobnig/Rehbinder 56 ff.", "out": [{"citation-number": "24", "author": "Rehbinder", "title": "Erkenntnistheoretisches zum Verh\u00e4ltnis von Rechtssoziologie und Rechtsvergleichung", "editor": "in: Drobnig/Rehbinder"}]}
+{"in": "25 N\u00e4her dazu Merryman (oben N. 18) 101 ff.", "out": [{"citation-number": "25", "author": "Merryman", "backref": "oben N. 18)"}]}
+{"in": "26 Heidrich, Sozialwissenschaftliche Aspekte der Rechtsvergleichung, in: Drobnig/Rehbinder 178 (186 ff.).", "out": [{"citation-number": "26", "author": "Heidrich", "title": "Sozialwissenschaftliche Aspekte der Rechtsvergleichung", "editor": "in: Drobnig/Rehbinder"}]}
+{"in": "27 Siehe etwa die Erkl\u00e4rung, warum das \u201eAccess to justice movement\" in der Bundesrepublik vergleichsweise wenig Widerhall gefunden hat von Blankenburg, Patterns of Legal Culture as a Variable for the Chances of Legal Innovation, in: Blankenburg (Hrsg.), innovations in the Legal Services (Cambridge, Mass.; Meisenheim 1980).", "out": [{"citation-number": "27", "author": "Blankenburg", "title": "Patterns of Legal Culture as a Variable for the Chances of Legal Innovation", "editor": "in: Blankenburg (.)", "container-title": "innovations in the Legal Services", "date": "1980"}]}
+{"in": "28 So Rehbinder (oben N. 24) 60.", "out": [{"citation-number": "28", "author": "Rehbinder", "backref": "oben N. 24)"}]}
+{"in": "29 Dazu R. Abel, Comparative Law and Social Theory, Am. J. Comp. L. 26 (1978) 219 (224 ff.).", "out": [{"citation-number": "29", "author": "R. Abel", "title": "Comparative Law and Social Theory", "date": "1978"}]}
+{"in": "30 Dazu etwa Smelser 175 f. \u2014 F\u00fcr die Kriminologie siehe Kaiser (oben N. 22) 89 sowie Blazicek/Janeksela, Some Comments on Comparative Methodologies in Criminal Justice, Int. J. Crim. Pen 6 (1978) 233 (240). Als besonders gef\u00e4hrlich hat sich die unkritische \u00dcbertragung solcher Konzepte auf L\u00e4nder der Dritten Welt erwiesen. So kam man etwa zu dem Ergebnis: \u201eThe U. S. law and development movement was largely a parochial expression of the American legal style\u201c, Merryman, Comparative Law and Social Change - On the Origins, Style, Decline and Revival of the Law and Development Movement, Am. J. Comp. L. 25 (1977) 457 (479).", "out": [{"citation-number": "30", "author": "Smelser"}, {"citation-number": "30", "author": "Kaiser", "backref": "oben N. 22)"}, {"citation-number": "30", "author": "Blazicek/Janeksela", "title": "Some Comments on Comparative Methodologies in Criminal Justice", "journal": "Int. J. Crim. Pen", "date": "1978"}, {"citation-number": "30", "author": "Merryman", "title": "Comparative Law and Social Change - On the Origins, Style, Decline and Revival of the Law and Development Movement", "journal": "Am. J. Comp. L", "date": "1977"}]}
+{"in": "31 Payne (oben N. 13) 15, 25 f.", "out": [{"citation-number": "31", "author": "Payne", "backref": "oben N. 13)"}]}
+{"in": "32 D\u00e4ubler, Systemvergleich im Arbeitsrecht? Vor\u00fcberlegungen zu einigen Methodenfragen, Demokratie und Recht 1979 /1 S. 23 (31 ff.). - Zum Vergleich mit den sozialistischen L\u00e4ndern siehe auch Zweigert/Puttfarken, Zur Vergleichbarkeit analoger Rechtsinstitute in verschiede nen Gesellschaftsordnungen, in: Zweigert/Puttfarken (Hrsg.), Rechtsvergleichung (1978) 395 (402 ff.).", "out": [{"citation-number": "32", "author": "D\u00e4ubler", "title": "Systemvergleich im Arbeitsrecht? Vor\u00fcberlegungen zu einigen Methodenfragen", "journal": "Demokratie und Recht", "date": "1979"}, {"citation-number": "32", "author": "Zweigert/Puttfarken", "title": "Zur Vergleichbarkeit analoger Rechtsinstitute in verschiede nen Gesellschaftsordnungen", "editor": "in: Zweigert/Puttfarken (.)", "container-title": "Rechtsvergleichung", "date": "1978"}]}
+{"in": "33 Blankenburg, Task Contingencies and National Administrative Culture as Determinants for Labour Market Administration (HM discussion papers 1978 \u201423) 5 ff.", "out": [{"citation-number": "33", "author": "Blankenburg", "title": "Task Contingencies and National Administrative Culture as Determinants for Labour Market Administration", "journal": "HM discussion papers", "date": "1978"}]}
+{"in": "34 Zweigert/K\u00f6tz I 30 f.", "out": [{"citation-number": "34", "author": "Zweigert/K\u00f6tz"}]}
+{"in": "35 Dazu etwa Armer, Methodology Problems and Possibilities in Comparative Research, in: Armer/Grimsbaw 49 (50 ff.); Smelser 182 f.; Trommsdorf, M\u00f6glichkeiten und Probleme des Kulturvergleichs am Beispiel einer Agressionsstudie, KZfSS 30 (1978) 361 (364 ff.).", "out": [{"citation-number": "35", "author": "Armer", "title": "Methodology Problems and Possibilities in Comparative Research", "editor": "in: Armer/Grimsbaw"}, {"citation-number": "35", "author": "Smelser"}, {"citation-number": "35", "author": "Trommsdorf", "title": "M\u00f6glichkeiten und Probleme des Kulturvergleichs am Beispiel einer Agressionsstudie", "journal": "KZfSS", "date": "1978"}]}
+{"in": "36 Wenn die Strenge elterlicher Strafen gemessen werden soll, kann man etwa darauf ausweichen, welche Strafe die Kinder am meisten f\u00fcrchten, siehe Malewswka/Peyre, Juvenile Deliquency and Development, in: Szalai/Petrella 131 (157 f.).", "out": [{"citation-number": "36", "author": "Malewswka/Peyre", "title": "Juvenile Deliquency and Development", "editor": "in: Szalai/Petrella"}]}
+{"in": "37 N\u00e4her Scheuch, The Cross-Cultural Use of Sample Surveys \u2014 Problems of Comparability, in: Rokkan 176 (185); Biervert, Der internationale Vergleich, in: van Koolwiyk/Wieken-Mayser (Hrsg.), Techniken empirischer Sozialforschung, Bd. 2 (1975) 113 (124 ff.).", "out": [{"citation-number": "37", "author": "Scheuch", "title": "The Cross-Cultural Use of Sample Surveys \u2014 Problems of Comparability", "editor": "in: Rokkan"}, {"citation-number": "37", "author": "Biervert", "title": "Der internationale Vergleich", "editor": "in: van Koolwiyk/Wieken-Mayser (.)", "container-title": "Techniken empirischer Sozialforschung", "date": "1975"}]}
+{"in": "38 Verba, The Uses of Survey Research in the Study of Comparative Politics \u2014 Issues and Strategies, in: Rokkan/Verba/Viet/Almasy 56 (80).", "out": [{"citation-number": "38", "author": "Verba", "title": "The Uses of Survey Research in the Study of Comparative Politics \u2014 Issues and Strategies", "editor": "in: Rokkan/Verba/Viet/Almasy"}]}
+{"in": "39 Gessner, Soziologische \u00dcberlegungen zu einer Theorie der angewandten Rechtsvergleichung, in: Drobnig/Rehbinder 123 (134 ff.).", "out": [{"citation-number": "39", "author": "Gessner", "title": "Soziologische \u00dcberlegungen zu einer Theorie der angewandten Rechtsvergleichung", "editor": "in: Drobnig/Rehbinder"}]}
+{"in": "40 Nowak (oben N. 7) 42.", "out": [{"citation-number": "40", "author": "Nowak", "backref": "oben N. 7)"}]}
+{"in": "41 F\u00fcr die Bedeutung der funktionalen \u00c4quivalenz beruft man sich h\u00e4ufig auf Merton , der sie am Beispiel der Religion n\u00e4her erl\u00e4utert hat (Social Theory and Social Structure, New York, London, erweiterte Aufl. 1968, S. 82 ff.): Eine gemeinsame Religion erf\u00fcllt im allgemeinen data\". OECD, The OECD Social Indicator Development Programme - 1976 Progress Report on Phase II (Paris 1977) 40.", "out": [{"citation-number": "41", "author": "Merton", "title": "Social Theory and Social Structure", "date": "1968"}, {"citation-number": "41", "author": "OECD", "title": "The OECD Social Indicator Development Programme - 1976 Progress Report on Phase II", "date": "1977"}]}
+{"in": "43 Rheinstein, Marriage Stability, Divorce, and the Law (Chicago 1972).", "out": [{"citation-number": "43", "author": "Rheinstein", "title": "Marriage Stability, Divorce, and the Law", "date": "1972"}]}
+{"in": "44 Abel (oben N. 4) 194 ff., 221 f. - Siehe auch Wilpert, Die Messung von Mitbestimmungsnormen \u2014 Darstellung eines international vergleichenden Forschungsansatzes (HM-Paper 1979\u2014 13) 2 ff. - Zur Behandlung der \u201eKultur\" in vergleichenden Untersuchungen n\u00e4her Scheuch (oben N. 37) 197 ff.", "out": [{"citation-number": "44", "author": "Abel", "backref": "oben N. 4)"}, {"citation-number": "44", "author": "HM-Paper", "title": "Die Messung von Mitbestimmungsnormen \u2014 Darstellung eines international vergleichenden Forschungsansatzes", "date": "1979"}, {"citation-number": "44", "author": "Scheuch", "backref": "oben N. 37)"}]}
+{"in": "45 Abel (oben N. 4) 207 ff. \u2014 Siehe auch Constantinesco, Ideologie als determinierendes Ele ment zur Bildung der Rechtskreise, Zeitschrift f\u00fcr Rechtsvergleichung 19 (1978) 161 ff.", "out": [{"citation-number": "45", "author": "Abel", "backref": "oben N. 4)"}, {"citation-number": "45", "author": "Constantinesco", "title": "Ideologie als determinierendes Ele ment zur Bildung der Rechtskreise", "journal": "Zeitschrift f\u00fcr Rechtsvergleichung", "date": "1978"}]}
+{"in": "46 Siehe Blankenburg (oben N. 33) 3 ff.", "out": [{"citation-number": "46", "author": "Blankenburg", "backref": "oben N. 33)"}]}
+{"in": "47 Rose (oben N. 7) 176.", "out": [{"citation-number": "47", "author": "Rose", "backref": "oben N. 7)"}]}
+{"in": "48 Dazu etwa Benda-Beckmann (oben N. 4) 55 ff.; Constantinesco, \u00dcber den Stil der \u201eStilthe orie\" in der Rechtsvergleichung, ZvglRW 78 (1979) 154 ff. mwNachw. \u2014 Eine vergleichbare Debatte \u00fcber \u201e\u00e4hnliche\u201c und \u201eun\u00e4hnliche Gesellschaften\u201c wird seit D\u00fcrkheim auch in der Soziologie gef\u00fchrt. Siehe Payne (oben N. 13) 16 ff.", "out": [{"citation-number": "48", "author": "Benda-Beckmann", "backref": "oben N. 4)"}, {"citation-number": "48", "author": "Constantinesco", "title": "\u00dcber den Stil der \u201eStilthe orie\" in der Rechtsvergleichung", "journal": "ZvglRW", "date": "1979"}, {"citation-number": "48", "author": "Payne", "backref": "oben N. 13)"}]}
+{"in": "49 Siehe Zweigert/K\u00f6tz I 70.", "out": [{"citation-number": "49", "author": "Zweigert/K\u00f6tz"}]}
+{"in": "50 Hofstede, Cultural Determinants of the Exercise of Power in a Hierarchy (Mimeographed, European Institute for Advanced Studies in Management Working Paper 1977 -8). Ebenso f\u00fcr das Arbeitsrecht D\u00e4ubler (oben N. 32) 33, der auch die skandinavischen L\u00e4nder in diese Gruppe aufnimmt.", "out": [{"citation-number": "50", "author": "Hofstede", "title": "Cultural Determinants of the Exercise of Power in a Hierarchy", "container-title": "European Institute for Advanced Studies in Management Working Paper", "date": "1977"}, {"citation-number": "50", "author": "D\u00e4ubler", "backref": "oben N. 32)"}]}
+{"in": "51 Dazu Zweigert/K\u00f6tz 1 110 f. \u2014 Kritisch Benda-Beckmann (oben N. 4) 58 ff.", "out": [{"citation-number": "51", "author": "Zweigert/K\u00f6tz"}, {"citation-number": "51", "author": "Benda-Beckmann", "backref": "oben N. 4)"}]}
+{"in": "52 IDE-International Research Group, Industrial Democracy in Europe (erscheint bei Oxford University Press, London 1980) Chapter VIII.", "out": [{"citation-number": "52", "author": "IDE-International Research Group", "title": "Industrial Democracy in Europe", "date": "1980"}]}
+{"in": "53 Zweigert/K\u00f6tz I 78.", "out": [{"citation-number": "53", "author": "Zweigert/K\u00f6tz"}]}
+{"in": "54 IDE-International Research Group (oben N. 52) Chapter VIII.", "out": [{"citation-number": "54", "author": "IDE-International Research Group", "backref": "oben N. 52)"}]}
+{"in": "55 Daf\u00fcr D\u00e4ubler (oben N. 32) 33. Rechtsvergleicbung und vergleichende Recbtssoxiologie 79", "out": [{"citation-number": "55", "author": "D\u00e4ubler", "backref": "oben N. 32)"}]}
+{"in": "56 Siehe dazu Rheinstein, Die Rechtshonoratioren und ihr Einflu\u00df auf Charakter und Funk tion der Rechtsordnungen, RabelsZ 34 (1970) 1 ff.; Bernstein, Rechtsstile und Rechtshono ratioren. Ein Beitrag zur Methode der Rechtsvergleichung, RabelsZ 34 (1970) 443 ff.", "out": [{"citation-number": "56", "author": "Rheinstein", "title": "Die Rechtshonoratioren und ihr Einflu\u00df auf Charakter und Funk tion der Rechtsordnungen", "journal": "RabelsZ", "date": "1970"}, {"citation-number": "56", "author": "Bernstein", "title": "Rechtsstile und Rechtshono ratioren. Ein Beitrag zur Methode der Rechtsvergleichung", "journal": "RabelsZ", "date": "1970"}]}
+{"in": "57 Dazu etwa Ruescbemeyer, Lawyers and their Societies -- A Comparative Analysis of the Legal Profession in Germany and the United States (Cambridge, Mass. 1973); ders., The Legal Profession in Comparative Perspective, in: H. M. Johnson, Social System and Legal Process (San Francisco, Washington, London 1978) 97 ff.", "out": [{"citation-number": "57", "author": "Ruescbemeyer", "title": "Lawyers and their Societies -- A Comparative Analysis of the Legal Profession in Germany and the United States", "date": "1973"}, {"citation-number": "57", "author": "ders", "title": "The Legal Profession in Comparative Perspective", "editor": "in: H. M. Johnson", "container-title": "Social System and Legal Process", "date": "1978"}]}
+{"in": "58 Klausa, Politische Inhaltsanalyse von Rechtslehrertexten, ZfS 8 (1979) 362 ff.", "out": [{"citation-number": "58", "author": "Klausa", "title": "Politische Inhaltsanalyse von Rechtslehrertexten", "journal": "ZfS", "date": "1979"}]}
+{"in": "59 Siehe Nowak (oben N. 7) 23 ff.; Smelser 167 ff.", "out": [{"citation-number": "59", "author": "Nowak", "backref": "oben N. 7)"}, {"citation-number": "59", "author": "Smelser"}]}
+{"in": "60 Dazu n\u00e4her Teune, Analysis and Interpretation in Cross-National Survey Research, in: Szalai/Petrella 95 (101) ff.", "out": [{"citation-number": "60", "author": "Teune", "title": "Analysis and Interpretation in Cross-National Survey Research", "editor": "in: Szalai/Petrella"}]}
+{"in": "61 Siehe dazu Nader/Todd, The Disputing Process \u2014 Law in Ten Societies (New York 1978).", "out": [{"citation-number": "61", "author": "Nader/Todd", "title": "The Disputing Process \u2014 Law in Ten Societies", "date": "1978"}]}
+{"in": "62 Siehe zum entsprechenden Problem in der Kriminologie Kaiser ( oben N. 22) 88 mwNachw. ; Blazicek/Janeksela (oben N. 30) 235 f., 242.", "out": [{"citation-number": "62", "title": "Problem in der Kriminologie", "author": "Kaiser", "backref": "oben N. 22)"}, {"citation-number": "62", "author": "Blazicek/Janeksela", "backref": "oben N. 30)"}]}
+{"in": "63 Clinard, Comparative Crime Victimization Surveys \u2014 Some Problems and Results, Int. J. Crim, and Pen. 6 (1978) 221 ff.", "out": [{"citation-number": "63", "author": "Clinard", "title": "Comparative Crime Victimization Surveys \u2014 Some Problems and Results", "journal": "Int. J. Crim, and Pen", "date": "1978"}]}
+{"in": "64 Siehe Abel-Smith/Zander/Brooke, Legal Problems and the Citizen (London 1973); Rokumoto, Legal Problems and the Use of Law in Tokio and London - A Preliminary Study in International Comparison, ZfS 7 (1978) 228 ff.; Schuyt/Groenendijk/Sloot, Rechtspro bleme oder private Schwierigkeiten \u2014 Die Inanspruchnahme von Rechtshilfe in den Nieder landen, in: Jahrbuch f\u00fcr Rechtssoziologie und Rechtstheorie 5 (1978) 109 ff. Rechtsvergleichung und vergleichende Rechtssoziologie 81", "out": [{"citation-number": "64", "author": "Abel-Smith/Zander/Brooke", "title": "Legal Problems and the Citizen", "date": "1973"}, {"citation-number": "64", "author": "Rokumoto", "title": "Legal Problems and the Use of Law in Tokio and London - A Preliminary Study in International Comparison", "journal": "ZfS", "date": "1978"}, {"citation-number": "64", "author": "Schuyt/Groenendijk/Sloot", "title": "Rechtspro bleme oder private Schwierigkeiten \u2014 Die Inanspruchnahme von Rechtshilfe in den Nieder landen", "journal": "Jahrbuch f\u00fcr Rechtssoziologie und Rechtstheorie", "date": "1978"}]}
+{"in": "65 Dazu Podgdrecki, Comparative Studies on the Attitudes Towards Various Legal Systems, Polish Sociological Bulletin 21 No. 1 (1970) 83 (88 ff.). \u2014 Siehe auch Ziegen, Zur Effek tivit\u00e4t der Rechtssoziologie: die Rekonstruktion der Gesellschaft durch Recht (1975) 196 ff.", "out": [{"citation-number": "65", "author": "Podgdrecki", "title": "Comparative Studies on the Attitudes Towards Various Legal Systems", "journal": "Polish Sociological Bulletin", "date": "1970"}, {"citation-number": "65", "author": "Ziegen,", "title": "Zur Effek tivit\u00e4t der Rechtssoziologie: die Rekonstruktion der Gesellschaft durch Recht", "date": "1975"}]}
+{"in": "66 Siehe Podgdrecki, Legal Consciousness as a Research Problem, European Yearbook in Law and Sociology 1977 (Den Haag 1977) 85 (88 ff.).", "out": [{"citation-number": "66", "author": "Podgdrecki", "title": "Legal Consciousness as a Research Problem", "journal": "European Yearbook in Law and Sociology 1977", "date": "1977"}]}
+{"in": "67 Kutchinsky, \u201eThe Legal Consciousness\u201c: A Survey of Research on Knowledge and Opinion about Law, in: Podgdrecki/Kaupen/van Houtte/Vinke/Kutchinsky, Knowledge and Opinion about Law (Bristol 1973) 101 (126).", "out": [{"citation-number": "67", "author": "Kutchinsky", "title": "The Legal Consciousness\u201c: A Survey of Research on Knowledge and Opinion about Law", "editor": "in: Podgdrecki/Kaupen/van Houtte/Vinke/Kutchinsky", "container-title": "Knowledge and Opinion about Law", "date": "1973"}]}
+{"in": "68 Podgdrecki, Public Opinion on Law, in: Knowledge and Opinion about Law (vorige N.) 65 (84 ff.).", "out": [{"citation-number": "68", "author": "Podgdrecki", "title": "Public Opinion on Law", "container-title": "Knowledge and Opinion about Law", "backref": "vorige N.)"}]}
+{"in": "69 Heintz, Interkultureller Vergleich, in: K\u00f6nig (Hrsg.), Handbuch der empirischen Sozialfor schung, Bd. 4 (3. Aufl. 1974) 405 (414 f.).", "out": [{"citation-number": "69", "author": "Heintz", "title": "Interkultureller Vergleich", "editor": "in: K\u00f6nig (.)", "container-title": "Handbuch der empirischen Sozialfor schung", "date": "1974"}]}
+{"in": "70 Siehe Hegenbarth, \u00dcber methodische und organisatorische Grenzen der empirischen Rechts forschung in Entwicklungsl\u00e4ndern, Informationsbrief f\u00fcr Rechtssoziologie April 1979, Son derheft 2, S. 5 ff. mwNachw.", "out": [{"citation-number": "70", "author": "Hegenbarth", "title": "\u00dcber methodische und organisatorische Grenzen der empirischen Rechts forschung in Entwicklungsl\u00e4ndern", "journal": "Informationsbrief f\u00fcr Rechtssoziologie", "date": "1979"}]}
+{"in": "71 Siehe etwa Gessner, Recht und Konflikt \u2014 Eine soziologische Untersuchungprivatrechtlicher Konflikte in Mexiko (1976) 37 ff.", "out": [{"citation-number": "71", "author": "Gessner", "title": "Recht und Konflikt \u2014 Eine soziologische Untersuchungprivatrechtlicher Konflikte in Mexiko", "date": "1976"}]}
+{"in": "72 Vgl. Heintz (oben N. 69) 407.", "out": [{"citation-number": "72", "author": "Heintz", "backref": "oben N. 69)"}]}
+{"in": "73 Da die theoretischen und technischen Erfordernisse solcher Vergleiche in der Tat komplex sind, bestand in der Kriminologie noch Mitte der sechziger Jahre internationale \u00dcberein stimmung, da\u00df vergleichenden Studien kein Vorrang zu geben sei. Dazu Friday, Problems in Comparative Criminology, Int. J. Crim. 1 (1973) 151 (152).", "out": [{"citation-number": "73", "author": "Friday", "title": "Problems in Comparative Criminology", "journal": "Int. J. Crim", "date": "1973"}]}
+{"in": "74 Zur Anlage vergleichender Studien n\u00e4her Rokkan, Vergleichende Sozialwissenschaft (1972) 9 ff.; Szalai, The Organization and Execution of Cross-National Survey Research Projects, in: Szalai/Petrella 49 ff. sowie IDE-International Research Group (oben N. 52) Chapter I.", "out": [{"citation-number": "74", "author": "Rokkan", "title": "Vergleichende Sozialwissenschaft", "date": "1972"}, {"citation-number": "74", "author": "IDE-International Research Group", "title": "The Organization and Execution of Cross-National Survey Research Projects", "editor": "in: Szalai/Petrella", "backref": "oben N. 52)"}]}
+{"in": "75 Siehe Blegvad, Methodological Aspects of the Project \u201eLocal Legal Systems\u201c, in: Kulcs\u00e1r (Hrsg.), Sociology of Law and Legal Sciences (Budapest 1977) 97 (99 ff.).", "out": [{"citation-number": "75", "author": "Blegvad", "title": "Methodological Aspects of the Project \u201eLocal Legal Systems", "editor": "in: Kulcs\u00e1r (.)", "container-title": "Sociology of Law and Legal Sciences", "date": "1977"}]}
+{"in": "76 Dazu n\u00e4her Zweigert, Die kritische Wertung in der Rechtsvergleichung, Festschrift f\u00fcr Schmitthoff (1973) 403 ff.", "out": [{"citation-number": "76", "author": "Zweigert", "title": "Die kritische Wertung in der Rechtsvergleichung", "container-title": "Festschrift f\u00fcr Schmitthoff", "date": "1973"}]}
+{"in": "77 Siehe etwa zu vorliegenden franz\u00f6sischen Untersuchungen D\u00f6rner, Rechtstatsachenforschung und Gesetzgebung \u2014 Hinweise zur Entwicklung einer Gesetzgebungssoziologie in Frank reich, Interview und Analyse 1979, 377 ff.", "out": [{"citation-number": "77", "author": "D\u00f6rner", "title": "Rechtstatsachenforschung und Gesetzgebung \u2014 Hinweise zur Entwicklung einer Gesetzgebungssoziologie in Frank reich", "journal": "Interview und Analyse", "date": "1979"}]}
+{"in": "78 Siehe Bryde, Recht und Konflikt \u2014 Mexiko und Afrika, Verfassung und Recht in Obersee 12 (1979), 159 ff.", "out": [{"citation-number": "78", "author": "Siehe Bryde", "title": "Recht und Konflikt \u2014 Mexiko und Afrika", "journal": "Verfassung und Recht in Obersee", "date": "1979"}]}